## Day 1 – Monday 13\textsuperscript{th} April

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Pod</th>
<th>Riverside Room A</th>
<th>Riverside Room B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11.00-11.45</td>
<td>Registration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.45-12.00</td>
<td>Conference Opening</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.00-13.00</td>
<td>Keynote 1</td>
<td>(Chair: Ryall) Andrew Edgar - Power and Possession: What Sport Can Teach Political Philosophy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.00-14.00</td>
<td>Lunch (provided)</td>
<td>(Chair for sessions 1 – 3: Parry)</td>
<td>(Chair for sessions 1 – 3: Hardman) Camporesi – Hyperandrogenism as Unfair Advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.00-14.45</td>
<td>Session 1</td>
<td>Archer - On Sporting Integrity</td>
<td>Davis – Cheating Non-cheating and Gendered Vice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.45-15.30</td>
<td>Session 2</td>
<td>Nlandu – Concept of Fair Competition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.30-15.45</td>
<td>Refreshment break</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.45-16.30</td>
<td>Session 3</td>
<td>Kreft - Pyndaric Criticism and the Olympic Myth</td>
<td>Piacente – Epistemology in Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.30-18.00</td>
<td>EAPS AGM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.00-19.00</td>
<td>Drinks Reception and presentation of the student essay award</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Day 2 – Tuesday 14th April

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Pod</th>
<th>Riverside Room A</th>
<th>Riverside Room B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.30-10.15</td>
<td>Session 4</td>
<td>C Devine - Sex sport and voice</td>
<td>Bloodworth and Jones – Choosing Addiction and Disorder in Sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.15-11.00</td>
<td>Session 5</td>
<td>Edwards - Tackling the FA</td>
<td>Churchill – Exploitation and American College Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00-11.15</td>
<td>Refreshment break</td>
<td>(Chair for sessions 6 – 7: Edgar)</td>
<td>(Chair for sessions 6 – 7: Jones)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.15-12.00</td>
<td>Session 6</td>
<td>Scholl and Chabrak - Liverpool Case</td>
<td>Pike – Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory and Anti-Doping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.00-12.45</td>
<td>Session 7</td>
<td>Hardman and Elcombe - Conventionalism with a Pragmatic Twist</td>
<td>Burns - Towards an Understanding of Sportspersonship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.45-14.00</td>
<td>Lunch</td>
<td>(Chair for sessions 8 – 9: Camporesi)</td>
<td>(Chair for sessions 8 – 9: Kreft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.00-14.45</td>
<td>Session 8</td>
<td>Betrams et al – Doping Usage and Attitudes</td>
<td>Kosiewicz - Sport and Art: Differences and Theatrical Similarities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.30-16.30</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>BPSA AGM (with refreshments)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.00-21.00</td>
<td>Conference Dinner</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Brasserie)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Day 3 – Wednesday 15th April

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Pod</th>
<th>Riverside Room A</th>
<th>Riverside Room B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.30-10.15</td>
<td>Session 10</td>
<td>Borge - Chess and Sport</td>
<td>Parry and Martinková – Safe Danger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.15-11.00</td>
<td>Session 11</td>
<td>Kumankov - Is Sport War</td>
<td>Howe - Ludus Mimesis and the inevitability of deception in sport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00-11.15</td>
<td>Refreshment</td>
<td>(Chair: Ryall)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.15-12.15</td>
<td>Keynote 2</td>
<td>Keith Thompson - Sport and the Rest of Life - A Personal Perspective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.15-12.30</td>
<td>Conference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Close</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Alphabetical List of Abstracts

Alfred Archer

On Sporting Integrity

It has become increasingly popular for sports fans, pundits, coaches and players to appeal to ideas of ‘sporting integrity’ when voicing their approval or disapproval of some aspect of the sporting world. However, it is far from clear exactly what is meant by the phrase ‘sporting integrity’. In this paper I will examine whether there is any way to understand this idea in a way that both makes sense of the way in which it is used and presents a distinctly ‘sporting’ form of integrity.

I will start with a brief overview of the philosophical literature on integrity. This literature suggests a range of different ways in which we might seek to understand sporting integrity. First, sporting integrity could be viewed as a personal virtue, an institutional virtue or as a virtue of the sport as a whole. Second, we could view sporting integrity as a matter of coherence, practical identity or as a social virtue.

I will then present three recent high profile sporting incidents that caused the sporting integrity of sporting participants or governing bodies to be called into question. I will argue that in order to do justice to the way the phrase is used in these three case studies we have to understand sporting integrity as a virtue that is possessed by sports rather than by the individuals or institutions involved in sport. I will defend a coherence account of sporting integrity. Drawing on the work of Bernard Suits (1978), I will argue that a sport can be said to possess integrity to the extent that the contestants face the same constraints in the means they can use to achieve the goal of the sport. I will explain why this definition does a better job than its rivals (eg. Oxford Research 2010).

Keywords: Sporting Integrity, Sportsmanship

Bibliography:


Personal Details

Alfred Archer, University of Bristol, email: aa15690@bristol.ac.uk
Doping: Usage and Attitudes in Contemporary Student Populations

Nijmegen University’s Honours Programme hosts an interdisciplinary think-tank on Sports and Enhancement. This academic year, 10 Masters students will develop several theory driven practico-philosophical scenarios for ‘good sport practices’ in the Netherlands. The students are commissioned by The Mulier Institute, a national centre for research on sports in society, which is to stimulate the coordination, synchronization and co-operation of more fundamental and policy-based scholarly sports research by monitoring developments in sports, to comprehend and explain current (policy) issues and to communicate and discuss knowledge on sports and society.

Attitudes towards doping use are usually negative, but the distinction between elite sports (faster, higher and stronger!) and mass sports (enhancing health and regression to the mean!) may lead to distinct attitudes. Fairness may be framed differently in each, and this may impact on the ethical analysis of doping. In the debate, we address principled, categorical arguments, pragmatic arguments, utilitarian arguments and virtue ethical arguments.

Often, in philosophical research on sports, empirical data take a lesser place. This poses a weakness in relation to research on attitudes and the use of doping. We developed a qualitative empirical approach to attempt a reflective analysis of the data provided by a survey to render explicit the basis of such current arguments in the debate over doping. Our intention is not to study the prevalence and probability sampling of usage and attitudes. We rather used our survey for data on existing deliberative aspects of the debate, and thus provide an array of views, tendencies and opinions amongst our respondents. For this reason, we used both Likert-scaled-questions and open questions.

On this basis, we will give an account of the existing arguments in the debate on doping on the basis of our research, and we will provide for a critical analysis of current doping policies on this basis.

Keywords: doping, doping policy, doping attitudes, enhancement.

References:


Ivo van Hilvoorde & Laurens Landeweerd, Enhancing disabilities: transhumanism under the veil of inclusion? Disability and Rehabilitation, 2010; 32(26): 2222–2227


Andy Miah, Genetics, Bioethics and Sport. Sport Ethics and Philosophy, 1, 2, 2007, 146-158.

Personal Details:

All authors are from Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.

r.welters@science.ru.nl
Addiction, mental illness or disorder is generally regarded as negative or problematic. In sport, however, there are obsessive or compulsive behaviours which have demonstrable beneficial effects. In this paper we explore whether an athlete who demonstrates symptoms of exercise addiction and disordered eating is in fact suffering from the mental disorder of addiction, and therefore in need of therapeutic intervention. We compare and contrast Frankfurt’s account of the willing and unwilling addict with Nordenfelt’s account of compelled pathological behaviour as behaviour that is fixed, unavoidable and compromising vital goals.

We argue that the criteria used to distinguish pathology from volitional action - freedom, knowledge and desire – can be opaque in this context. The individual’s history - a long-term career of intense training and highly disciplined attitudes toward food and the body - might impact the individual’s autonomy and make them desire and endorse what they ought not to desire. We explore the possibility that certain fixed, perfectionist, highly disciplined tendencies might now be ingrained to the extent that they reflect the individual’s own authentic view.

Bibliography:


Personal Details

Andrew Bloodworth, College of Human and Health Sciences, Swansea University a.j.bloodworth@swansea.ac.uk
Carwyn Jones, Cardiff School of Sport, Cardiff Metropolitan University crjones@cardiffmet.ac.uk
Steffen Borge

Chess and Sport

According to Bernard Suits, sports involve skills that are physical (Suits 1973: 44-45, McNamee 2008: 15). This requirement seems to rule out chess as a sport. Graham McFee has criticized Suits’s essentialist line and pointed out that chess is regarded as a sport in Cuba (McFee 2004: 19, 46). McFee’s suggestion seems to be that the Cubans cannot be wrong. Here I am going to consider an argument to the effect that they are. The argument takes the form of a thought experiment. If one can imagine a competitive game of some kind being performed by two clairvoyants playing against each other without moving their bodies, then the skills involved in playing that game are not physical and the game should not be regarded as a sport.

Chess is like that, as we can envisage two clairvoyant persons playing chess with each other. These would need to move neither their bodies nor physical chess pieces. Still, they would be playing chess. Mind-chess is chess. Then do the exercise for other activities like the 100-meter dash, ice hockey, archery and so on and so forth. You will find that it hardly makes sense to think of mind-versions of these competitive activities, and even if it did they are different from the original activities. Mind-archery is not archery, mind-100-metre dash is not the 100-metre dash, etc. The skills in the latter types of activities are essentially physical and these activities should be regarded as sports.

Keywords: Chess, sport, physical skills

Bibliography


Personal Details

Steffen Borge, UiT The Arctic University of Norway, Department of Philosophy, steffenborge@yahoo.com
Robbie Burns

Toward an Understanding of Sportspersonship: Practices, Virtues and Vices

Scholars have begun to question the claim that sport develops virtuous character amongst athletes, with some calling for it to be abandoned altogether (Back, 2009). Yet although there may be clear sporting examples and empirical data to support this view, it does not follow to assume that sport is an unethical endeavour. Rather, what is needed, is to rescue the rich resources of virtue inherent within sport, that have the potential to promote and cultivate virtuous sportspersons. To do this however, some clear conceptual groundwork must be undertaken to develop an understanding of sport and sportspersons from the perspective of virtue rather than vice. This paper will focus on two of these groundwork issues arguing that (1) inherent within sport are virtues and (2) these virtues can be adopted by sportspersons.

My discussion will be in two parts. Drawing primarily upon MacIntyre (1985), the social nature of sport will be revealed through a comparison with Suits’ (2005) analytical approach. As a social practice, sport produces social virtues in order for internal goods to be attained. The second part of my discussion will consider three essential virtues of sportspersonship: justice, courage and honesty. Although vices do exist within sport, it will follow that for a sportsperson to be called ‘virtuous’, they must act in a just, courageous and honest way.

Keywords: Sportspersonship, Virtue, Vice

Bibliography


Personal Details

Robbie Burns, Cardiff Metropolitan University, Cardiff. Email: st20019224@outlook.cardiff.ac.uk
The appeal of Dutee Chand to the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne: Hyperandrogenism as an unfair advantage?

The Indian athlete Dutee Chand was banned from competition in July 2014 after a medical test determined that her androgen level was above the limit set by IAAF policies on eligibility of female athletes with hyperandrogenism to compete (IAAF 2011). Chand has appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Lausanne against her banning from competition. Her case is currently under judicial arbitration, and for the duration of the arbitration she is unable to compete.

In this paper I draw analogies with and expand on my previous argument on Caster Semenya’s case (Camporesi & Maugeri 2010; Karkazis et al 2012) to argue that CAS should overturn Dutee Chand’s ban, on the basis that IAAF policies are unfair on several levels, namely:

1. Inappropriate medicalization: if Chand is able to reduce her androgen levels to fall within the testing range decreed by the IAAF, she will be allowed to resume international competition;
2. The unfair advantage assumption: I employ and develop Hämäläinen’s (2012) distinction between property and performance advantage to argue that hyperandrogenism does not constitute unfair advantage;
3. Discrimination: female athletes who do not conform to heteronormative assumptions regarding femininity become, as such, the target of testing;
4. Burden of proof: the onus to demonstrate androgen resistance (and to be readmitted to compete), and to cover the costs of the inappropriate medicalization (in 1) falls on the athlete.

I conclude that IAAF policies on eligibility of female athletes with hyperandrogenism to compete should be withdrawn.

Selected references


Personal Details

Dr Silvia Camporesi, Department of Social Science, Health & Medicine
King’s College London; D6, 2nd floor, East Wing; WC2R 2LS London
Phone: +44(0)20 78487918 Email: silvia.1.camporesi@kcl.ac.uk
Silvia Camporesi and Mike McNamee

Ethics of genetic tests for talent identification in sport: 
A virtue ethics approach

As scientists explore further the genetic basis of sports performance, an indirect consequence has been the renewal of debates around eugenics in the context of elite sports. A range of ethically challenging questions arise including (i) To what extent is it possible to groom early Olympics champions via genetic screening programmes? and (ii) Ought parents attempt to detect and/or predict their children’s talents when they are infants, as they are already doing in the US with direct-to-consumer genetic tests sold over the Internet? In this paper we discuss the ethical implications of genetic tests for this purpose.

Underpinning the emerging rise in the market of genetic tests is an assumption that talent identification and development can be traced back to a few genetic polymorphisms that can be identified in children. Despite the complexity of genetic science in sport, this is a remarkably simplistic assumption. We will assume though, for the sake of the argument, that tests for performance enhancing polymorphisms are more scientifically reliable than is currently the case.

On the basis of this premise, we explore the justifications for parents to use genetic testing to identify their children’s apparently precocious talent. We argue that the crux of the matter lies between children’s rights and parental duties and rights. We critically review Joel Feinberg’s argument regarding the ‘right to an open future’, and William Ruddick’s life prospect principle in order to argue that the use of such tests, independently of their scientific validity, is not ethically justified. We will also attempt to spell out an alternative, virtue ethical, approach to frame the issue focusing on the virtues and vices of sporting parenthood.

Selected references


http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/ruddick/papers/parenthood.html

Personal Details

Dr Silvia Camporesi, King’s College London, UK. Email: silvia.1.camporesi@kcl.ac.uk

Professor MJ McNamee, Swansea University, Wales. Email: m.j.mcnamee@swansea.ac.uk
In his original 2001 entry on exploitation in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Alan Wertheimer listed five scenarios of alleged exploitation. The first of these scenarios was about college athletics in the United States. It read as follows: ‘The president of Stanford University claimed that big-time college athletics "reeks of exploitation," because the universities gain a great deal of revenue from the services of the athletes while the athletes (whose graduation rate is much lower than that of non-athletes) gain little from their college experience.’

Although Wertheimer devoted a chapter of his 1996 book *Exploitation* to the topic of exploitation in American college sports, his argument there is unsatisfying. Wertheimer argues that certain student-athletes in the NCAA are exploited by their schools in a mutually advantageous way, and insofar as it is mutually advantageous, nothing needs to be done to rectify it. After expositing his view, I argue that – if we correctly apply his own theory – student-athletes are actually harmfully exploited by their schools. There are certain student-athletes (mostly those who play men’s basketball and football for teams that create significant revenue for their schools) who receive less than they would in an ideal world. While Wertheimer and I both agree about this, I argue that the number of schools that exploit their student-athletes is larger than Wertheimer allowed.

I argue further that NCAA schools actually act fraudulently and coercively in their transactions with student-athletes. Wertheimer is clear that any exploitative transaction involving fraud or coercion is a case of harmful exploitation. So, if the transaction between certain NCAA schools and certain student-athletes involves both coercion and fraud by NCAA schools, it is therefore a case of harmful exploitation. What Wertheimer calls the principle of permissible exploitation therefore does not apply, and the harmfulness of these transactions should – on his own view – be rectified.

**Selected References**


**Personal Details**

Kevin Churchill: MA Candidate, Department of Philosophy, Carleton University, Canada.

Phone: (1) 613-298-8428      Email: kevinchurchill@cmail.carleton.ca
Cheating, Non-Cheating and Gendered Vice

John Russell (2014) has argued that there is no normatively distinctive concept of cheating in sport. He notes that the concept nevertheless carries a precise normative sting. To dub behaviour cheating is to express an especially pungent species of disapproval.

The juxtaposition of conceptual indeterminacy and normative sting elicits intriguing questions about which transgressions are culturally framed as cheating and which transgressions escape the infernal c-word. It also raises parallel questions about the rationales of the respective penalties for transgressors considered to have cheated and transgressors considered not to have cheated. The use of banned substances is perfunctorily dubbed ‘cheating’ and is the most reviled transgression in sport, with exposed elite-level users sport’s most demonised characters. Formal penalties and public opprobrium are continuous with these framings. Maradona’s ‘hand of God’ similarly cast him as a Luciferian cheat, and a later drugs transgression, alongside an alleged tendency to dive and to feign injury – each of which also incite the c-word - has sculpted him into the Platonic ideal of the Cheat and arguably the most culturally demonised figure in England.

Conversely, ugly and malevolent transgression that results in or courts serious physical damage, particularly in football and rugby, typically escapes the charge of cheating, as well as the public opprobrium and institutional penalties visited upon drug-users, match-fixers and one who profitably punches the ball into the net. Maradona, Ben Johnson, Dwain Chambers and Lance Armstrong belong in hell or (if lucky) Oprah’s purgatorial confessional, but Roy Keane and Graeme Souness belong in pundits’ seats during televised European matches.

Russell (2014, 310) wonders ‘whether anything substantial can be said that explains why special opprobrium is reserved for cheaters and cheating conduct when other types of advantage-seeking rule violations do not motivate such responses.’ This presentation will focus instead on the equivalent asymmetry between cheating and the preceding malevolent and dangerous transgression, and propose that a gendered hierarchy of vice is a robust part of the explanation.

**Keywords: Cheating, transgression, violence, gender**

**References:**


**Personal Details**

Paul Davis, University of Sunderland. Email: paul.davis@sunderland.ac.uk
One of the necessary conditions for personhood is the capacity to act as a moral agent. Historically the perceived limited capacity for moral reasoning of women has been one of the arguments excluding them from full status as persons and citizens. Feminist political and citizenship work starts from the premise that women and girls should have equal moral and therefore political standing as citizens with men and boys. This means their voices must carry equal democratic weight. Feminist scholars therefore argue that citizenship must involve both ‘status’ as membership of a community and ‘practice’ as political participation or ‘voice’ in public life (Lister, 2003), that is political participation as well as cultural recognition and economic redistribution (Fraser, 2008). As Fraser puts it ‘all those affected by a given social structure or institution have moral standing as subjects of justice in relation to it’ (2008, p.24).

If the context for the development of virtuous moral agency, phronesis or practical wisdom is framed to include engagement with the politics of sport and the common good, it is crucial that women’s voices are heard in public debate. This requires ‘voice’ beyond the gymnasium, athletics track, water course, or playing field; the traditional sporting terrain. However, entering public debate, particularly for women, may involve exposure to sex-specific abuse, sanctions and punishment as forms of social control. Nevertheless, it has been argued that 2014 has marked a watershed regarding the political space accorded to the voices and political participation of some women, particularly in relation to violence against women, including in sport.

This paper explores the ways in which Vera Caslavska in 1968, Tanni Grey-Thompson in 2012 and Jess Ennis-Hill in 2014 have exercised moral agency by way of a public voice and the public reaction to this.

Selected References


Personal Details

Cathy Devine, University of Cumbria, UK.
Email: cathy.devine@cumbria.ac.uk
**Trust and Doping**

While there has been much recent work on the justifiability of the ban on doping, the question of how best to cultivate compliance with the ban has received comparatively little philosophical attention. There is a variety of approaches that might be explored in motivating compliance: punishment, shame, and incentives that appeal to rational self-interest, to name but three. In this paper, I assess the prospects of ‘trust’ as a motivation for compliance.

For both moral and practical reasons, athletes cannot be monitored to the extent necessary to guarantee compliance with anti-doping regulations. This requires that we trust athletes not to cheat. But what do ‘trust’ and ‘trustworthiness’ mean in the sporting context, and what sporting virtues are trust-supporting? By pursuing a combination of suspensions and financial penalties, sports authorities have pursued a principal-agent model of accountability to address this problem. The principal-agent model attempts to circumvent the need for trust by aligning athletes’ narrow self-interest with behaviour desired by sports authorities (e.g. compliance with anti-doping regulations).

I will demonstrate the limitations of principal-agent models of accountability in the context of elite sport, and I will establish the enduring need for trustworthy athletes. I propose ‘sportsmanship’ as the quintessential trust-supporting sporting virtue, and I advance an account of sportsmanship as a commitment to the excellences around which the sport is organised. Finally, I develop one avenue by which sportsmanship may be cultivated: integrity-based models of accountability.

**Selected References**


**Personal Details**

John William Devine, King’s College, London. Email: johnwilliam.devine@kcl.ac.uk
Andrew Edgar

**Power and Possession: What Sport Can Teach Political Philosophy**

Building on my earlier work on the aesthetic experience of space in football, the presentation will explore the broadly political meanings of space, territory and possession in strategic team games such as kabaddi, football, and basketball. Sport is here understood as an embodied competition, the nature of which is constituted through the sport's rules. Each team strives, fundamentally, to inhibit the capacity of their opponents to exercise their athletic and competitive competence. In part, any such inhibition is realised through the control of territory. The rules of any given sport constitute different understands of space and of territorial possession, and hereby constitute diverse possible ways in which these understandings may be extrapolated, metaphorically, as articulations of power struggles. Possession within the game is thus to be understood as an opportunity to reflect upon and become aware of political struggle, and more broadly the place that such struggle plays in what it is to be human. Sport, it will be argued, is an alternative medium (alternative to the dominant medium of conceptual thought) through which political philosophy may be pursued.

**Keywords:** *Space, territory, phenomenology, hermeneutics*

**Bibliography**


Andrew Edgar (forthcoming) ‘Football and the Poetics of Space’, *Sport, Ethics and Philosophy*

**Personal Details**

Andrew Edgar, Cardiff School of Communication, English and Philosophy, Cardiff University, Wales. Email: edgar@cardiff.ac.uk
Lisa Edwards

**Tackling the FA:**
*A philosophical evaluation of the FA’s rule on mixed gendered football.*

The Football Association (FA) has been under pressure to allow girls to play in mixed teams since 1978, following 12 year old Theresa Bennett’s application to play with boys in a local league. In 1991, over a decade after Bennett’s legal challenge, the FA agreed to remove its complete ban on mixed football and introduced Rule C4 in order to permit girls and boys to play together in competitive matches under the age of 11 (Griggs and Biscomb 2010). More recently, following a campaign by parents, coaches, local Members of Parliament and the Women’s Sport Foundation, the FA agreed to trial mixed gender football for the under-12 to under-15 age categories in order to determine, among other things, the risk of injury to players in sex-integrated competitions. A series of exponential changes ensued; between 2010 and 2014 the age at which mixed football was permitted increased from U11 to U16 (FA September 2014).

In this paper I critically examine the key reasons given by the FA to uphold the ban on mixed football for players over the age of 16, namely that (i) girls could face an unacceptable risk of injury; (ii) boys have an unfair advantage; (iii) removing the ban might harm the women’s game. My aim in this paper is to examine the philosophical and moral shortcomings of each of these rationales. Specifically I argue, firstly, that the rule preventing mixed football beyond age 16 amounts to misplaced paternalism and, secondly, that the burden of proof lies with the FA to demonstrate that sex-segregated competition is necessary to ensure fair and safe competition. In conclusion, I suggest that the FA ought to abandon the complete ban on mixed football over the age of 16 and that decisions ought to be based on a player’s competence to play, at any particular level, rather than on their sex.

**References**


**Personal Details**

Lisa Edwards, Cardiff School of Sport, Cardiff Metropolitan University.
Email: lleedwards@cardiffmet.ac.uk
Are we trying Too Hard?

The scourge of drugs has been in sport for a long time. Using drugs is wrong; it is cheating. By definition, taking some substances is prohibited and so to take them is to cheat. Yet elite athletes in a range of sports are found to take drugs (whether willingly or coerced) in their search for improved performance. This paper seeks to move beyond Lance Armstrong’s apparent lack of contrition, the latest failed dope test, or to consider what the World Anti-Doping Agency must do to eradicate this scourge. Side-stepping what is a very important moral debate, this paper explores a more fundamental question. Is there a point at which athletes engaging in sport cross the line and simply try too hard?

For those who seek to stay inside the rules, the concept of ‘marginal gains’ has transformed the way athletes (at even relatively modest level) approach their sport. To win in sport one has to excel at science. Where once a fortuitous mix of genes, a lucky talisman and a good night’s sleep could secure victory, now it seems to require more technology and expertise than was necessary to put a man on the moon. And as science drives performance to ever higher levels, sportswomen and men become its hostage. If sport is all about winning, then Dave Brailsford and his Olympic heroes have disproved the Law of Diminishing Returns; but marginal gains demand ever greater sacrifices from athletes (and their families), as diet and training regimes become ever more extreme. And it isn’t just a pound of flesh that today’s athlete must find for her Shylock; he also expects her mind. To become a top sportsperson you need the right mind-set. Commitment and belief must be nothing less than 100%. In the 21st century to excel in sport we must be savagely ruthless when competing and incredibly dedicated in our training regimes. No sacrifice is too great and no quarter must be given. Yesterday’s sporting hero has morphed into today’s superhero.

It would be easy to hark back to a golden age of amateurism when imagined Corinthian values saw taking part as more important than winning. But even at grass roots level, the joy of simply competing seems to be evaporating, as fitness becomes the driver to participation in sport. In the 21st century is our collective commitment to the scientific management of performance driving the sport out of sport?

Keywords: Competitiveness, Professionalism, Scientification, Marginal Gains, Winning, Sporting Spirit, Participation, Moderation

Bibliography:

Personal Details:
Ian Fouweather, The Graduate School, University of Bradford, Great Horton Road, Bradford, BD7 1DP.
Phone: +44(0)1274 236566 Email: i.m.fouweather2@bradford.ac.uk
Alun Hardman and Tim Elcombe

Conventionalism with a Pragmatic Twist

William Morgan’s (2012) provocative reintroduction of “conventionalism” to the sport philosophy literature intends to offer a “genuinely acute and incisive” approach to “make critical sense of the contemporary sport scene” (p. 89). In particular, Morgan asserts that his notion of “deep conventions” offers a superior normative framework relative to the “too abstract, too far removed” Dworkian-inspired “realist” principles championed by interpretivist-minded philosophers of sport. “Deep conventions,” Morgan writes, “are better suited [than interpretivist principles] to do heavy normative lifting precisely because of their social and historical situatedness” (p. 66) and thus hold “the key to normatively perspicacious inquiry into sport” (p. 79).

In this paper, we continue to push for greater deliberation on “conventionalism”, and take it as settled that with the presentation of Morgan’s deep conventionalism, one of three common criticisms typically launched against conventionalism – that conventional accounts offer little of relevance for critical normative inquiry (Ciomaga 2012) – has been put to rest.

Our distinctive aim is to examine Morgan’s conventionalist critique from the perspective of pragmatism as it offers, we think, an additional response to the charge that conventionalism is unable to instigate or account for normative criticism of sporting practices. More specifically, we will attempt to show deep conventionalism, when supplemented by pragmatic philosophy, is better suited to initiate, engage, and make use of (both “internal” and “external”) criticism, and move beyond allegations of relativism often levied against conventionalist accounts.

Keywords: Conventionalism, Pragmatism, Normative change

References


Personal Details

Alun Hardman, Cardiff Metropolitan University, Wales. Email: ahardman@cardiffmet.ac.uk

Tim Elcombe, Wilfred Laurier University, Canada. Email: telcombe@wlu.ca
Leslie A. Howe

Ludus, mimesis, and the ubiquity of deception in sport

This paper makes two claims: (1) that deception in sport should be understood on the model of seduction rather than assertion, and (2) that pretence is at the heart of sport and so the demand for sincerity in sport risks incoherence unless framed precisely.

Regarding (1), while deception in sport does occasionally take the form of a lie, sport is primarily a physical rather than verbal interaction and its most characteristic deception is shown by participants' behaviour. To deke/dummy is to deceive by acting in such a way as to persuade one's opponent that one will do x when in fact one intends to do y. One's opponents beliefs are less important than whether they act as if one was to do x. Sport-deception here is behaviour designed to produce corresponding behaviour by another. It is designed not to state but to mislead as to future intended behaviour. This kind of deception is not assertoric but seductive. Seduction is the complex art of contriving situation through skilled juxtaposition of objects, behaviours, and statements to lead another to draw a specific conclusion on their own, one to which the seducer himself does not commit. Deception in sport likewise leads the opponent to commit a response to signals suggesting movement, tactic, or strategy, while the seducing player retains freedom to do otherwise.

Regarding (2), ludus and mimesis are inseparable: play is a conventional suspension of our expectation of sincerity. Sport, like theatre, is an ironical exercise: we pretend that a ghost walks in Elsinore and that it matters who runs fastest or scores more goals. Sincerity is required in that we must take the make-believe seriously and play within the play. Unlike intra-, extra-lusory deception violates the convention that allows play to occur and thus cannot be countenanced without the game collapsing as play.

Keywords: deception, pretence, sincerity, seduction, play

Bibliography:


Personal details

Leslie A. Howe, Philosophy Dept. University of Saskatchewan. L.a.howe@usask.ca
Filip Kobiela

On Beautiful and Kitschy Sports.

The article addresses some problems concerning the aesthetics of sport: 1) D. Best's distinction between purposive sports and aesthetic sports in comparison to B. Suits' distinction between games and performances, 2) Analysis of the suggestion that the aesthetic dimension of sport is connected rather with aesthetic sports (performances) than purposive sport (games), 3) Discussion of the notion of moral and aesthetic kitsch in sport, 4) Discussion of alleged art status of sport in the light of reversal (using Suits' idiom: reverse English) of means and ends in sport and art, and Best's claim that art, in contrast to sport, has an imagined object, that at least allows to express some life issues (moral, political etc.), 5) Finally, discussion of a wider context of comparison of sport and art in contemporary society, especially Best's claim 'I just do not see why it should be taught that sport would somehow be endowed with greater respectability if it could be shown to be art'. My aim is to provide an analysis of some old arguments, as well as to offer some new arguments. The tools I'm using belongs both to analytic (Suits, Best) and continental (Ingarden, Welsch) traditions.

Keywords: art, artistic, sport, aesthetic, purposive, Suits, Best, Welsch.

Bibliography:


Personal details:

Filip Kobiela, PhD, University School of Physical Education in Krakow, Poland, Department of Social Sciences. filipkobiela@interia.pl
Discussions on the interrelation between sport and art have continued sporadically since the 1970s and 1980s. In his recent paper, Tim Elcombe (2012) reviewed the status of such discussions and sympathized with the view of David Best, who some years ago argued that sport is not art (1988). Best's viewpoint was criticized by Jan Boxil (1988), Spencer Wertz (1988), and Terry Roberts (1995), who believed that sport could be treated as art. Christopher Cordner (1995a; 1995b) and Joseph Kupfer (1988) also challenged Best, although they did not entirely disagree with him (see: Elcombe, 2012).

The discussion in Poland however, differs. Because literature on the subject published in English presents diversified statements on the interrelation between sport and art, and the circle of people engaged in the matters of physical culture in Poland is still in favor of equating sport with art, I have decided to consider three hypotheses:

1. Sport and art constitute two separate and distinct spheres of cultural activity. Equating one with the other is a mistake that leads to misunderstandings.
2. Considerations on the effects of both sport and artistic activity indicate that between – just as within the range of terms used to discuss them – the two occurs approximation, inter-penetration, and intersection.
3. The research pertaining to the approximation, inter-penetration and intersection of sport and art understood as concepts and phenomena proves that they constitute two distinct and separately defined spheres of knowledge, which confirms the first hypothesis.

Keywords: sport; art; theatre performance; aesthetics of ugliness

Bibliography:


Personal Details

Prof. Dr. Jerzy Kosiewicz, Josef Pilsudski University of Physical Education in Warsaw, Poland
Jerzy.Kosiewicz@awf.edu.pl

* This paper was prepared within the framework of the statutory research Ds.-209 financed by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education.
Lev Kreft

Pindaric Criticism and the Olympic Myth

David C. Young (1937-2013), one of the most outstanding classical philologists of the 20th Century, was a specialist in Pindaric criticism (Young 1964) who devoted additional part of his research to dismantle the Olympic myth of Greek amateur athletics (Young 1985). He divided history of Pindaric criticism into three periods, of which the first one (1821-1894) corresponds with the process of revival of the Olympic Games. The myth of Greek amateur athletics and its later decline caused by the introduction of professionalism was falsely and ideologically constructed from Pindar’s odes to support modern Olympic ideology. When Young started to criticize this myth for the first time, even classical philologists could not accept his “heterodox” (Young, 1985, vii) conclusions. As amateurism had already vanished from elite international sport and from the Olympic Games, his criticism was later accepted by his colleagues and by philosophers of sport without initial bewilderment. He found a difference between Pindaric criticism’s mainstream, and constructed or faked sources of the Olympic myth: in mythologizing constructions second-rate classical scientists were engaged. With parallel reading of both of his main studies, we can conclude that both mainstream and second rate philologists still have two points in common. The first one is that they study Pindar’s epinikions as documents and not as poetry, which is the main point of Young’s reproach. The second one is their use of Pindar as an aristocratic voice against the democratic turn in ancient Greek history. Young’s criticism of the modern Olympic myth is still valuable, not as a weapon against the doctrine of amateurism which died long ago but as a tip off about that part of the myth which did not change or disappear but strengthened in the last hundred years of Olympism: aristocratic regulation and rule of and over sport and the Olympics.

Keywords: David C. Young, Pindaric criticism, Olympic myth, amateurism, aristocratic regulation of sport

Bibliography:


Personal Details

Prof. Kreft Lev, Department of Philosophy at the Faculty of Arts /University of Ljubljana – Slovenia. lev.kreft@guest.arnes.si
**Arseni Kumankov**

**Is sport War?**

21st century is a hard time for war. The concept of war itself is very powerful, impressive, heavy, that is why it is used and avoided in the same time. It is often replaced by euphemisms. On the one hand, when the fight for some good purpose is a question, for example when there is struggle with drugs, illegal migration or corruption, then it is common to use the word “war”. But when people can be involved in the conflict with doubtful purposes or when the government would like to reduce the tension in the society, then there appears concepts such as counter-terrorism operation or police operation. But can we say that sport is a sublimated form of armed conflict as well? Or at least, if the sporting event was not understood initially as a political or social collision, is not it now a symbolic replacement of power struggle? And if we give an affirmative answer to the last question, we will be faced with the necessity of moral evaluation of sport. On the one hand, contest launches an ongoing process of competition, which may open the way to different forms of strife such as football hooliganism or even a real war, as happened in 1969, when Football War between Honduras and El Salvador started. On the other hand, sport meets public demand for violence, but allows us to transfer aggression to bring a peaceful end to it, reducing it to the form of a game. Thus, sport dialectically combines unifying and splitting principles, and although the competitive physical activity should solve an important social problem, some sports will always keep potential to cause unfair violence actions. And if sport is war, then that is form of war that does not correlate with Clausewitz’s classical understanding of war but with Schmittian concept of unjust modern war that does not focus on making peace.

**Keywords:** war, violence, competition, morality of sport, sublimation of aggression.

**Bibliography:**


**Personal Details**

Arseni Kumankov, National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Philosophy Department, Moscow, Russia, Email: akumankov@hse.ru
On the Concept of Fair Competition in Today’s European Football Leagues

The notion of competition depicted in sport literature appears to be inconsistent with the goals of current European football competitions. This paper aims at refuting the view that professional football only requires some basic equality of chances beyond the differences in skills and strategy. It also aims at shedding some light on some misconceptions inherent in such a view. Hence, we shall call for both genuine legal and ethical reforms, since football competition requires a notion of equality as both a goal and a right. In fact, such a view entails that the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and its national and local governing bodies ought to adopt and promote a concept of competition based upon genuine legal and ethical fairness similar to the one advocated by such American sport governing bodies as the National Football League, National Basketball Association, and Major League Soccer.

Keywords: Ethical reform, European football leagues, fair competition, legal reform.

References:


Personal Details

Tamba Nlandu, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, John Carroll University, USA. Email: tnlandu@jcu.edu
Jim Parry and Irene Martínková

Safe Danger

Personal Details

Jim Parry, Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Physical Education and Sport, Charles University in Prague. Email: s.j.parry@leeds.ac.uk

Irene Martínková, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Physical Education and Sport, Charles University in Prague. Email: martinkova@ftvs.cuni.cz
**Epistemology in Sport**

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between two forms of knowledge in sport which, following Gilbert Ryle among others, have come to be called “knowledge how” and “knowledge that.” Knowledge that, or justified, true belief, has been the dominant, if not exclusive, form of knowledge of philosophical interest, especially in the west. Indeed, it could be argued that knowledge how, or practical knowledge, has been almost entirely ignored by western philosophy. So much so has knowledge that dominated in fact, it has led some to look for ways to reduce knowledge how to knowledge that. But this reduction has proven particularly difficult, and nowhere more so than in sport. The inability to turn performance in sport into a set or instructions, procedures or rules, ones which when grasped capture what it is to perform and thus aid performance, indicates that knowledge how may be irreducible to knowledge that in this one case. It may indicate more. The discussion of rule following in sport has shown it might not just be that performance in sport cannot be reduced to a set of rules captured as knowledge that, but that the very rules of sport themselves, classic paradigms of knowledge that, may in fact fail to be varieties of knowledge that and rather are varieties of knowledge how. Building on this discussion of rule following in sport, what I will argue here is that not only are a number of issues related to rules interpretation and the normativity of rules addressed when the knowledge of rules is seen as a matter of knowing how instead of knowing that—as has been argued by others—but that this points in the direction of a much broader epistemology in sport and maybe beyond.

**Keywords:** knowledge how, knowledge that, rule following, theory, practice

**Bibliography:**


**Personal Details**

Albert Piacente, New York University, USA. Email: ap17@nyu.edu
Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory, and Anti-Doping

I apply the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory (Rawls 1999) to anti-doping in sports. I ask whether the supposed anti-doping obligations of athletes are generated in ideal or non-ideal theory. Non-ideal theory characteristically concerns the nature and stringency of obligations in situations of partial non-compliance (Valentini 2012) (Robeyns 2008). Standard examples include the nature and stringency of our obligations to distant strangers in a context of widespread noncompliance with those obligations, on the part of wealthy and close others. A contrasting example is the nature and stringency of an obligation not to dope in the Tour de France peloton circa 1998 in a context of widespread non-compliance. But sports’ Anti-Doping Culture (ADC) takes a strongly ideal-theoretic approach, ignoring widespread non-compliance.

On the other hand, a different version of the ideal/non-ideal distinction takes ideal theory to be characterised by near-perfect knowledge, including knowledge of intentions, whereas non-ideal theory adapts to the feasibility constraints that arise from imperfect knowledge of intentions. A standard example is the liability of combatants to killing in war, where a rough and ready principle - non-combatant immunity - is justified by reference to the ‘fog of war’ and other feasibility constraints. Analogously, the ADC takes a strongly non-ideal theoretic approach, insisting, for practical reasons, on the strict liability of athletes for positive tests (McNamee and Tarasti 2010).

As is fairly well known, both these commitments of the ADC can generate injustices. More surprisingly, they are in tension. I explicate that tension and attempt to resolve it.

Keywords: anti-doping, ideal theory, partial compliance

Bibliography


Personal details

Jon Pike, Department of Philosophy, The Open University  J.E.Pike@open.ac.uk
Liverpool Case: Ownership Revisited

Economic difficulties largely due to the financial collapse in 2008, combined with a large acquisition debt, contributed to long disputes between Liverpool’s owners (Tom Hicks and George Gillette), board members, creditors, fans and managers. These disputes eventually landed in court. The independent board, whose membership was largely determined by Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and chaired by Sir Martin Broughton, announced and proceeded with the sale of Liverpool Football Club (LFC) to New England Sports Ventures (NESV), led by John Henry, in the autumn of 2010. Hicks and Gillette asserted board did not consider the highest bid, which was against their interest as owners. From its side, the LFC board and RBS declared through its chair that the sale was decided in favor of the bidder who could constitute the best owner of the club going forward. The central question in this case is the differing interpretations of the phrase ‘best interests of the club’ in the context of differing theories of ownership.

We analyze this case through the lenses of two contrasting theories: the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and the team production theory (Blair and Stout, 1999). More precisely, this analysis will address the notion and philosophy of ownership in the specific context of professional sport. The case ownership dilemma is accentuated by contingencies such as cultural and sociological differences in the understanding of the role of corporations in the specific context of sport. The case also highlights cultural differences in corporate law when dealing with bankruptcy. Finally, the case contributes to the philosophical and ethical debate on corporate ownership, accountability, responsibility and governance.

Keywords: Sports Governance, Agency Theory, Team Production Theory, Liverpool Sale, Fan Internet Activism, Corporate Ownership

Selected Bibliography:


Personal Details

Ann Scholl, Philosophy Dept. UAEU. Email: T_Scholl@uaeu.ac.ae
Nihel Chabrak, Accounting Dept. UAEU. Email: Nihel.Chabrak@uaeu.ac.ae
Keith Thompson

Sport and the Rest of Life - A Personal Perspective

My talk will be a personal, wide ranging, possibly (gently) provocative and not fully scripted account; *inter alia*, how much sport matters in the context of life as a whole, and distinguishing particularly between intrinsic and instrumental value.

Personal Details

Keith Thompson. Email: k.t@blueyonder.co.uk