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Abstracts

The Psychological Concepts of Well-Being and Quality of Life: A Philosophical Analysis

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This paper will seek to examine philosophically the concepts of “well being” and “quality of life” as addressed in both exercise and health psychology literatures.

Health Related Quality of Life (HRQL) is a concept utilised in the psychological literature. Whilst many approaches define HRQL in terms of *physical* functioning, there are more extended within the psychology . Rejeski, Brawley and Shumaker (1996), for examples, also consider HRQL in functional terms, but refer additionally to physical, emotional, social and cognitive functioning.

The expanded conceptual space of “functionings”, however, is considered by Griffin (1993) to be too large. He argues that in order to get at what is important in terms of people’s quality of life we need to ‘reach rock bottom’ in terms of prudential judgements about the qualities of our lives. The paper will assess whether the psychological literature reaches this level of explanation and the extent to which they answer the question of how exercise contributes to the quality of a person’s life.

The scientific emphasis evident within the literature on sport and exercise psychology will also be addressed. There is an emphasis on controlled, experimental studies as the strongest route to establishing a connection between physical activity and well being (see Biddle et al. 2000.) This approach emphasises internal control, minimising external variables in order to establish causal relationships. This approach leads to an emphasis on short term measures of well-being, measures directly related to exercise and possibly somewhat transitory in nature. The long term effects of physical activity on well-being have been addressed in epidemiological studies (Biddle et al. 2000), though it can be argued that the preference for controlled experimental studies may have inhibited the development of a broader, long-term conceptions of the quality of life or well-being of participants, because of the operational difficulties in establishing and measuring such a concept.

The paper will also seek to address an apparent paradox between the emphasis in the psychological literature on the internal aspects of well being and the failure of the scientific approach utilised in such research to consider the experience of the first person. Boyd (2000) refers to how an acceptance that a true picture of us is found “out there” rather than within us concedes the scientific point of view and allows for the perpetuation of the image of the athlete, being the image of health. Whilst concepts such as affect and emotion within the literature of exercise psychology are prevalent,

the concepts themselves are said to blur the qualities of emotional reactions (Lazarus 1991 in Biddle et al. 2000). The paper will seek to address whether these constructs are adequate representations of human experience essential to well being, or a reduction of the concepts, facilitating intersubjective comparison and a scientific notion of objectivity, that fail to apply to the real world.

Trivial Pursuits: Christopher Lasch & The Degradation of Sport, a Critical Reappraisal

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There is now a comprehensive body of work within the academic study of sport concerned with the impacts of the global processes of commodification and commercialisation upon the ethical and social contexts of sport. This body of work predominantly conceives these as a ‘corruption’ or ‘degradation’ of sport and its meanings. This paper seeks to reappraise these assumption utilising Christopher Lasch’s (1979/1991) psychoanalytically influenced Marxist critique of sport. Lasch offers a considerable challenge to the sociological and philosophical study of sport, which undermines dominant perspectives upon the commodification of sport and its wider implications. From the outset Lasch challenges the sociological premise that sport has any meaningfully significant relationship with what might be termed wider society. Lasch (1979/1991: 100) argues, that the essence of sport resides in the explicit futility of the autotelic sporting act. Furthermore Lasch lambastes the academic cannon for its compromise on the question of sporting competition and its rejection of the maxim that ‘nothing matters but winning’ – the composite elements that Lasch identifies as essential if sport is to have any meaning at all. Following Lasch we contend that it is through sports ‘futile’ ‘useless’ nature exemplified in its relentless competitive ethic, that sport derives its authentic meaning - as sporting acts in and of themselves, rather than as measures or illustrations of external social process. Whilst the process of commodification and commercialisation are apparent for all to see, this paper argues that the seeds for sports corruption lie within the contemporary critique of commodification itself, premised as it is upon an implicit (and reductionist) trivialisation of the competitive ethos as a crude economic impulse. Furthermore the paper suggests that Lasch’s critique provides the basis for utilising psychoanalysis as a critical tool within the study of sport, particularly with reference to the pertinent question of the subject and its intellectual diminishment within the contemporary moment.

The Moral Potential of Sports: A Philosophical Analysis

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This paper firstly, examines the ways in which the notion of ‘character’ and ‘virtue’, implicit in virtue-ethical approaches to moral philosophy helps us to characterise a ‘morally’ good sportsperson (Aristotle; Sherman, 1989; Kupperman, 1991; Hursthouse, 1999). Hursthouse (1999) views an action to be morally correct ‘if it is

what a virtuous agent would do under the circumstances'. This suggests a strong link between 'acting virtuously' and who we perceive to be a 'morally' good person.

There exist conflicting views on the nature and extent of the 'moral' role of the teacher (Carr 1996). Virtue-ethical approaches to moral education emphasise the importance of the kind of person the teacher is in nurturing, developing and cultivating a child's moral outlook (Pincoffs, 1985). Slote (1997) contends that 'the *only* way to understand and apply the virtues' is to see them enacted in others. On this view, the teacher acts as a moral exemplar. What sports are taught and how they are presented and taught, are seen to have both a positive and negative affect on the ways children perceive their own participation in sports (Jones and McNamee, 2003).

Secondly, following Pincoffs (1986), I argue that most people (in this case PE teachers) *are* concerned with the kind of person they are and want to be. If this is true, then rather than perpetuating an increasingly narrow focus on (PE) teachers' management skills, teacher education institutions should extend their Continuing Professional Development provision to include a range of imaginative opportunities and programmes that aim to develop the 'moral' role of the (PE) teacher (Armour & Yelling, 2004). By adopting a virtue-ethical approach in the context of PE and school sport, I argue that, a PE teacher is better able to examine, describe and evaluate what constitutes: i) a 'morally' good sportsperson; ii) 'moral practices' in sports; and iii) appropriate 'practice communities' to aid in the moral development of young sportspeople. Finally, I consider the effects such an examination might have on the 'flourishing of the teacher' (Higgins, 2003) and on shaping culturally valuable human activities, such as sports, for young people (MacIntyre, 1985).

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The significance of endurance in women's distance running: a contextual exploration

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This paper uses a hermeneutical approach to discuss the meaning and significance of endurance, in the context of women's distance running, and argues that endurance consists of many paradoxical elements, some of which should possibly be valued highly, while others are in themselves negative. The hermeneutical approach enables the details of events as they are experienced to contribute to a more accurate theoretical sketch of endurance.

The significance that endurance may hold for specific women is explored in relation to the experience of enduring the later parts of marathons, and other long distance runs. Narratives and case studies are used to gather 'empirical' material for understanding what occurs as a runner endures. This material provides a sketch of endurance which can then be analysed, with attention to the internal workings of endurance, as well as to the particular nature of endurance in specific running contexts. The interpretation of this material reveals the structure of endurance as consisting of a tension between endurance and difficulty which may be suffering. For the woman who endures as she runs this tension occurs between hope and despair. The interpretation also reveals the contextual nature of endurance, here, as intrinsically related to the content of each specific running experience. This content may include: the running environment, possibly the natural world; transcendence of everyday life, possibly empowerment or spiritual experience; and the experiences of solidarity and isolation.

Analysis of endurance as experienced in women's distance running is found to be related to hope and opposed to suffering and difficulty. The paper uses the interpretation of the material to sketch out possibilities for a Christian understanding of endurance, and asks if endurance might have a broader significance, arguing that any positive evaluation of endurance must confine itself to the elements of the endurance experience which relate to hope and the overcoming of difficulty, in order to prevent the attribution of high value to suffering.

Violence in Rugby Union and a review of institutional responsibilities for protection and redress of Rugby Union players

Brian Charles

In this paper I take violence in sport to refer to those deliberate acts performed with the intent to cause physical injury and destruction contrary to the laws and ethics in a sport. Violence is not controlled (by law and ethos, values and norms) assertion, aggression, or intimidation. Rugby Union tolerates violence as a part its evolutionary ethos. Within that historically developed ethos the morality of "zero-tolerance" is neither assumed, nor enforced. With documented evidence of such a philosophy, rugby union perpetuates the corruptibility of its own perceived morality and that of other sports. Further, rugby union and other sports practiced in post modernity may not provide satisfactory security and redress for the victims of violence, or for those afflicted by injuries brought about by controlled assertive behavior. The ethical

considerations of these issues have not been fully considered or acted upon by rugby union and other sports in contemporary society.

In this paper I address violence and its' evident culture in rugby union and the need for valued nondiscriminatory insurance policies in rugby union, and the relevance to arguments that the International Rugby Board should mandate new and more stringent policies towards on field violence, player conduct, sanctions, banned registers, and governance insurance that other world sports bodies could follow as a standard.

The paper will provide an independent review of recent violence in rugby union, its' speculated causes, and methods that could be adopted to eradicate it from the game. Further, the paper presents new methods that might be employed to provide rugby with equitable and effective insurance for all practicing players, coaches and referees, designed by its' governing body in collaboration with insurers that would be mandatory for National rugby unions to offer and clubs to acquire through the effective and efficient pooling of financial resources with strong ethical and equitable management worldwide.

The apathy of sporting institutions such as (inter)national governing bodies to address the stronger need to invest in ethics related activities and their apparent indifference to on field violence has prompted the author to promote the design of an interactive website - www.sportnotviolence.org - that may encourage many sports, and those that govern them to look introspectively at their very ethos, future practices, development, global standard disciplinary control, commercial and moral integrity, and their image in the wider community.

Playing at Monarchy: Eugène Chapus, Bourgeois Champion of the Second Empire.

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Following the fall of the second republic and the rise to power of Napoleon III, the French bourgeoisie reestablished itself as the dominant class. In order to assert themselves as the legitimate successors of the nobility, the bourgeoisie assimilated the practices and pastimes of the aristocracy. On September 17, 1854, Eugène Chapus, Editor of "Le Sport," wrote in the newspaper's first number:

Among the pleasures of Paris, Sport occupies today a special and beautiful place. For the last several years, the taste of Parisian youth has been drawn more and more to these aristocratic distractions. . . . The brilliant cult of Sport reminds us of the great and aristocratic existence in its peaceful and continual enjoyment, and for this reason that its development has long been restricted here. We have too harshly attacked hunting and elegant carriages; it has been a perpetual calumny against these opulent practices.

Sport, then, represents a return of the aristocratic life-style—it is a symbol of the prestige of the new ruling class. Chapus, however, acknowledges that the nobility's successor (the bourgeoisie) is not empowered by birth but by the new marker of power: money. He therefore adds (in the same article) practical language that appeals to the utilitarian spirit of the growing bourgeoisie.

These pastimes of a beautiful existence, which distance man from the amusements of pure sensation, elevate and invigorate his character, test his diverse aptitudes, courage, dexterity, agility, flexibility and prepare him more than one thinks, by glorifying him and poeticizing him, for the useful or brilliant careers of society.

The pleasures and benefits that we designate under the name of Sport are moreover of a hygienic necessity and the complement of life in large cities. By varying one's elegant occupations, we diminish the fatigues. After the insomnia of a night of dining and dancing, for the spirit to regain its energy, for the extremities to be renewed, for the blood to be revitalized, one needs the contact of the outdoors, the emotions of shooting, outings by carriage or by horse.

In an essay titled, “Sport and Social Class,” Bourdieu argues that sport represents “activity for no purpose,” an endeavor that allows for the accumulation of “social capital.” In the above quotation, Chapus argues that, on the contrary, sport does serve a valuable purpose (preparing practitioners for the “useful or brilliant careers of society”). Participating in sport, then, instead of leading to the accumulation of social capital, leads to the accumulation of financial capital. The evocation above of aristocratic pursuits combined with a description of established bourgeois values (work, progress, good health) amounts to the appropriation of sport (and by extension of the nobility) by the bourgeoisie.

In my presentation I will examine Eugene Chapus’ strategic attempts (outlined in newspapers and books) to use sport as a symbol of bourgeois supremacy via his description of sports as “noble pursuits” on one hand and as a “hygienic necessity” on the other.

[Original French—translations above are mine]

Parmi les plaisirs de Paris, le Sport occupe aujourd’hui une spéciale et belle place. Depuis quelques années, le goût de la jeunesse parisienne se porte avec un entraînement de plus en plus vif vers ces divertissements aristocratiques . . . Le culte brillant du Sport implique la grande et aristocratique existence dans la jouissance paisible et continue de ses prérogatives, et c'est pour cette raison que son développement a été longtemps restreint chez nous. On s'était trop attaqué en France à toutes les choses qui respirent un air de grandeur: on s'était attaqué à la vénérerie, aux chasses, aux beaux équipages; c'était une calomnie perpétuelle contre ces opulentes habitudes.

Ces passe-temps de la belle existence, qui, éloignant l'homme des amusements de pure sensation, élèvent et retrempent le caractère, mettent à l'épreuve ses aptitudes diverses, le courage, l'adresse, l'agilité, la souplesse et le préparent plus qu'on ne le pense, en le grandissant et en le poétisant, aux carrières utiles ou brillantes de la société.

Les plaisirs et les déduits qu'on désigne sous le nom de Sport son d'ailleurs une nécessité hygiénique et le complément de la vie des grandes métropoles. En variant ses occupations élégantes on en diminue les fatigues. Après les insomnies d'une nuit de bal ou d'un raout, l'esprit pour reprendre son essor, les membres pour se retrémper, le sang pour se vivifier, veulent le contact du grand air, les évolutions du manège, les émotions du tir, la promenade soit en voiture, soit à cheval.

The Paradox of Bad Faith and the Technological Attitude to the Sporting Body

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The issues of technology, the scientific manufacturing of athletes, elitism and the performance principle in sport have received much attention in recent philosophy of sport literature (Miah 2004; Munthe 1999; Schneider and Butcher 1999; Tännsjö 1999; Tamburini 1999; Loland 1999 and Hoberman 1992 and 1995). In all this work the issue of the self-deception which both emerges from and facilitates such practices as the use of performance enhancing drugs in sport, strict adherence to extreme training and dietary regimes and the adoption of a technological attitude to the sporting body has remained unconsidered.

In an initial attempt to begin to rectify that omission this paper considers Hoberman's (1992 and 1995) critique of the technological attitude in elite sport, paying particularly close attention to Hoberman's use of the work of Heidegger on technology. The paper argues that while his critique is of considerable value, it is ultimately incomplete. Hoberman emphasises the ideological nature of the problem and locates the difficulty in the dominance of the technological attitude and the lack of an adequate alternative. This fails to appreciate the degree to which athletes are responsible for their own deception.

The paper argues that the notion of bad faith, a particular form of self-deception described in the early work of Jean-Paul Sartre, helps us understand the role (and role-playing) of the athlete in the forms of self-deception which are found in elite competitive sport. Any discussion of self-deception will encounter a paradox: How is it possible for an individual to believe that something is true and yet know that it is untrue? The solution offered by Sartre rests on a complex phenomenological ontology. It is argued here that close consideration of Sartre's use of the words 'belief', 'faith', 'knowledge' and 'awareness' can assist in dissolving the paradox without the need for Sartre's phenomenological terminology.

The technological attitude to the sporting body and the accompanying practices of performance enhancement, including those found in sports science and sports medicine, clearly raise ethical issues. While bad faith is an ontological category and not an ethical one, it is closely connected to ethics in that it allows the adoption of a role as a means of hiding from freedom, responsibility and recognition of the fact that one's role and one's actions could have been otherwise, regardless of limitations placed on the realistic options available. The paper considers 'weak' and 'strong' forms of bad faith (Catalano 1993) and suggests that it is possible for athletes to avoid bad faith in the strong sense despite persistent weak bad faith.

Is there something about sport which promotes self-deception more readily than other social practices? While the paper argues (following McFee 1998 and 2004) that there is no essence of sport, it is maintained that the way in which much elite competitive sport is conducted does lead to a greater incidence of self-deception (in the form of bad-faith) than other social practices, including those which are overtly competitive and performance-orientated. It is argued that the dominance of the performance principle and the accompanying logic of progress found in elite sport, when added to

the emphasis on the body, quantification and competition, lead to elite sport having a rare combination of features which facilitate bad faith.

Friluftsliv as a Possible Guide to Wilder Area Sport in the UK?

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Contrasted to sport that takes place in a stadium or another element of the built environment, the consideration of sporting activity located in wilder, more natural, locations should engender a philosophical analysis that addresses sport and its relationship to the natural aspects of its location.

Despite its usual association with Scandinavian countries, something at least, of the genesis of *Friluftsliv* can be traced back to the influential British element of the Romantic Movement. Given such a link, this paper will explore the possibility of the adoption of *Friluftsliv* as a guide to wilder area sport in the UK.

Three themes are considered in this paper:

1. A brief history of the philosophical development of *Friluftsliv*, especially in the Norwegian context;
2. A conceptual analysis of the central normative values and aesthetic perspectives found in *Friluftsliv*;
3. To compare the contemporary Norwegian and British contexts and to consider if all, or a modified version of some of, *Friluftsliv* could be adopted as an applied philosophy to guide policy and practice in the UK.

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What is Art? James and Collingwood on Sport

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C. L .R. James famously addressed Tolstoy's question 'What is Art?' to sport. His arguments may be seen to focus on the potential grace and beauty of art, and upon the expressive elements of art. James opens up the possibility that the athlete may be understood as an actor, taking on a persona as they enter the sports arena. This paper will attempt to take James' initial inquiry further by moving from Tolstoy (and James's appeal to Berenson) to R. G. Collingwood's *Principles of Art*. While Collingwood is typically presented as an expressivist, in the third book of *Principles* he defends art as a language, through which the feelings and self-understanding of a

community are articulated. Art may thus be understood in terms of the events and objects through which a community comes to recognise itself as such. The artist (or athlete-actor) thus does not simply express their own feelings, but rather those of their community, and they require recognition and confirmation from that community. This paper will suggest that certain sporting activities may thus be understood as the focus of a community's self-understanding. A shared interest (however well or ill-informed) in the sport becomes definitive of the community, and a significant resource for articulating communal identity. The focus here would not necessarily be on a community that is participating actively in the sport, or even the community of supporters or fans, but rather on the relationship between sport and a wider 'non-sporting' community that recognises itself in the athlete or team. At best, sport becomes a critical resource through which the community does not merely affirm itself, but is forced to confront its weaknesses and insecurities. This approach could serve for the analysis of, for example, the place that rugby union plays in Welsh and New Zealand identity.

In-Between Spaces in Sport: Corporeal Re-creation and the Trick Skater

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This paper explores the transformation of the body through an experience of, and devotion to, recreational trick skating – a form of freestyle ice-skating in which figure skating moves are performed on hockey skates. This playful mixing of two distinct and highly structured on-ice disciplines both troubles the traditional division between feminized-aesthetic and masculinized-athletic sport, and affords us an in-between space from which to assess not so much what sport is, but what we seek through doing it. Such a gender- and genre-bending space is rare in the generally stratified and rule-bound world of organized sport. By its very nature, trick skating is also elusive: a Barthesian-style “exercise in intermezzo” that owes its pleasures in part to its continual interrupting, disturbing, and displacing of that which might otherwise settle into a place that isn’t in-between (Barthes, 1985). I posit that it is this mixture of ambiguity and volatility that makes trick skating an ideal site for examining “why sport?” Central to this inquiry is the notion of the body as flow rather than fleshly substance, and trick skating as “re-creation” rather than mere physical activity.

Drawing on the proprioceptive and haptic senses, the trick skater doesn’t so much copy moves as inhabit movement: allowing herself as she glides, twirls, leaps, swerves to avoid collision and sometimes falls to become but one element in a fluid interplay of ice, blades, bodies, music and air. In this light, “re-creation” through trick skating can be seen as a *Becoming* – that is, as a joyous and infinitely ongoing process of making and re-making one’s self over without beginning, without end, and certainly without end-goal. Like the competitive hockey player or figure skater, this is a body continually redefined in terms of its capacity for doing what was previously unimaginable. Where it differs, however, is that what is primarily sought by the trick skater is the simple yet exhilarating experiencing of the “thisness” of sharp blade meeting hard ice: a “thisness” which, for its emphasis on affect and the singularity of its unfolding, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) term a “haecceity.”

In other words, if the quest for perfection is what drives the competitive athlete, what drives us recreational types is not less, but more: seeking that which Georgio Agamben (1993) has described as a “halo” – that supplement added on to perfection which doesn’t so much alter a movement, as provide it with a reverberating vibration or glow. If this “accidental reward” added on to the essential allows us to re-think the frontiers, the borders, the very edges of the sporting body, it also speaks to that oh-so-astounding moment of serendipity when you find yourself in the zone. Informed by feminist re-theorizations of the body (I. M. Young; J. Grimshaw; E. Grosz) and drawing on my own experience as a trick skater, this paper works towards an understanding of what it means for a body to be in movement.

Blowing the whistle on ‘sledging’ in elite women’s cricket

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Recent stories of match-fixing, bribery, the use of recreational and performance-enhancing drugs, and other ‘inappropriate’ behaviour have challenged the reputation that men’s cricket has enjoyed for playing the game in a positive, sporting spirit. Many of these have been sensational and unusual. One feature of men’s cricket that seems, on the face of it, to be much more embedded in the fabric of the contemporary game is ‘sledging’. Described variously as ‘verbal pressure’, ‘banter’ and ‘mental disintegration’, sledging is an attempt verbally to provoke a loss of concentration on the field of play, and so compromise the performance of opponents.

Less has been made known (in the public domain, at least) about women’s cricket. This paper presents some preliminary findings from an ethnographic study conducted during the English [*sic*] summer of 2001. Data were gathered by one of us [GR] using participant observation and semi-structured qualitative interviewing techniques with fellow elite players (n=5).

The findings of the study indicate that sledging was evident, though not universal in women’s cricket. It was more prevalent at international level where the *ethos* emerged as significantly different from that of domestic competition. Importantly too, sledging can be thematically organised into an analytical typology which includes: racism, references to physical appearance, challenges to playing competence, intimidation concerning actual violence on the field, and the sexuality and/or sexual behaviour (of the player herself, or of a family member). The offensive nature of the remarks is compounded by the use of a vocabulary which emphasises (and even celebrates) ‘foul and abusive language’.

The paper concludes by considering two related issues: the defensibility of an ‘insider to the context’ to blow the whistle on this particular social practice in this way, and the responsibility of the practice community of women’s cricket to address the phenomenon.

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The Olympic way: An exploration of problems faced by teachers of Kendo when a traditional culture is challenged by modern pressures

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Budo (martial ways) is considered by Alexander Bennett (2004) to be Japan's most successful cultural export. It is a system of ethics developed in Japan and formally articulated in 1987 as the BUDO CHARTER. Its first article states:-*the object of budo is to cultivate character, enrich the ability to make value judgements and foster a well disciplined and capable individual through participation in physical and mental training utilizing martial techniques* Kendo is an exemplification of *budo* and an important Japanese culture treasure.. The concept of Kendo, articulated in 1975 by the ZNKR states' *the concept of kendo is to discipline the human character through the applications of the principles of the katana*'. . Kendo is played by two people who attempt to strike four armoured targets using bamboo swords. Traditional etiquettes, behaviour and attitudes are learnt and expected to be demonstrated in life. Fighting attitude, demonstrated by such things as spiritual pressure, self-control and posture, is considered more important than the result. High quality Kendo, being demonstrated by a good loser, is thought better of than low quality Kendo being demonstrated by a bad winner.

There is a concern in the Japanese Kendo society that 'Kendo as Budo' is becoming 'Kendo as Competitive Sport' The example of Judo and the effect of its internationalisation is held up as a warning. Carr (1993) states that when Judo became an Olympic sport its philosophical formulations fell by the wayside.

Kendo is internationalised but to a lesser extent than Judo. The International Kendo Federation, with 44 member states, holds a world championship every three years. There are moves, particularly from Korea to try and get Olympic recognition for Kendo and to change some of the equipment and regulations to make it more accessible to naïve spectators.

This struggle is reflected in Japanese schools. In the curriculum, Kendo is included in a group of sporting and social activities which encourage a healthy life style. In school clubs, a student can advance to university on the basis of competitive success. Both of these use a sporting context, are played to win and so tactical thinking and practice are important. The same teachers teach them.

Interviews with these teachers revealed, however that they had negative thoughts about teaching tactics and their reasons were strongly related to their ideologies of Kendo. For them using tactics means attempting to do anything to win and they perceive that it prevents students from learning the important essence of Kendo. Their concepts have been constructed from their own experiences of ‘Kendo as Budo’ with their teachers. They see themselves as torchbearers of the traditional culture and accept a responsibility for passing on these concepts.

The dilemma to be explored about how an important culture treasure is preserved, how the modern generation can give to it positively and pass it on enhanced.

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Vicarious Pain and Genuine Pleasure: Some Reflections on Spectator Transformation of Meaning in Sport

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The athlete’s experience of pleasure and pain in intense athletic endeavour can have a range of meanings for him or herself as an embodied being engaged in consciously adopted strategies of behaviour. Some of these meanings are ambiguous, as for example, the notion of “good pain” or in the seeking out of difficult or terrifying challenges. In this paper, I explore some wider ambiguities that are encouraged or provoked by the insertion of the spectator into the sport-situation as a consumer of the athlete’s activity. The spectator has the potential to alter, not only the external detached significance of a sporting event for him or herself as observer, but the meaning of athletic practice for the athlete, through the reshaping of the latter for alternate purposes. The revaluation of athletic performance from the pursuit of personal excellence and self-realisation (a lived activity) into entertainment product designed for more or less passive consumption by the non-participant facilitates the progressive transformation of the meaning of the athlete for others along the following lines. This transformation begins with the athlete as the representative of the ordinary possibility of success as an embodied individual, and quickly elevates him or her into a character ideal, the exemplar of courage, fortitude, and personal virtue; at a more developed level of external interpretation, the athlete (or team) becomes the champion of the spectator, the role model or focal point of civic pride whose victory asserts the ascendence of my team and town over yours; and finally, the athlete or team is the intentional object of fan identification: my team *is* me. In this context, I pursue some ways in which the demands of the “good show” incite alternate and ambiguous evaluations of pain and success of and by the athlete. For the athlete, pain indicates technical and/or practical failure; for the spectator, pain is a potential element of interest and even attraction, primarily due to the vicarious meaning placed by the spectator on the sporting event and the athlete/team as the chosen incarnation of aspirations for triumph. The real struggle and suffering of the participants heightens the symbolic value of the contest for the spectator, who is spared the real agony but experiences the joy of victory gained at tremendous cost. For the sake of the show, it is better that there be spilled blood to make the victory all

the more compelling and cathartic for the viewer—not the athlete. For at this point, the athlete and the contest exist for the sake of the spectator and the *latter's* redemption; in effect, the determination of meaning is transferred from one to the other, although for the project to succeed, both must believe that it is the athlete who is the creator of meaning.

Experience and Heidegger's analysis of authentic existence

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Although Martin Heidegger did not use the notion “experience” in his outline of fundamental ontology, I think his analysis of the human way of being is inspiring and stimulating for persons interested in the experience phenomenon.

The study briefly sketches the basic points of the phenomenological approach of Husserl's type in the first part and it differentiates the specific nature of following Heidegger's thinking. The question about the sense of a human being is unthinkable without an analysis of the world and topicality. That is why both the notions are succinctly outlined. The fleeting suggestion of Heidegger's analysis of stay – Dasein (human existence) accents the authenticity emerging from the difference between being and beingness.

Based on this preparation, the second part of the study compares the basic terminology of Heidegger's investigating of human existence and terminology coming up in the sphere of thinking over the experience. The relationship towards time and topicality is here shown as a basic point of view from which it is possible to grasp the sense of human experiencing.

The closing third part then applies this philosophical aside to the level of the pedagogical application of the experience phenomenon, concretely in the sphere of experiential education with the possibility of reviving the Hellenic term SCHOLÉ as an inspiration for the active and meaningful spending of leisure time.

Character, Virtue and Physical Education

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The perennial, and possibly tiresome question, about whether sport can contribute to the moral development of those, in particular children, who play it, has been the subject of continuous academic and political debate. As yet, however, there seems to be little conclusive evidence one way or another. Recently Theodoulides and Armour (2001) have advocated that more care and attention be paid to the issues of personal, social and moral development through team games in light of the explicit goals for Physical Education identified in the National Curriculum for P.E in England and Wales. Given the epistemological and pedagogical malaise that surrounds the issue in the media, in schools, in academic discussions, and the lack of any concrete proof of sports utility in this direction, they propose the following.

What seems to be required, therefore, is research, which looks at both PE and sport, and which seeks to critically examine the pedagogical issues raised by claiming to teach socio-moral development through team games within P.E. Useful opening

questions might be as follows: What exactly are we attempting to teach? What do we expect pupils to learn? Why? How can we know if we have been successful? (Theodoulides and Armour 2001p.19)

In this paper I attempt to answer these questions whilst advocating a significant change in the normative, methodological and epistemological commitments that have dominated previous such attempts. Moral development ought to be about the development of a good virtuous character. Developing valuable contextually sensitive, relatively stable habits of perception, emotion, judgment and action is the goal of the physical education teacher. This requires being a certain type of person as well as having certain types of skills, a person who sets good examples and creates a nurturing ethos rather than just tinkering with the curriculum and lesson structure. Finally, the measurement of success requires a rethink of the dominant empirical or action research methodologies that characterise much pedagogical research.

Aesthetical Aspects of Sports Activity

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The relationship between aesthetics and sport is varied and concerns many aspects. It is difficult to discuss it exhaustively in one text. It will always be more complex than presented so far, even for those who strive to present an approach which is universal and necessary (as suggested by Kant). It will always be possible to change something, to add something, present another, different point of view. This results from the complexity of sport and the complexity of aesthetics.

As an aside we may mention that it is impossible to formulate one exhaustive and final definition of each of these concepts. Since this seemingly simple task may not be accomplished, then the realization of an even more complex purpose, i.e. the characterization of the relationship between sport and aesthetics is even less feasible.

The views concerning this issue are always subjective to some extent and, irrespective of ambitions of the author, they always present his point of view. For this reason they are open to discussion, and encourage others to present their positions. Each author dealing with these issues may present his own ideas in at least three ways: in an autonomic, synthetic and mixed manner.

The autonomic manner is related to the presentation of one's own independent position, which differs considerably from other positions relating to the issue in question. This is the only currently used characterization of the relationship between sport and aesthetics.

The synthetic manner is used to discuss given relations in the subordinating perspective, which classifies the solutions achieved to date in this respect.

The mixed approach contains a presentation of one's own position with references to other points of view. It places a given idea in one of the existing trends, or outside it, and the existing output is treated in a transcendental, external manner (as if put in brackets, it is considered a useful or useless point of reference).

The contribution to the characterization of the relationship in question is closely related with the approach. It always reflects the research and axiological preferences of a given author. This applies to both the first and the second approach. It also applies to the synthetic presentation showing the author's own attitude to the existing output with regard to the issue being studied.

Days of Youth: political aesthetics and physical culture

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On the continent, and even more so in the Central Europe, sports were just a part of physical culture for quite a period of time, which meant that nation-building or other ideological concepts dominated the scene, including concepts of Physical Education. Sport only became an independent, autonomous field much later. In many countries, physical culture was quite a movement, with its regular public manifestations. Mass collective exercises were very important and meaningful spectacles.

The modern concept of physical culture and Physical Education started from the necessity to produce a common body – a commonwealth of individuals who possess republican virtue, discipline and physical skills to promote and defend their community. In his proposal for saving Poland, Jean-Jacques Rousseau elaborated the idea which soon became a nation-building instrument, and an instrument for all the other ends which needed a disciplined collective body, physically and mentally ready to follow this or that cause. Orchestrated physical movement of disciplined bodies was adored by all regimes, and not only by totalitarian states. The coincidence of the political and the aesthetic in physical culture may be interesting for philosophy of sport as well, because philosophy of physical culture can open some new approaches to contemporary spectacles, and develop another aspect of the use of the body and its aesthetic expression.

Socialist Yugoslavia (1945 – 1991) was no exception to the rule and, besides the general political uses and abuses of physical education and sport, it developed a spectacle celebrating Tito as a Leader, and Youth as body of his emerging new followers on the path of socialism - communism. These elaborate festivites (symbolic relay over the whole country; May as month of Youth with obligatory political, cultural, or sport activities in all schools, factories, vilalges ot towns, and many other occasions) included the transcending *finale*: on each May 25, Tito's alleged birthday, there was a central spectacle in Belgrade.

I will explore here what happened with Day of Youth festivites, and the main spectacle of May 25, after Tito's death in 1981, and how the whole monumental structure collapsed after so called »poster scandal« in 1987, from the perspective of a political aesthetic of physical culture.

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needed disciplined collective body, physically and mentally ready to follow this or that cause. Orchestrated physical movement of disciplined bodies was adored by all regimes, and not only by totalitarian states. The coincidence of the political and the aesthetic in physical culture may be interesting for philosophy of sport as well, because phylosophy of physical culture can open some new approaches to contemporary spectacles, and develop another aspect of the use of the body and its aesthetic expression.

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It is interesting to follow what happened with Day of Youth festivites, and main spectacle of May 25, after Tito's death in 1981, and how the whole monumental structure collapsed after so called »poster scandal« in 1987.

The Dialectics Of Doping: Towards An Ethics of Modern Sport

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“Doping” has proven to be one of the main threats to the social evolution of modern sport. It not only questions the moral integrity of sport as a honest competition between equals but even seems to subvert both its social legitimacy and its political and economical support. On the other side “doping” presents itself as an immanent consequence of the modern longing for ever greater achievements and unforeseeable records. Far from being a strange external power haunting the integral essence of sports somehow from the outside, doping has to be conceptualized as the “dialectical other” of modern sport. In my contribution I want to explore several aspects of this dialectics in order to outline an ethical model that could orientate both the moral evaluation of modern sports and the juridical treatment of doping.

The first part of my paper will try to demonstrate how the “ontological idea” of modern sports has developed within the conceptual framework of the modern category of nature that comprises two opposed meanings: the autonomous totality of being (the modern assimilation of the theological doctrine of a “natura pura”) on the one hand and the corrupt state of humankind that has to be evaded (Hobbes’ “status naturalis”) on the other. Sport may be understood as the physical dramatization of this dialectic: to get *beyond* nature *within* its insurmountable limits.

Drawing on arguments developed by Bruno Latour the second part will try to show, how this dialectical idea of nature, that is constitutive of the ontological structure of modern sports, has come into a crisis that is overall threatening its meaning and function. The expanding “hybridisation” of nature and the human body (and “doping” is only one of its prominent examples) gives way to phenomena, that are subverting the matrix of modern culture (and sports as one of its important elements).

The third part wants to confront the ethical problems resulting from the ontological hybridization of nature. As the controversial discussion on doping shows, the category of nature has lost its normative power to orientate the moral evaluation and juridical treatment of modern sport. Nevertheless most of the defendants of its ethos still refuse to give up the reference to this concept. I want to argue that, although the logic of hybridisation subverts any appeal to a substantial normativity of nature, it reveals an alternative ethical horizon of modernity: the inscrutability and constitutive indeterminacy of the subject (I will outline this idea in reference especially to Lévinas and Adorno). It is in this horizon that a new (both descriptive and normative) analytic of modern sport can be developed.

Dialogue with our “body”

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Dialogue, namely the dialogue (*dia-logos*) of Socrates will be shown as a means to care of our “body”.

First we will be showing what the dialogue of Socrates meant, regarding to our knowledge and its impact on our life. Then we will put it in the opposition of monologue, where monologue means not paying attention to the speech of others, to insist on one’s own will, whatever it is. It is not only in speaking though, *logos* means thinking as well. *Dia* (two) thus does not have to be only two people – but also I can speak with myself. In both cases dialogue questions the unreflected truths, which are not dangerous only for my inter-relations, but primarily for my own being. These truths create our lives, but because they are usually unreflected, we do not know ourselves.

We usually think that dialogue takes place on the level of the mind and concerns our concepts. But this is the dualistic approach to the topic. We use the word “body” in the quotation marks, as it is not the body, that we usually get from the division of the human being onto the body and mind, or body, mind and soul, i.e. a man in the dualistic tradition. It is more in the sense of looking at our human being from the perspective, where we are our body, and the body we take care of, is not an external object, a machine, but our being. Like this there is no difference between physical and psychical dialogue, we already know that these two are never divided. They are one. When they are one, the dialogue cannot aim at the mind only, but it aims at the whole of our being (viz. Heidegger’s being-in-the-world).

What is the dia (two) between what the dialogue arises? It is between “what we think we are” and “what we are”. Getting into the distance of “what we think we are”, i.e. what we have taken as the truth so far, we can question it and learn about ourselves, about what creates our life.

Dialogue about “my body” does not touch only what we usually consider physical, as if I am one, any improvement helps the whole (being-in-the-world).

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Positivism, Popper, and Paradigms; some misconceptions in sports and exercise sciences

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In this paper I offer a schematic historical and philosophical picture of positivism and the Popper's (1934) and Kuhnian (1970) challenges to it. I locate some typical confusions in selected literatures in sport and exercise sciences in both the characterisation of positivism and in Popper's falsificationist reactions against it. In sketching out the Popperian position I also show the positivistic commitments he retains viz: the fact – value dichotomy and the unity of scientific method. In contrast, and despite the value of a range of Kuhnian insights, I show some problems with the use of the concept of "paradigm" which stem from Kuhn's self-confessed laxity of use (Kuhn: 1970; 1977) and similar attributions in sports research. I question the use of paradigm talk in particular in the social sciences of sport and argue that the term must be refined or rejected. I end with a plea for the place of philosophy in the education of researchers in the exercise and sports science fields.

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Is Doping Suicide?: Considerations on Sports and Death

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Nowadays we can find many different forms of sport, sometimes they are just classic types of sport in a new covering, sometimes variations that mutated into independent kinds of sport. All in all a tendency to "the extreme" is noticeable. This trend towards extremes seems to have an "unavoidable" connotation of risk – cultivated in so called *high risk sports*. Now, what do athletes really risk in those kinds of activities and what might the benefit be?

At first we have to differentiate between types of sport where athletes have to run an *extreme distance* – a 100 km run for example, where they (only) take the risk of

“minor” injuries – and types of sport such as free-climbing or any other kind of death-centred sports, where people take an *extreme risk* into account – to risk their life. The question at stake is: do such *near death experiences* lead to an enhanced existence, respectively to an enhanced “Dasein” (Heidegger, 1993). High risk sports might not be the only way to attain an extended awareness of *being*, but sport might provide a more controlled way to experience such a challenge of life and death. In a second step an interpretation of this “flirting with death” follows (Slusher, 1967) with the help of concepts like: *luck, flow, eroticism* and *ecstasy*. These concepts can be seen as forms of expression of an enhanced existence and might be helpful to understand this “carrying-to-the-extreme” boom where people gamble with their physical existence. A further connotation of death in sports could be seen in the field of drug abuse (doping) in performance sports. For example, if athletes accept to take drugs to enhance their performance, knowing that these drugs might harm their body or might kill them, hence such a form of doping could be regarded as *suicide*. Besides the problem of death and dying, two significant aspects of immortality should be analysed. The first aspect focuses on the “as-if-immortality”, i.e. the promise of lifetime extension through sports, while the second one is a study of *heroes* and *legends* in the field of sport. “Real” heroes only seem to reach the *mystic hyperspace of immortality* when they are dead.

Talking about death and dying still seems to be a taboo in our society. Almost every scientific paper about death in the field of sport sciences is written from a medical point of view and only very few research concerning death *and* sports takes place in the humanities. Even in the ostensible domain – the philosophy of sports – only a small amount of publications on that topic can be quoted. On the contrary the philosophy itself regards the idea of “learning to die” as one of their ultimate goals. The author’s aim is to lessen this deficit by a philosophical interpretation of such death-centred sports as well as stressing the positive consequences of sporting activities in the face of death. “Finitude as topic of self-awareness attains [...] a positive momentum, because in *Grenzsituationen* [extreme situations] (Jaspers) such as suffering and death-awareness the individual is radically reflected on itself and has to encounter the task of realisation of the essence within his limited lifetime” (Burkard, 1999).

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Watching Sport

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Most philosophy or sport is focused on the sporting event itself or participation in such an event. Yet most people’s experience of sport is that of a non-participant spectator, either at the event or through the media. Is there anything of philosophical interest in the watching of sport? And does it have a unique and characteristic function that cannot be served by watching drama or looking at art?

I look at a number of areas in which the watching of sport has a philosophical dimension.

Sport as an aesthetic experience: Superficially, we can see that sport provides many good examples of aesthetic experience, broadly construed. There is the obvious grace and beauty of gymnastics, in which perfect human forms are exhibited. But there can be a more abstract, higher-level beauty in something like a style of play or particular move in football. Sport provides the transcendence from one's self that is the benefit, according to Schopenhauer, of aesthetic experience. In sport, one is able to lose the sense of self almost completely and immerse one's conscious in contemplation of the object.

Sport as a moral guide: Many use sport as a moral guide to life. It offers lessons: endeavour produces reward; adversity builds character; preserve dignity through bad luck and defeat; cheats harm themselves most; keep a cool head during bad times. Drama also displays such lessons. But sport has the key characteristic of being unscripted, just like our lives, so it allows us to see and assess the reactions of real people to life's vicissitudes. It shows that adversities can be overcome, unlike a work of fiction where a character's fate is fixed. Sport provides a moral guide in a narrow sense but it may also be a guide in a broader sense, providing practical life-lessons on how best to conduct oneself.

Sport as a focus of emotion: Sports characteristically foster intense emotional attachments. These can be to teams or to individuals. The basis for the attachment can be wide-ranging: sometimes geographical but other times ideological or simply from personal admiration. Sport enriches our emotional life in many different ways. But sport can often provide a distinctively simple and asymmetrical relationship that is appealing to many of us. We expect our team to do their best to give us joy, yet often we give little in return. This emotional experience can become a commodity. It is unlike the complexity of personal relationships that involve obligations on both sides. Some sporting allegiances may be selected on the basis of which team will best meet one's emotional needs. Hence one may choose a very successful team if one can face only good emotional experiences. Some favour a more mixed emotional package, perhaps because of the training for life it provides.

It is a reasonable hypothesis that these three aspects satisfy human needs: aesthetic experience, moral guide and emotional investment. The popularity of watching sport is in some part due to its unique position to meet all three needs, sometimes in a single experience: watching one's favourite team play a beautiful game to overcome their unworthy and immoral opponents.

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In spite of the fact that sport and philosophy both represent and express interests, needs, expectations, feelings, and possibilities of a man, sport in its present form has not been forecasted or anticipated by philosophy. Present sport being at its top level and due to its value orientation has gone beyond the subject area of reasoning philosophically and philosophy in and of itself. Current professional sport signalizes

that sports and philosophy fundamentally differentiate from each other and do not accord with each other. Thus the usual communication between science and its subject area is not possible in this case. Accordingly we pose a question whether professional sport is not set to a position of non-cognitive element related to philosophy. In our opinion it is reasonable to inquire whether present professional sport (at least several of its spheres) is estimable enough to be a subject area of philosophy. The question is particularly warrantable due to the fact that value priorities predominating in sport are not of those to be acceptable as interest priorities of philosophy. Critical reservations about certain philosophical reflection of sport and philosophical interpretation of its values in academic world and general public as well, are, *inter alia*, based on presenting the results of dualistic research on sport and its human performer. Coming from this dualism, sports activities seem to exist at two levels. The first one - "mundane" and physical is not worth being (and it is not appropriate either) a subject area of reasoning philosophically and it does not express any sophisticated values. Factual foundation for the sport and axiological reasoning also comes from factual cultural inclination of some athletes and sports officials. However, the second level which is derived from Plato's doctrine on "genuine" value of the world of ideas i.e. the world of sport ideas, does exist only in vision of philosophers and sports intellectuals. According to philosophy (unfortunately, not only philosophy) a man – an athlete is a "mechanical" duality of body and soul, mind. The first, physical substance is manipulated by sports establishment, i.e. a group of people ruling this field of man's activity. The second substance represents platonic love of lofty ideas and ideal mission of sport.

Alain and Dwain, Rio and Greg - not guilty?

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Athletes are not quite like ordinary citizens. 'Ordinary' laws and moral principles apply to athletes as much (or as little) as anyone else – but athletes are subject to another set of considerations just because they seek to enter the co-operative enterprise of competing with and against others in sporting contests. As 'contractors to contest', they must accept certain constraints in order to count as acceptable opponents.

One such putative constraint is that against doping in sport. Much has been written on the theory, facts and morality of doping, and on the justification for banning it. This essay is an attempt to explore the issue of doping in sport via applied ethics, showing how complicated and messy individual cases can be, and how our judgements about them are coloured by a range of moral possibilities and intersecting contextual features. Sometimes the sheer weight of competing considerations, together with the uncertainty of empirical determinations, overwhelms our ability to arrive at conclusions acceptable even to ourselves – sometimes there just aren't any clear-cut answers.

The paper, then, will address issues of the relation between theory, empirical evidence, background scientific assumptions, the ethics of sport and the context-dependence of our judgements.

It will do this via an examination of four recent cases involving British athletes, Alain Baxter (skiing), Dwain Chambers (athletics), Rio Ferdinand (football) and Greg Rusedski (tennis). These cases present us with very different though overlapping features, which open up a wide range of issues for consideration. It will explore the adequacy and morality of the actions of the athletes and their support teams, and of certain rules, procedures, decisions, and judgements surrounding these cases. The outcome will be assessments of the relative innocence and guilt of each athlete in respect of a variety of factors.

Using Sport As A Political Instrument

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This paper will look at the relationship between sport and politics and determine whether sport is a legitimate tool to be used within the political realm and if so, what is its acceptable and reasonable use.

In apparent contrast to the International Olympic Committee's belief that politics should not play any part whatsoever in this sporting event, over ten of the 27 modern Olympics have been affected by political disputes and boycotts. Added to the recent controversial decision as to whether England's cricket team should tour Zimbabwe, there is no doubt that sport often finds itself inextricably linked with political issues. Whether, in an ideal world it should be, is the matter I wish to bring to hand.

This paper seeks to argue that sport does have moral judgements to make in relation to political matters but that the fundamental decisions should not be left to individual players or even to the governing bodies. Leaving the decisions to those directly involved in the sport places a heavy burden upon them in regards to consequences that may adversely affect the sport's publicity, finance and future player selection. This could be seen in the International Cricket Committee's threat to fine and suspend the English Cricket Board if they failed to honour their fixtures in Zimbabwe, a punishment that would not be enforced if the Government took a clear lead and decision on the matter. In these situations, I will argue that governments are shirking their responsibilities if they do not take the resolution of such moral problems that affect sporting events upon their own shoulders. But this in turn means that governments and democratically elected politicians should be allowed the authority when taking a political stance to use sport as a means to an end even if those directly involved in the sport are uncomfortable with being used in such a manner. Further to this, I will be arguing that politicians have failed to identify the advantages of using sport as a political device in order to embrace and interest an increasingly politically disillusioned electorate.

Sport and human potential: an ethical discussion

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In this paper I explore the idea that technology can be used as an efficient means to ‘releasing undiscovered potential’ (Rechnitzer, 1989: 68) of athletes. It is undeniable that technology and scientific research has had a profound impact on modern elite sport. Equally, it is clear that there have been benefits: safer equipment can allow athletes to develop new skills and techniques; and many areas of training and conditioning can also be performed both more effectively and more safely. Nevertheless, there is also a sense in which the athlete’s body has become a laboratory specimen, the structure and potential of which can be calculated in clear-cut quantitative terms. Because the typical scientific focus is on understanding the performance, the human is all too easily reduced to a set of data points on a computer spreadsheet. The human and the human aspect of sport are neglected.

The aim of this paper is to challenge the dominant view that human potential is a given, to be exploited by scientists and technologists (physiologists, psychologists, biomechanists, engineers, and pharmacologists) alike. First, I outline and explore Scheffler’s (1985) Aristotelian-inspired account of the traditional misconceptions of human potential: (i) fixed potential, (ii) harmonious potentials, and, (iii) uniformly valuable potentials. I argue that sports scientists failure to recognize these misconceptions and damaging normative practices are powerfully at play in their approach to developing human potential in sports. Then, I reflect critically on the nature of human potential in sports in terms of a type of complex human activity as outlined in MacIntyre’s (1985) thesis, *After Virtue*, which is grounded in a virtue-based practice-tradition model. This includes reference to the place of the virtues in the concept of a practice, the narrative unity of a human life and the concept of a tradition. I conclude that technology and the practices and attitudes it encourages, obscures the proper focus on human capacities and skills given a particular shape by each sport. Rather, ethics and the notion of the good life ought to define the boundaries of what it means to develop human potential in sport. The focus will then be on the wholly human rather than on the reduced picture of physical potential.

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Conflict of Interest: An Interesting Conflict?

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Corporate sponsorship, team franchises, broadcasting rights and players’ salaries are all indications of the ever increasing move towards a model of corporate sport (Shilbury & Deane, 2001). As sport continues to become more professional and

bureaucratised, so to does the management of sport itself. Sport managers utilise the experience and knowledge gleaned from the broader business sector to further develop their sporting organisations. This phenomenon is evidenced by their readiness to embrace mainstream business management practices in order to try to ensure best practice (Shilbury & Deane, 2001).

Sport managers are looking to utilise the theories and concepts of business ethics to assist their decision-making processes and the management of their sporting organisations. One of the key examples of this move towards professionalism in sport management has been the emergence of ethical codes (Zeigler, 1989). A raft of ethical issues confronts sport, both on and off-field. Increased professionalism off-field has led to a greater focus on the accountabilities and ethical dilemmas faced by sport managers, such as fiduciary responsibility to stakeholders and ethical sponsorship choices, such as the ban on tobacco advertising at Australian sporting events.

The increasingly professionalised role of the board of directors in corporate sport has been subject to public and media attention, predominantly on the governance of sporting organisations and conflict of interest situations. A conflict of interest may be described as a conflict that occurs when a personal interest interferes with a person's acting so as to promote the interest of another when the person has an obligation to act in that other person's interest (Boatright, 1992).

There are a variety of roles, responsibilities, interests and organisational settings that may contribute to a conflict of interest. A number of cases in Australia have been reported where the inherent duties and obligations held by a director of a sporting organisation or club have potential to, or actually conflict with those of a salaried position, such as stadium management, broadcaster, coach or management role within another sport organisation.

Key ethical concepts of: morality, role conflict, agency theory, obligation and duty, benefit, and biased judgement found throughout the conflict of interest literature are drawn upon and applied to the study of conflicts of interest in sport management to conceptualise the situational relationships and roles found in a conflict of interest situation within the sport management arena.

This paper will demonstrate the relevance of literature drawn from the various business ethics theories upon which conflict of interest is based, as it relates to the study and practice of sport management.

Philosophical Aspects of Modern Olympism

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If we tried to determine the distinctive phenomena of the 20th century, sport would surely take a prominent place. It acquired the same significance that religion had in the Middle Ages: the Olympic Games became the most important festivity of the modern world and the Olympic idea its "humanistic" gospel. Modern Olympic paganism is the form in which capitalism wiped out Christianity (as well as other religions) and became the chief ideological instrument for integrating people into the spiritual orbit of capitalism. The calendar of leading sports manifestations assumed the role of religious calendars and became a spiritual pivot, while the stadium became the most important cult venue of the modern world. Sport is not only an "ideological curtain concealing the real evil" (Adorno), it is the bourgeois means of erasing the cultural traces of mankind and destroying the emancipatory heritage of civil society.

The myth of modern Olympism falls into the category of myths by which the ideologues of West-European colonial metropoles try to obtain the "civilizing" legitimacy for their colonization of the world. It ranks with the myths of the "exploratory" character of the voyages of Columbus and the "civilizing" nature of the Catholic "missions". At the same time, the creation of the Olympic myth creates a mythological conscious and a mythological relation to the fundamental principles of capitalism: *bellum omnium contra omnes* and the general principle of performance (*Leistung*) as expressed by the maxim *citius, altius, fortius*. The Olympic Games are a "festivity of youth" (Coubertin) - and that means flourishing of the vital force of capitalism and a revived faith in its "eternal" values. Hence the significance attached to the "holy rhythm" of the Games (every four years), which by no means must be interrupted. Modern Olympism is one of the most aggressive totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century, which tends to destroy man's dignified liberating spirit and "reconcile" him to the existing world of injustice (Comte). It is one of the supporting pillars of the spiritual firmament of the 20th century and thus the chief political tool for achieving one of the main goals of monopolistic capitalism: to do away with democratic institutions and establish direct control over the working class.

Philosophical considerations of sport are burdened by misconceptions and bias, so that even such thinkers as Jager, Bloch, Sartre and Horkheimer fail to grasp the essence of sport as a concrete historical phenomenon: Jager reduces sport to the ancient agon; Bloch maintains the illusion that sport is an value-neutral phenomenon and that there exist "good" and "bad" sports depending on whether they are "left" or "right"; Sartre sees in sport a way of leading man to being; Horkheimer, who laments the plight of philosophy, appeals to sport to save the most important values of capitalism - from capitalism itself. It has turned out that fighting for philosophy and supporting sport as the chief means of the capitalist way of dealing with the mind is not only a hopeless, but also a disastrous business.

The fundamental idea used in this paper as the starting point for a criticism of capitalism is not Marx's "alienation" (*Entfremdung*), but the idea of destruction. Starting from Marx's most important methodological postulate, that the "anatomy of man is the key to understanding the anatomy of monkey", it is justified to establish the starting point for a criticism of monopolistic capitalism at its final "consumer"

stage of development, in which the contradictions of capitalism as a destructive order dramatically threatening the survival of mankind have been fully developed. The fact that capitalism has evolved into a destructive system not only discredits bourgeois thought, but throws a new light on Marx's criticism of capitalism, questioning its foundations and current relevance.

"Something you either believe in or you don't, like God": Masculinity and the Sacramental Nature of Sport in Nick Hornby's Fever Pitch

For good or ill, the relationship between masculinity and sport is well established, if not always well investigated. Epic representations of sports and sports stars, like the romantic images of the soldier-hero which preceded them, act as masculine signposts, directing boys toward stable, recognizable and "appropriate" forms of manliness. In many cases, sport provides the cognitive framework, the grand narrative, through which males begin to understand what it is to be a man.

Nick Hornby's 1992 soccer memoir *Fever Pitch* demonstrates the degree to which sport forms the basis of a specifically masculine spiritual life. Perhaps more importantly, it demonstrates the ways in which the rituals of the sporting life (the ceremonies of donning jerseys, taking the train, drinking, singing, etc.) serve specifically religious purposes for some men. Hornby's book suggests that, in the absence of any more conventional religious faith, and, in the presence of crumbling families and cultures, men use sport as the mythic super-structure which gives meaning to otherwise insignificant lives. The proposed study shows how Hornby's presentation of sport is essentially sacramental in nature, how the transformations and transubstantiations of sport "only work if one believes" (*Fever Pitch* 83). The football matches Hornby describes seem to act as sacraments in the sense described in Vatican II; they represent the "middle way" (*Symbol and Sacrament* 415) between the profane and the sacred, between doubt and faith, and between agony and ecstasy. They allow for a type of ritualized spiritual transcendence, one which recognizes that "the loss of [individual] identity can be a paradoxically enriching process" (*Fever Pitch* 44). And, this ritualistic sense of the sacred is not the simple result of a kind of idle hero-worship (aimed at strong, athletic men), but rather a legitimately religious type of devotion to a mammoth but intangible abstraction. As Hornby describes it, "the players are merely our representatives" (*Fever Pitch* 153). They serve the function of priests and ministers, closer to, but not synonymous with, the ideal they represent. The "magnificently single-minded sense of purpose" (*Fever Pitch* 197) that Hornby finds in sport is in effect a kind of secular and culturally sanctioned avenue toward masculine spiritual contemplation; it provides a unique forum for belief, hope and faith in contemporary masculine consciousness.

In *Fever Pitch*, sport is not just serious recreation; it's the foundation of an acute and involved spiritual life, one that dwarfs (and masks) the pettiness and disappointment of daily life. Compared with soccer, "real life is paler, duller, and contains less potential for unexpected delirium" (*Fever Pitch* 188). To Hornby's soccer-mad men, "real" life is something very like "mortal" life to the faithful, a subdued and unrewarding precursor to something eternal, majestic and good, a prelude, in fact, to heaven.

Offside and involvement

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The offside law in Association Football (Law 11) and the recent FIFA guidelines on its interpretation may seem an unlikely subject for philosophical analysis. No so.

I shall argue that there are three aspects of philosophical interest:

Semantic. The terms “opinion of the referee”, “involved in active play”, “interfering” and “gaining an advantage” will be analysed. It will be shown that so far as Law 11 itself is concerned there is terminology which is otiose and misleading. It will further be shown that the guidelines on clarification far from making clear only add to the obfuscation.

“Ought implies can”. It is an accepted principle that it is improper to impose an obligation on a person in authority if that person cannot as a matter of fact be expected properly to carry it out. I shall submit that the offside law/ interpretation cannot be made operational and therefore is abused as a direction on practice.

Intentionality. I shall also show that the introduction of language indicating intentionality in the guidelines far from clarifying introduces a notion which is missing from the law and is both unnecessary and misleading.

The game (like all games) is shaped by its rules and guidelines on their interpretation. If these are inadequate then the game is seriously weakened.

This is no empty academic exercise. If, as is happening, a law is amplified by guidelines, alleged clarifications, which are then themselves further interpreted, differentially, by officials responding to different actions by players either doing what they believe to be legitimate or testing the limits of legitimacy or trying to get away with exceeding the limits, then there is an urgent need for genuine analysis of the problem and its solution. The issues are not simply empirical. Philosophical analysis will show what is wrong and point to a way forward.

Gentlemen professionals: the applicability of codes of conduct to international sport

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The sporting contest is predicated upon the notion of ‘fair play’. Historically, this concept has come from the playing fields of the English public school system, where one was expected to play not only by the rules of the game, but to abide by the ‘spirit’ of the game. Not to do so was perceived as a flaw in one’s character. This understanding of the nuances of ‘fair play’ shaped the ethos of the ‘gentleman’ and was deemed to differentiate him from the ‘professional’ (Loland, 2002).

In the 1980s, the sport of cricket became big business and the governing body, the International Cricket Council (ICC), realised that they had players whom they

expected to be gentlemen professionals, but whose behaviour may not have always mirrored such an ideal. In 1992, the ICC turned to a code of conduct in order to provide guidelines for all aspects of the game. According to McNamee (1998:151), such codes can provide:

clarity and simplicity in a confusing world
standards of conduct that can be consistent over time
a neutral framework for conflict resolution
an ability for the professional body to exclude those whose behaviour is non-conformist.

The ICC code appears to conform to these ideals. It is a prescriptive document of thirty pages that ensures that every one connected with the game at the international level is well aware of their obligations to abide by it. It is framed in legalistic terms with a definition for every activity of the game and for each infraction that is cited there are penalties determined. The code is extremely detailed in its coverage of the expected behaviours of participants. It looks at such issues as dress standards, sponsorship and especially focuses on player misconduct whilst playing the game. Borrowing from the business literature and the classification categories of Vinten (1990), one would classify the ICC code as being *regulatory*: such a code is similar to the Ten Commandments. There are no shades of grey and statements about ethical imperatives are not open to debate.

The ICC code does seem to lack in an important area of code development. It has no introductory statement of intent to give players an explanation of the reasons for the rules embodied in the code. It appears to be assumed that these players will automatically be acculturated in to the ethical philosophy and intent of the code. This may not be as obvious as it may seem when at the highest level, players from such diverse countries and cultures play the game.

International sports that establish codes of conduct that transcend cross-cultural boundaries need to ensure that all parties are able to relate to the ethos of the code. A statement of ethical intent should be a part of the document and communicated to all stakeholders. Not to do so may lead to different cultural interpretations of the concepts underpinning the code and as such may lead to transgressions that are based more on cultural difference than intended rule violations.

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