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Sports' contribution to well-being

Andrew Bloodworth

It is widely held both within and outside the academic community that sport and exercise enhance the quality of our lives. Psychological research in particular has focused upon the contribution of exercise to our well-being. (Biddle 2000). This research has employed subjective assessments of well-being, focusing on how exercise makes one feel.

These subjective assessments leave a number of questions unanswered. Can an individual be mistaken in considering sport and exercise to be a part of their well-being? Research has suggested that the use of exercise in avoidance or emotion- focused coping, employed by someone with an eating disorder, may help to cover up deeper- seated problems (Loumidis and Wells 2001). A related question concerns whether our well-being is limited to how we feel, and whether sport and exercise may contribute to our well-being in the absence of positive affect, perhaps in times of challenge or struggle? Philosophical theories of well-being offer an alternative platform from which to examine such questions.

Griffin's Well-Being (1986) is a highly regarded philosophical theory. The theory proposes the prudential values that well-being consists in: (i) Accomplishment; (ii) Agency – liberty, autonomy; (iii) Understanding; (iv) Enjoyment and (v) Deep personal relations. These prudential values will be analysed in the context of sport and exercise. Griffin's theory not only provides a basis from which to explore the potential value of sport, but also to investigate the importance of our own attitudes to participation, how we value the activities and the implications for our well-being. A discussion of this point will address Griffin's concept of informed desire and individual differences in the pursuit of well-being. An examination of this complex theory is hoped to enhance our understanding of both well-being and the role of sport and exercise in our lives.

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Moral Education and Physical Education: a virtue-theoretical approach

Rona Brodie, University of Gloucestershire, 1.2.05

NCPE documentation, in England and Wales, requires that PE teachers address 'the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of their pupils' (DfEE,1999:8). Whilst this places the responsibility for moral education 'more- in-the-hands' of the practitioner it provides very little, in the way of further insight, as to how the practitioner might go about morally educating young people in their care (Carr, 1996). I consider whether a virtue-ethical approach to moral education in PE and sports can provide guidance to PE teachers and coaches who take seriously the goal of moral development.

Any examination of what is a good sportsperson requires some explanation about how the sports part of the term 'sportsperson' qualifies the good person (McNamee, 1995). To be a good sportsperson in a particular sporting context requires that a person have, or acquire, certain dispositions or character traits rather than others. A good sportsperson will be required to act in certain ways and demonstrate a range of sensitivities in different contexts, with different people, under different circumstances. I aim to show how an involvement in PE and sports require and make salient some dispositions or character traits over others. Part of the problem is that there is no conclusive proof to say that an engagement in sports does in fact develop a good person and some empirical evidence is quite to the contrary (Bredemeier and Shields, 1998).

I adapt a MacIntyrean virtue-ethical approach to moral education for PE and sports and aim to show that a good sportsperson does not come about accidentally or solely through their own efforts. Following MacIntyre (1985), I examine whether teleologically-oriented moral theories can help sportspersons distinguish between the kind of person they are now and the kinds of person they want to be become. I critically examine MacIntyre's (1985) claim that an involvement in practices, such as sports, makes more intelligible, to young people (and their teachers and coaches), what it is to be and become a 'morally' good sportsperson. Finally, I explore whether a focus on the disposition of the 'joyful' sportsperson offers PE teachers and sports coaches a telos through which the moral educational potential of PE and sports could be more readily taught and realised.

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'Dehumanisation' and Performance-Enhancement

Leon Culbertson

This paper focuses on the claim by Schneider and Butcher (2000) - repeated by Miah (2004) - that it makes little sense to criticise the use of performance-enhancing drugs (in the case of Schneider and Butcher) or genetic modification of athletes (Miah) as 'dehumanising' (as, for example, Hoberman, 1992 does) because we are unable to give a satisfactory account of what it is to be human. Schneider and Butcher (2000: 196) put this as follows: 'The dehumanisation argument is interesting but incomplete. It is incomplete because we do not have an agreed-upon conception of what it is to be human. Without this it is difficult to see why some practices should count as dehumanising.'

The case against the use of the concept of 'dehumanisation' rests on the fact that no satisfactory account can be given of what it is to be human. The fact that we can't say what it is to be human means that we cannot claim that anything is dehumanising, because to 'dehumanise' is to make no longer (or at least less) human.

I argue that there is a mistake here in the interpretation of the meaning of the word 'dehumanise'. It is meaningless to use 'dehumanise' as if it mean 'to make no longer human', or 'to reduce one's humanity'. Not only is this meaningless, it is also not what we mean when we say that the genetic modification of athletes or the use of performance-enhancing drugs is 'dehumanising'. Further, I argue that because we know what we mean by the word 'dehumanising' when used in this context, there is no need for us to have a definitional account either of what it is to be human, or of what 'dehumanisation' means. A definition in either case appears 'neither possible nor desirable' (McFee, 2004: 22).

I argue that Schneider and Butcher (2000) and Miah (2004) i. Confuse the existential verb for a copula in propositions such as 'I am human'. ii. Treat existence as a predicate, and iii. Treat 'dehumanise' as univocal and fail to consider it in the concrete context of language-in-use. Approaching 'dehumanise' in context requires consideration of the contrast that is drawn in concrete cases of the use of the word. This raises questions about agency and confusion around the concepts of 'natural' and 'unnatural', and the distinction between the two. The paper attempts to clarify some objections to the use of performance-enhancing drugs and the prospect of genetic modification of athletes by sketching an overview of possible concrete uses of 'dehumanise'. The focus of the paper, however, is 'making sense of what we (are inclined to) say ... [rather than] ...making explicit what underlies what we say' (McFee, 1993/4: 115).

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Critical (Realist) Reflection on Policy Enquiry in Sports

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This paper revisits the ontological and epistemological grounding of economic, social science and management research in sports that has, as its motivation, a desire to inform policy. To inform policy requires an implicit assumption about the generality of insights and, moreover, access to enduring phenomena upon which policy levers can operate. Yet these assumptions are not typically made transparent in applied work, emanating from an economic or management perspective and much social science research rejects the concepts. In what sense, thus can research inform policy advice and, or policy failures be understood? The paper argues that critical realism can provide the philosophical framework within which answers to these questions can be offered. Moreover, critical realism imposes some clear guidelines upon the nature of research design. As well as research design, the paper revisits concepts of cause, including agency and emergence. The arguments are illustrated with reference to research into professional team sports and volunteering.

The State of Scottish Climbing: bolt or not?

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This paper presents, and examines the need for, a set of criteria by which to evaluate the role and justification for bolting climbing routes in Scotland. Bolting involves drilling metal rungs into the rock so that the climber can clip into these and protect his progression. Although bolting has been a central focus of ethical dispute within climbing communities for many years, it has recently re-emerged with particular controversy within the context of what many take to be a bastion of traditional (non-bolting) climbing: Scottish winter climbing. Unfortunately, the discussion of bolting has been informed by lack of argument and just plain bad argument on both sides of the debate. Our aim in this paper is to provide a more reasoned approach by rationally reconstructing and critically assessing the grounds for relevant arguments. Having separated a number of frequently conflated issues (for example, prohibiting bolting per se and limiting it, bolting for some purposes but not others), we draw attention to the diversity of considerations relevant to all these issues. They include: environmental and aesthetic factors; the role bolting has for climbing 'development'; the value of traditional practices; the impact of bolting on mountain 'tourism'; and so forth. We then construct and examine specific arguments, and assess the extent to which the considerations they raise can be weighed against one another in giving overall verdicts on the issue. An important implication of our strategy is that it raises a number of further issues. In particular: who is, or should be, the source of authority – (e.g.) representative bodies or leading climbers? What measures can, and should, be imposed on those who violate generally recognised codes of practice? Should there be general (or location-specific) codes? Our aim is not to provide specific answers to these questions but, rather, to introduce the issues they raise in a more systematic and hopefully instructive way.

The missing art of sport.

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The purpose of this presentation is to explore the relationship between sport and art by examining the representation of sport in the visual arts (and in particular in sculpture and painting). Superficially, sport would seem to be an appropriate subject for visual artists. Kant and Hegel both identified the representation of the human body as the 'ideal' of artistic beauty, and the corpus of ancient art contains notable examples of sculptures based on sport (the discus thrower and the wrestlers), as well as vase paintings representing the ancient Olympics. Much modern sporting art is of poor quality, failing to engage at any depth with the major developments of contemporary art. Sport is rarely the subject-matter of Western canonical painters in the modern era. Exceptions tend to relate to hunting scenes and field sports, to bull fighting (Goya) or to equestrianism (e.g. Stubbs and Degas). It may be suggested that the absence of sport in art reflects the separate social and cultural developments of art and sport. Modern sport, characterised in terms of mass participation and mass following, emerges at historical point at which art turns away from mimesis. While this is a key element in exploring this relationship, it cannot be exhaustive. A few modernists do turn occasionally to sport (e.g. Leger), thereby suggesting its continuing potential for artists, while relatively few of the remaining realists or mimetic painters demonstrate an interest in sport (with those few including Eakins and Bellows). The presentation will approach this issue within an analytical framework borrowed from Adorno's Aesthetic Theory. There Adorno treats art dialectically both as a social fact and as autonomous – in order to explore the tension between its determination by social conditions and its development in terms of its inherent aesthetic logic. A similar approach may be applied to sport, to suggest that it too develops through an interaction between its social determination and its inherent logic. The presentation will therefore explore the points of tension both within the social constitution of sport and art, and in their inherent logic and meaning as autonomous cultural activities. In conclusion it will be suggested that while social factors tend to separate mass participation sport from elite high art, there is a fundamental overlap in their meaning, allowing them to be read as separate but potentially equally valid responses to the contradictions of late capitalism.

A Soft Gynocentric Critique of the Practice of Modern Sport

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Despite over a century of feminism and accompanying social scientific research on gender, many aspects of contemporary society, such as films, advertising, popular music, business, politics, education and sport recreate and naturalise this supposed biological gender difference. At the same time the image of men as masculine and women as feminine is perpetuated and the former quality is elevated above the latter. In this paper I critically analyse and re – conceptualise the numerous ideological practices that work to preserve sport as a primary site for maintaining this historical pattern of male dominance and female subordination. This paper will also review contemporary strategies aimed at challenging the hierarchy of sex in the sporting world; colonization of the feminine through mass consumption and mass media; maintenance of male sport as the standard; the elevation of a narrow (masculinised) definition of excellence and the numerous ideological methods which help perpetuate this. This involves firstly discrediting the spurious notion, which serves patriarchal interests, that the fundamental determinants of gender identity are biological or genetic factors. I argue instead that gender is a social construct that is attached to a given identity and that these secondary characteristics arise later in the production of one's identity. This view recognises the influence of biological sex, however, regards social influences as the most significant determinant of gender identity. I will examine the suggestion that sport offers potential tools for debunking gender concepts and will argue that sport can be a social practice liberating to both men and women. This will involve the analysis of two main strands of feminism, gynocentric and humanist feminism. I will explore the shift from the popularised liberal feminism towards a more radical critique of male dominated society. However, I will not strictly adhere to all aspects of one over the other but offer instead a soft gynocentric approach as an alternative in this critique of the modern practice of sport.

The Problem of Corporeality and Temporality

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The body is understood in a variety of ways in sport and in the scientific study of sport: as object and mechanistic physiology;; or as „experienced“ as in classical psychology. Equally, in understanding the moving body of sports persons, we can attend to factors such as the Spatiality of one's body own and one's own motility; or the role of temporality from phenomenological point of view in synthesis of one's bodily experiences; or the body as experienced in expression and speech.

Writers as distinct as Nietzsche and Heidegger have extolled different ways of understanding our experience of corporeality. Nietzsche talks of onticity, and how our appreciation of existence of individual persons is derived from considerations of power. The transferrance of this idea to situations in sport might offer a new perspective for the analysis of performance in the human life. Heidegger, has argued that our intentional disposition toward the world is founded through the idea of being „ready to hand“. The prolonged hand of our „hand“ is the speech from Heideggerian's point of view. „The body is in possession“ of our hand and the speech. Both creates the substance of intention to the world. This intention is fundamental to our understanding of human motility. He argues, moreover, that the phenomenological analysis of time is the basis for the understanding of the motion of our hand and „hand“ as speech.

Sport is symbol of our Heideggerian hand: the significance of sport is the symbol of our speech. An education in sport ought therefore to be the background for the whole human motility, for the whole life. I argue that those who merely understand human motility in terms of its biological a physiological life typically miss out the richness of our lived-experience in sport which can only be attained through phenomenological considerations such as those of Heidegger and Nietzsche.

Is Fink's phenomenology of game and play sufficiently radical?

Ivo Jirásek, University of Olomouc, Czech Republic

As the European tradition of thinking regarding the concepts of "game" and "play" are not really known in the U.S.A., the paper briefly reminds us, in the first part, of the philosophical ideas of basic thinkers regarding game and play, specifically: Huizinga, Caillois and Wittgenstein. Having given consideration to the relationships between culture and game and play, to the peculiarity of the classification of games and to the conception of language as its own game, it is possible to explore phenomenological interpretations of game and play.

The central part of this paper charts the developments in the thinking of Eugen Fink and the direction in which he aims at the question of world and in particular his ontology of game. The paper recapitulates Fink's attitude toward game and play as to "existential" (and thus the equalization of game with other structural moments of human existence) and then his conceptualization of "game" and "play" as symbolic of the world. It is just in this relationship between game and world - in Fink's conceptualization - that it is possible to see some inconsistency of this interconnection. The difference between the actual world and the world of games is justified by symbolic representation, by the magic character of things. First of all the selfhood of time and topicality of game ("the flash of eternity") indicates the possibility of the separating of these two worlds, however the idea is underdeveloped. I therefore deal polemically with Fink's embedding of game in the form of an ontological non-independent non-real field whereas he confronts it with the concept of the so-called possible world of game and play.

The paper uses for empirical documentation of such a position the example of some games originating in the Vacation School of Lipnice, in an organization which is a member of the international "Outward Bound" movement. The perception of the world of game as ontologically possible, having materialized and been made to exist in the present, exists only for those actually involved in the course of playing the game itself (not for those participating merely in the observation of a game). This is an experience every player is able to confirm.

Re-humanizing sport: Giovanni Gentile's contribution to the instances of modern sport

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Re-humanizing sport today means to centralize again the actions of man in this social practice. The thought of Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944), the most important Italian philosopher and pedagogue of the twentieth century, with his doctrine of the act ("actualism"), overcomes the rigid Cartesian dualism of spirit versus nature and soul against body, and permits the interpretation of the physical dimension as a reality that man – through play, sport and athletic exercises – continuously "spiritualizes" and transforms in part his cultural world. In this paper I consider both the body and the "lusory attitude" (Suits, 1966) as an essential element of man's civil education and unique existential realisation. This means – first of all – that we resist the mechanisation and de-individualisation of his acts by means of science and technological application as exemplified in practices such as doping.

The Line Between Art and Sport: Dressage, a Case Study

Michele Friend

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There are several sports which straddle the line between art and sport: ballet, gymnastics, synchronised swimming and so on. The discussion of the paper should apply to all of these equally, even if the examples are taken from dressage, where there has been a lot of heated debate over whether to think of dressage as a sport or as an art. In the dressage literature we draw the distinction verbally. Typically, 'classical dressage' falls on the 'art' side. 'Competitive dressage' falls on the 'sport' side. In the paper, I look at what the arguments are for thinking of dressage as one or the other. I look at how it is that dressage riders and trainers in fact draw the distinction, and then look at whether or not this distinction is philosophically well motivated by considering how philosophers individuate art. Lastly, the paper addresses the question of how this distinction affects the teaching, judging and presentation of dressage.

More specifically: a spectator might witness two consecutive rides in a dressage test, and not know that one of the riders is a 'classical' dressage rider, and the other is a 'competitive' dressage rider. They both compete, they both do well. They both look much the same. Moreover, many of the higher-level judges of dressage claim to be classically motivated. The rules for competing are supposed to be built on classical principles. Thus, the distinction is not an obvious or superficial one.

One way of drawing the distinction between dressage as an art form and dressage as a sport has to do with primary motivation. If one's motivation is to win prizes and ribbons in competition, then one is riding the dressage movements as a sport. If one is primarily interested in adhering to the classical principles, then one is unwilling to sacrifice those principles in order to do better in a competition. There are other ways of drawing the distinction.

Some philosophical theories of art call something art if it is seen as art. Thus, an object which was created by a person, but not intended to be seen as a piece of art, might nevertheless turn out to be so. This theory of art does not fit the motivational/ intentional way of drawing the distinction above.

Students, spectators and judges of dressage usually have a mixed idea of dressage as a sport and as an art form. However, how dressage is taught, seen, written about and judged varies with which side of the line, between art and sport, one is inclined towards. Disentangling the two sides of the line should help us, on a conceptual level, to be better sportsmen, artists, teachers, judges, presenters and 'sports' commentators.

Bioethics and Doping

Anna Di Giandomenico

Doping has been rapidly increasing in sport in the last few years: this type of phenomenon is commonly viewed in a negative way because of the effects it has on the athletes' health are detrimental in the long run. This paper examines the possibility of another type of doping – one that has no side-effect but only the desired improvement in performance. If this were possible would it still be considered unsporting behaviour?

This is not an odd question at all, if one thinks of the biotechnological perspectives and advantages disclosed by research on stem cells. Replying to such a question means firstly defining sport; then verifying if doping alters not only performance but also the main characteristics of a sporting activity.

Having identified the main characteristics of sport in the strict sense of the word, relating it to the improvement of one's own abilities, as well as within the institutionalization and the consequent regulation of the relationships interwoven inside the sporting practice, we analyse these relationships in order to verify whether they undergo or not any considerable change when a doping practice is taking place. First, we will examine the relationship the athlete has with his himself and his own body: a relationship that constantly pushes the athlete to go beyond his own limits, which implies an improvement of his own abilities. The following will be taken into consideration: the relationship with other competitors that presupposes the equality of the respective abilities, and the particular relationship between the athlete and the referee and/or the umpire – an asymmetric relationship, as the referee's power to decide is final– and finally the relationship between the athlete and the spectators.

Our aim is to verify the extent to which doping modifies these relationships. Transforming sport into an activity that could be defined as competitive but not certainly as sporty: in this case, the competitive spirit is influenced by interests that are not characteristic of sport but are imposed by communication, mass media or commercial needs. When the competitive spirit prevails, it is useful to distinguish the concepts of sports from games, by the unique characteristic which rules the sporting activity as a whole. Its main goal and grounds end up by coinciding: one must win, in any case and in spite of everything! At this point, the issue is that such an activity may be differently defined, but certainly not as sport – since all its characteristics have been eliminated and the only one left is that of pure competition.

Injury and the Suspension of Play: an examination of the moral terrain

Alun Hardman

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The Football Association Cup match between Arsenal and Sheffield United on the 13th of February, 1999 has provided much ammunition for professional pundits and philosophers alike. This was the game where the Sheffield United goalkeeper intentionally kicked the ball out of play to allow a team-mate to receive treatment after a challenge by an Arsenal player. The United players clearly thought the Arsenal players would return possession with the ensuing throw-in according to an "unwritten rule" of the game. Subsequent events show that some of the Arsenal players were unclear as what to do as the restart saw Arsenal regain possession and almost immediately score the game's winning goal while the United players stood impassively. After much rankling, Arsenal's offer to replay the game was deemed an exceptionally generous one.

My interest in morality of this event is twofold. The first has to do with examining the actions that initiated the controversy itself, namely, whether the unwritten rule in football which asserts players must stop the game when a player is injured is either morally commendable or a pre-reflective convention. The second has to do with assessing whether or not a more universal understanding of such cases can be developed in general. By using the unwritten rule in football as my key exemplar therefore, my overall task is to systematically examine the broader moral issues that emerge from the view that sporting contestants are morally obligated to voluntarily stop the game when a player is injured.

The philosophical tools that will be used in the first part of the paper to better understand this particular football example are well established in the literature on fair play. The issue will be examined from three ethical perspectives (a deontological, a utilitarian and a virtue ethics approach) in order to demonstrate the comparative strengths and weaknesses that each particular perspective has to offer.

Thereafter, the second part of the paper will focus on developing a more comprehensive conceptualisation as to how we are to understand and respond to situations where injury (or the potential for injury) is encountered in different sporting environments. It will examine the extent to which it is possible to develop more systematic guidelines to help deliberate on a broad range of sports where actions, born out of consideration for the prevention of injury (or potential injury) to participants, need to be evaluated in conjunction with how such actions impact other moral and nonmoral goods of sport.

Is the principle of fair play the highest value in sport?*

Jerzy Kosiewicz

The conclusion the author comes to is the following: although the principle of fair play is of vital and unquestionable importance for sport, it cannot be treated as the highest value within this form of social activity. He gives grounds for this opinion by presenting arguments of a historical and contemporary character.

The first of these refers to the roots of European agon, that is to the ancient Olympics. He points out that the highest values of ancient Olympic sport were religious values since the foundations of this sport were constituted by assumptions of cult-oriented and soteriological nature. These leading values of autotelic character were accompanied by utilitarian values, connected with shaping and fulfilling of sport behaviour models, determining how it is possible to achieve higher sacral aims, the highest spiritual values.

The arguments of the second kind point out that the aims the present-day achievement-oriented (and Olympic) sport formulates for itself are not of religious but of different nature (an exception in this respect may be constituted by various Christian and non-Christian sport organisations – however playing in sport as a whole only a marginal role – which treat sport in an instrumental way as a means of perfecting denominational values). Neither sports competitions are organised to perfect moral qualities since the latter are values only accompanying sports rivalry. They can constitute only intermediate, stage or supporting aims. Thus if e.g. the principle of fair play is put to the fore and if it is proclaimed that it constitutes the most important and autotelic aim, the values, aims and tasks sport has been called into being to realise are abolished to a considerable degree. In this case, sport becomes axiologically and instrumentally subordinated to moral values, it is reduced to a means realising an adopted ethical programme. According to the author, a different situation takes place – it is fulfilling of moral assumptions, whether deontological, perfectionist, utilitarian (both in rules and in behaviour) and paternalistic (hard and soft), or on the principle of fair play that can facilitate realisation of sport and spectacular aims, especially in achievement-oriented, professional or Olympic sports rivalry. Winning or some other kind of relative success in competition (like e.g. taking second, fourth or tenth place), inter alia of financial, social and political character, are among the most important of these aims.

The author concludes his considerations proclaiming that the aim of sport is perfecting mastery of practising a given discipline. It is the unconditional and final value. On the other hand, other values (health, religious experience, morality) have at most only relative, stage and instrumental character. They can never be the highest autotelic values constituting for top sport an aim in itself.

Moral action in sport- a plea for psychological realism.

Carwyn Jones

The fairly gloomy conclusions of moral psychological research in sport are by now reasonably familiar. Shields' and Bredemier's early findings in particular painted a pessimistic picture of sport's affect on the moral character of those who play it. There has been much criticism of the attempts to describe empirically the relationship between sport and morality. The focus of the criticism has concentrated on a few key issues. It has been argued that all "scientific" research into morality is wrongheaded and can never achieve scientific objectivity given the inescapably normative nature of the subject under scrutiny. Other criticisms have focused on the normative commitments to deontological ethical theory implicated in the evaluations made. In this paper I aim to focus specifically on the conceptualisation of moral character implicitly and explicitly implicated in the research into sport and morality. Drawing on the valuable insight of Shields and Bredemeier, I will argue that moral character is significantly more complex than is often acknowledged. I will also argue, following Flanagan (1991) that an account of moral character, including a sport specific account, must be realistic and not compromised by operational considerations. I will sketch an alternative, non-reductive, virtue theoretically informed account of moral character and identify the implications for playing sport in a morally appropriate way.

Martin in the Field

Lev Kreft

Martin Strel, Slovenian national hero, swims for Slovenia, for world peace and understanding, for unpolluted waters, and for records. His achievements include swimming the whole Danube, Mississippi, Parana, Yang-ce-Kiang (Blue River), a world record in interrupted swimming, world record in distance swimming etc. Slovenia is in the European Union, he is in the Guinness Book of Records. When he swam the whole length of the Mississippi river (2002), he entered the field of philosophy of sport as well. Among the other sportpersons, he was nominated for the »Slovenian sportperson of the year« award, but his sportsmanship was questioned by the sport community. His status was denied for many reasons which include arguments from everyday colloquial understanding of sport to institutional and academic definitions and arguments. His nomination was recalled. Basically, it seems that sport is something under control, which Martin Strel is not.

In this case, it is interesting to examine why and what for definitions of sport are used still and again, in spite of their at least doubtful credibility, accuracy, and validity which were questioned enough already. To combine Martin's case with that of philosophy of sport with Slovenian understanding of sport, and importance of its definition for sportology as academic discipline, the book on sportology by Slovenian Silvo Kristan (Sportology in Slovenia Today, Faculty of Sport/ Institute for Sport, Ljubljana 2000) will be introduced and examined.

Sport – a justification

Sigmund Loland

Justification of sport, that is, claims on the values of sport to the individual and society, varies with historical, social and cultural context. In what follows, main arguments of such justification will be critically examined, and a justification scheme for sport in contemporary Western society will be suggested.

Historically, a strong argument in the justification of sport has been its role in the moral upbringing of the young. The idea has roots in British 18th and 19th century educational ideology and in ideals such as Muscular Christianity (Mangan 1981), as well as in the ideology of the Olympic Movement as conceived of by Pierre de Coubertin (Loland 1995). The argument is examined and criticized. A key criticism, posed both by philosophers and social scientists, is the essentialist understanding of sport as automatically producing morality.

A second standard justification of sport is its positive impact on individual and public health. According to Frans de Wachter (1985), the first publicized link between sport (golf, actually) and health is found in the Diderot's Encyclopedia from mid 18th Century France. Although building on a quite different conceptualization of health, the argument seems to stand particularly tall in modern society (Waddington 2000). The argument is criticized for not being able to contextualize the changing concept of health, and for being overtly instrumental and reductionist in its view of sport.

A third argument refers to sport's eigenvalue, or to the experiential values in the very practicing of sport itself. The argument has roots in images of the playing human being (*homo ludens*) in the writings of philosophers and cultural theorists from Schiller (1979) to Huizinga (1950). The central idea is that sport as play serves humanistic ideals and the "aesthetic education of man", to use an expression from Schiller. Today, the argument comes in several versions, from those viewing sport as an amoral, aesthetic phenomenon (Gebauer 2002), to those who honour classic, humanistic educational schemes (Simon 2004). The argument is criticized for its idealist overtones and its historical and socio-cultural insensitivity.

In a final section, a possible justification of sport in contemporary Western society is outlined. Arguments of morality, health and eigenvalue are all relevant but must be connected in more complex ways than what is found in traditional justification schemes. Inspired by neo-aristotelian thought (McNamee 1994), experiential values of sport are linked to and interconnected with what is called the internal goods of sport, as well as with external goods such as health and morality. In some concluding comments, it is demonstrated how such a justification may have new and quite radical implications for the organization and structuring of sport in the future.

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Paradigms and possibilities: An exercise in “soiling one’s own nest”

Graham McFee

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In this paper I will urge, first, that — on Thomas Kuhn’s view — social sciences do not function in the paradigm-relative way characteristic of natural sciences; second, that Kuhn is right to take this view — and hence that any implications which would flow from it should be embraced; then, third, that these fact (and especially the second) are crucial — and crucially missing — when writers on sport address issues in the philosophy of science; as they must when they ask about the epistemologies of both sports science and the sociology of sport.

In urging this, I am offering a view of (especially) social science that might seem to be at odds with that of writers who — in addition to being my friends in ‘real life’ — are generally on the same side as me in major disputes about the inadequacy (or otherwise) of conceptions of knowledge, research and the like offered by (some) sports scientists. And it is this (apparent) direction, going against ‘my own folk’, which led yet another writer (not discussed here) to characterise my project as “soiling your own nest”. But that is, of course, entirely the wrong way to see my enterprise, even if one outcome may seem to be given succour to the misguided.

Transhumanism and the Moral Topography of Sports Medicine

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Miah (2003:html) has suggested that sports offer a “unique environment where transhumanism can gain social credibility and where its ideas become manifested and normalised” . In this paper I argue against the desirability of this position.

I first set out an account of moderate and extreme transhumanism. While their advocates range from the reflective (Bostrom, 2004; 2005) to the rather crazed at least certain portions of their values would find general appeal in the public, the (sports) medical profession and the communities of elite and recreative sport. Francis Fukuyama has recently referred to it as the world’s most dangerous idea”. To be fair it is better thought of as a “loosely defined movement” (Bostrom, 2005). Extreme Transhumanism includes the aim of overcoming the limits of human nature in order to become a post-human category (species?). Such “limitations” include intelligence, appearance, life-span, vulnerability to harm (e.g. susceptibility to disease). Moderate Transhumanism more modestly claims to use technology (genetic modification, nanomedicine) to enhance human characteristics, (e.g. intelligence, beauty, life-span, resistance to disease or injury). In this less extreme project, there’s no necessary aspiration to shed human nature/human genetic constitution, just to augment it with technology where possible and where desired by the individual. It is this latter version that may well attract the resolutely instrumentalist of the elite sports system.

Bostrom asserts that human nature is “a work-in-progress, a half-baked beginning” (2005). Likewise, those who advocate limitless autonomy, bolstered by scientific imagination, will find in moderate transhumanism a project for a sports medicine with or without substantive moral moorings. While technologies might be used therapeutically it is impossible to hermetically seal off those technologies to assist injury or illness prevention to those that attempt to alter normal anatomical and biochemical structures and processes to develop super athletes (Cyborg or otherwise).

By contrast I sketch out counter arguments against the adoption of TH ideals: (i) the threat to autonomy by ill-informed parental choice which already fuels much of the harms of children’s sport (Brackenridge, 2001; David; 2005); (ii) the use of sportsmedicine to legitimise the production of difference in order to generate heightened inequity and/or create a genetic aristocracy ; (iii) the undesirable degeneration of the category sportspersons” and (iv) a more respectful attitude to human nature in spite of its/our shortcomings.

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The DREAM Gene: Engineering Resistance versus the Ethics of Enhancement

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Downstream Regulatory Element Antagonistic Modulator, or DREAM for short, is a protein critical to pain sensations experienced by organisms. Recent research has suggested that this genetic origin to pain might be possible to exploit for the purpose of pain management (Cheng et al., 2002; Cheng and Penninger, 2003). This paper discusses the ethical implications of DREAM for sport to advance the debate on what constitutes a legitimate method of performance modification. Initially, it is argued that DREAM presents a more complex problem for anti-doping authorities than other methods of gene doping, since it cannot easily be characterised as enhancing or therapeutic. Indeed, the basis of this distinction is criticised by exploring a biocultural definition of health. On this model, which seems unlikely to be endorsed by anti-doping authorities, but, nevertheless, which is perpetuated by sport physicians, the use of DREAM would seem more difficult to prohibit on medical grounds. Its use is consistent with a medical desire to alleviate suffering, even where it is self-induced. A similar dichotomy exists when discussing the relevance of pain from a sporting perspective. While one might presume that the ethics of sport is such that any legal mechanism to improve performance is desirable for an athlete, pain tolerance appears to have a symbolic value that would undermine the usefulness of DREAM. This tension demonstrates greater complexity to the debate about the role of technology in sport and its ideological connotations about what it means to be an athlete.

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Truthmakers of Judgement Calls

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One realist or metaphysical conception of truth is provided by truthmaker theory. It is true that p iff p has a truthmaker T (Armstrong 2004). Can this theory be applied to sporting contexts?

A problem is that many 'truths' in sport are judgement calls. Not just standard examples of sports that have judges, but almost every sport requires the judgement of an arbiter or referee whose decision as to the truth of a matter is final. E.g. in football a goal is scored when the ball crosses the line (between the posts and under the crossbar) and the referee awards a goal. But in reality, only the second clause has force and the first is redundant. Cases have been known where the ball didn't cross the line but the referee awarded a goal and where the ball did cross the line but the referee did not award a goal. What is the truth of the matter in such cases? Were goals scored even though not awarded? And if the truth of the matter depends on the judgement of an official, what is the truthmaker of the truth?

Note that judgement calls affect almost every competitive sport. In archery, an official has to 'call' a shot and say how many points it scores. In bowls, a judgement has to be made of relative proximity. A measuring device may be used but still there is judgement involved in reading and performing the measurement correctly.

There are two options for how we should interpret the situation:

1. The truthmaker is an objective, mind-independent state of affairs, about which the umpire makes a judgement.
2. The truthmaker includes (indeed may include only) the umpire's judgement. The judgement, in part or in whole, constitutes the phenomena.

The problem with 1 is that the state of affairs alone does not seem sufficient for the goal. If the umpire does not allow it, it is not a goal. The problem with 2 is that it is hard to understand what the truthmaker is for the judgement call. An epistemic element will have been added to truth. Don't we want a non-epistemic theory of truth?

Solution: the umpire is appointed to the epistemic task only. Their role is to decide whether p has a truthmaker. In making that decision, they consider only the metaphysical elements. Their own epistemic state is no part of the basis for the judgement.

Essentially, this is a defence of solution 1. The fact that makes it true that a goal is scored is that the ball has crossed the line. The umpire's judgement does not figure in that fact, nor constitute the goal. It does not constitute the phenomena but is, rather, a judgement on the phenomena. For ease and speed, that is usually one person's judgement, though this is not necessarily so. There could be a committee of judges.

Problem: what of cases of pure judgement, e.g. points for artistic interpretation in ice-skating? Here there is nothing to count as the metaphysical phenomena. Answer: even here the judges are not expressing a judgement about their own epistemic/aesthetic states. That would be absurd as the competitor would be being judged on the states of a person other than themselves. Rather, the judge judges the aesthetic properties that the competitor has been able to instantiate.

Supplements – food or dope?

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This paper discusses conceptual and ethical aspects of the use of supplements in sport.

'Foods' are nutriment – things that nourish us. A food is something taken in order to maintain life, health or growth. Difficulty with this: to maintain life at what level? To assist health or growth to what degree? Can all my needs be met just by foodstuffs? And what are my 'needs'?

'Supplement' is an incomplete term (supplementing what?), and also ambiguous, meaning both:

- (a) Something added to supply a deficiency
- (b) An auxiliary means, an aid

'Drug' has a number of general meanings, which often become confused:

- any medicinal substance
- an opiate or narcotic
- a third 'modern' sense recognizes the increased use of 'social' or 'recreational' drugs
- a further use in sport emphasizes the performance-enhancing qualities of the substance.

In the sense of food-supplements, athletes must take supplements. They need to supplement a 'normal' food intake in order to support their extra activity.

In the case of enhancement-supplements, athletes should take supplements. It is their duty to be at their best, and to be as well-prepared as possible for competition.

So what are the issues?

1. Dope or Supplement?

If some supplements perform the same function as some banned substances, why are they not banned, too?

2. Health or Performance?

Some substances are recommended for health reasons, and some entirely for performance enhancement. Is there an ethical difference?

3. Supplement Efficacy

- a. Efficacy - do they work?
- b. Efficacy - how do they work?
- c. Efficacy - quality of substance

4. Placebo effect

5. Contamination

- a. Deliberate contamination
- b. Accidental contamination

6. Strict liability rules (and the application of other anti-doping arguments to supplements)

7. Problems:

- a. Combined effects
- b. Athlete Motivation
- c. Quality of Substance: Safety and Athlete Protection

Ought Olympic Games selection be based on equity, medal probability or Performance Directors' judgement?

Geoff Parsons, Design Group Ltd

For as long as there has been elite level sport, there have been disputes as to the selection criteria and processes to be utilised when choosing the athletic representative of a nation. The provision of a solution to these disputes, I argue, would not only re-define the relationship between competitors and National Governing Bodies (NGB), it would also change the nature of contracts and funding in sport and could significantly improve the entire atmosphere across British Sport at the elite level.

A key role of an NGB is to send the best national team to the Olympics but if this is widely agreed in the first place, one can query the efficacy of one – off selection trial and base selection instead on, for example, agreed performances over a given time frame and /or in relation to key international events prior to the Olympics. The current system of selection within athletics is a “fudge” where if top athletes fail at the “selection event” they may be offered a discretionary place.

In contrast, I argue that Performance Directors for each sport, should be made directly accountable for the results of the individuals and teams they select, with no selection events necessary. This would enable their professional judgement to rule over the contingencies of “one-off” selection events and avoid the hypocrisy of “discretionary” places for those who fail or are unable to complete at the trial. In addition, I argue that their salaries and contracts should be directly linked to this performance.

If the role of an NGB is to create the fairest process by which a competitor can be selected, then in all objectively measured sports, first three past the post should be the favoured method of selection, with no need for selectors and no way back for injury or failure. Athletes are then directly responsible for their performance and Performance Directors can be given contracts that reflect the competition cycle of the event.

In team events, Performance Directors should directly select the team, but be on the same contractual terms as the team members. Namely if the performers are on year round assessment, then the PD's contract should reflect this.

In doing this, it would force the re-assessment of UK Sport funding of competitors and create a much fairer framework in which all parties were equally accountable and equally rewarded and remove the “blackmail” style of manipulation and intimidation which both athletes and PD's use on a regular basis.

Some philosophical considerations on the idea of “hegemonic sport”. The Italian case

R. Presilla (LUMSA, Roma), F. Bonini (Università degli studi di Teramo)

The building of national identity is deeply interwoven with the development of sports, comprising both the practice and the show. This is true if we look at sport as a form of human achievement, but also if we see excellence in sport as a source of prestige for a given nation or race. We aim at offering a cultural analysis of the relationship between sport and Italian society, with an interdisciplinary approach including philosophy and political science.

The Italian case highlights the period of Fascist government, during which the growth of mass society cause the rise of “championism” (i.e. the exaltation of the sporting champion as a paradigm of the new, Italian Fascistic man). In this respect, the rites of sport nourish a still weak national identity, which is not yet enough oriented towards a Fascistic perspective. Hegemony in sports needs a hegemonic sport in order to function as a medium of propaganda: this role belongs initially to cycling, but also football is promoted as the hegemonic sport.

After World War II, sport institutions become autonomous from the Italian government, according to the slogan “sport to sportsmen” coined by Giulio Onesti, president of the Italian Olympic National Committee (CONI) from 1944 to 1978. In this way, sport can remain the sign of national identity, being no longer characterised in a fascistic sense, rather as a politically correct statement of the idea of “homeland” (patria).

In recent years sport institutions have been increasingly drawn to the globalised system of mass media and business, so that a dialectic tension grows between a public opinion still believing in the old values (sports as statement of national identity) and the reasons of global business (sport as part of show business).

The present day institutional and economic crisis of the Italian sport system does not point to a local difficulty, rather to a structural tension between the idea of sport as human achievement and show business. This is particularly true for the Italian hegemonic sport – football – which is constantly challenged to justify its role. It is not clear whether the category of “hegemonic sport” has still any value in a situation of radical reformulation of the concept of national identity.

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Consent by proxy in sport-related research: some ethical difficulties

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Covert methods in research are contentious (Homan 1991; Sieber 1992). As Hollway and Jefferson (2000) make clear, there are often tensions between voluntary informed consent on the one hand, and socially beneficial research that necessitates some level of deception on the other. They explain that a number of modified forms of consent have been devised to relieve these tensions, one of which is proxy or presumptive consent (getting approval from 'mock subjects'). Proxies are often used when persons are unable to speak for themselves. The role of the proxy is to speak for a person in the same way that the person would have done if they had been able to speak. In the medical or legal professions, for example, a person may be too ill or too young to provide consent. It seems unlikely, however, that one person will be able to speak adequately on behalf of another without 'knowing' her/him first.

In this paper we explore the extent to which consent by proxy is ethically defensible in sports-related research (cf. Brackenridge, 2001; Tomlinson & Fleming, 1997). We explore in particular two difficulties that arise for sports researchers who have adopted and adapted the use of proxies to gain consent. First, where consent by proxy is used, it may be the researcher rather than the subject of research who authorises the proxy to cooperate on behalf of the research subject. Those eventual research subjects will be unaware that they are the subject of research since they have not been consulted. Yet implicit in getting voluntary informed consent is the idea that research participants will have the opportunity to learn from the research experience. Second, consent by proxy is problematic because when acting on behalf of another, the context and outcomes of the action taken are never the same as they would have been for the subject. The difficulties inherent in using proxies are apparent even when a person has nominated a proxy to act on his or her behalf.

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Sports and Peace

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In order to speak of the relationship between sports and peace, before thinking about the nature of sports, it would be better to clarify what we mean by peace. According to Christian tradition, peace among men is an “ordered harmony”. Instead in modern thinking it is fundamentally the absence of war. At first glance, in one way or another, sports would seem to fall among peaceful practices. But if you were to look more closely you might begin to have some doubts. Sports, like all games, is a competition aimed at victory. More than an “ordered harmony” it would appear more like a “concordia discors” (disagreement), and one shouldn’t be fooled by the absence of a formal war, because there are clearly conflicts and rivalry in the practice of sports. On the other hand, it is too simplistic to reduce sports to a merely a phenomenon of conflict. It would be more appropriate perhaps to interpret it as a unique phenomenon somewhere between peace and war. But let’s proceed in order and turn to, as Husserl would have said, “zu den Sachen selbst”.

A speech by a political politician on the “peaceful” aspects of sports might stray from the theme of relationships: only if in life the relation with the other is essential and not simply random, then we can speak of a peaceful phenomenon, because in that case “being together” is fundamental to our very lifestyle, and to deny the relationship with the other would be mean to deny our very lifestyle and, in fact, deny our very selves and the possibility of self fulfillment in that field. In this sense, sports is a “peaceful” phenomenon – in other words, fundamentally relational – from a twofold point of view: from the point of view of learning the game and from the point of view of playing the game.

In regards to the first, the considerations of Ludwig Wittgenstein are enlightening especially in his thesis *Philosophische Untersuchungen* (1953), on games. According to the Viennese philosopher, a game is not simply the sum total of its rules that one learns simply reading the rules. According to Wittgenstein, a game is learned above all on the playing field, watching others play and following the direction of someone who knows more than you. None of us can directly intuit what it means to “know how to play” or “play well” a game. Only the others, the community of players, can tell us. That means that it’s possible to learn to play a game, or better to play a particular sport, only in relationship with others. Otherwise, games and sports would be “private” languages, and the rapport with our peers would not be essential. This point highlights the fundamentally relational aspect, and therefore pacific aspect, of the process of learning a sport.

But there is another important element that clearly illustrates the structurally peaceful nature of sports; the way they are played. Sports, at least in its modern evolution, is characterized by the “unbending” aspect of the rules that govern it. When playing a particular sport a “ternary” relationship is built among the two players and by each player with the common rules. So what does it mean then when one cheats in order to win? As the deontic logician Amedeo G. Conte recently said, a player who cheats, cheats against the “fundamental” rules of the game, actually he doesn’t want to put himself outside the game, he doesn’t want to declare war on the game, but he realizes what the ultimate goal of the game is (to win that game), and this he cannot escape from. But this means that the breaking of a rule is certainly an element but not enough to fully establish what it means to be dishonest in sports: at the core of cheating in sports is the deterioration of a relationship of mutual recognition between the two opponents. Someone who competes to win, does so accepting a set of rules held in common with his

opponent: to violate those rules means right from the start to fail to recognize the equal dignity and equal opportunity with the other players. It means destroying the very nature of competition and of sports. So if denying the relationship with the other competitors means denying the game as such, then it is clear that relationships and sports are one in the same. Therefore we can confirm the strict relationship between sports and peace.

One last reflection. The two elements just discussed, the learning of a game and the way (correct and incorrect) of playing it, allow us to be able to affirm, given that the two are intrinsically related, that sports is a peaceful phenomenon because it can only be edified and practiced in peace. But this shouldn't cause us to ignore the elements of conflict, fear, aggressiveness and violence that do exist in the sports environment both among players and fans. It's not the time now to analyze these pathological phenomena or explain its etiology (causes). It would appear that the relationship between sports and peace in itself – from a moral point of view more than cultural – would be a goal of sports. That besides the goals of winning and of following the rules of the game, there should be the extremely political goal of harnessing from time to time the negative forces of our selfish instincts and our most irrational passions so that the "beautiful game" might triumph.

Rules and rationality.

Keith Thompson.

It is clear that sports are defined by their rules. Rugby Union is different from Rugby League because its rules are different. But in each case some rules could be changed - and are from time to time - without the sport ceasing to be itself.

The questions arise : why would rules be changed and by whom? To the first there are many possible answers of different types: to increase excitement; to remove ambiguity; to facilitate refereeing/umpiring; to enhance safety, and so on. I wish to suggest that one possible and good reason for change is to substitute the rational for the irrational - simply that.

This is an unfashionable view. It is now widely held that rules are a function of the sport in question, arising and changed over time for a variety of reasons which can only be considered and judged within that culture and only be changed by insiders. On this view the issue of whether a particular rule is straightforwardly irrational does not even arise. Context is all. This is a version, in sport, of the much wider views that ethical judgments and aesthetic appraisals and political positions are all culture related. 'Is it wrong?'; 'is it beautiful?'; 'is it justified?': such questions are now widely held to be meaningless unless posited within particular settings of time and place.

By contrast I shall argue that certain rules / procedures in certain sports are just irrational. Examples will be taken from association football, track athletics and, in more detail, lawn tennis. In each case I shall argue a very strong view, namely that one needs no detailed knowledge of the culture and history of the sport to put a conclusive case for the irrationality of certain rules. I shall seek to show not only that one does not have to be an insider but that one need have no knowledge of the sport at all. Indeed a convincing case for irrationality could be made by someone who not only had never participated but who had not even been a spectator of the sport in question, given that they had been provided with appropriate information.

Re-conceptualizing high-stakes school examinations in Physical Education: The promise of phenomenology.

M Thorburn

The recent increase in student uptake for high-stakes examination courses in Physical Education (PE) courses has led Green (2001) to comment on the 'new orthodoxy' emerging within PE, so dominant have examination considerations become in curriculum discourses and in the professional lives and careers of many teachers. Examination courses in Scotland are characterized by practical experiential rationales, in which developing levels of practical ability links to both the process of analysing performance and understanding embedded content in specific performance related concepts. During this period policy documents were subjected to detailed scrutiny by Reid (1996a; 1996b; 1997; 1999) and in addition, by Carr (1997), and Parry (1998) who responded to arguments developed by Reid. However, the philosophical research completed during this period did not directly influence the policy making process, which was intent on dovetailing the government's concern with increasing attainment and accountability, with teachers' intrinsic beliefs about the subject.

Thorburn and Collins (2003) attempted to consider the impact of philosophy or overarching aims when enacted through various planning stages and eventual teaching methodology. Results highlighted profound disparities in the pedagogy practices teachers adopted in attempting to translate a dictated 'practical experiential' rationale into performance-led practice. Hence, further enquiry into whether the philosophy underpinning high-stakes school examinations in PE is achievable within the constraints and pressures revealed appears merited.

McNamee (2004, pp. 8) states that 'the greatest weakness in the epistemological aspect of Reid's account of physical education as education is his failure to offer a value argument for the kinds of knowledge representative of physical education.' This is perhaps evident when Reid (1997, pp.11) notes that:

It would be absurd to suggest that its value (practical knowledge) is of the illuminative kind we associate with intellectual understanding; we do not play tennis or football in order to deepen our understanding of the world and our place in it.

McNamee (2004, pp. 9) agrees, in part, and suggests those advocating the potential of games to confer a wide ranging cognitive value would be 'barking up the wrong tree'. However, it is the unsatisfactory nature of the second part of Reid's quote which also requires scrutiny, as it appears to reduce the value of experience and the participation intentions of students as part of quality living. As noted by McNamee (2004) the very difficulty might be the limitations of endlessly trying to reconcile PE with the dominant liberal analytical tradition of philosophy with associated knowledge-led imperatives rather than considering afresh the promise of phenomenology, which various author's work hinted at in previous years (Carr, 1979; Best, 1978), even though subsequently this area has received scant attention.

In Scotland, by accident as much as by design, attempts to connect performance-led experiences with areas of underpinning knowledge has been attempted, yet to date for a plethora of pragmatic reasons the results have been unsatisfactory. However, in light of continuing centrally driven policy-interventions which attempt to connect the motivations and interests of students with improved levels of attainment and increasing and widening access to higher education (without any perceivable lowering of academic standards) such investigations require to continue. Such accounts could begin to consider whether examination awards can connect authentic student embodied experiential descriptions of physical education with

traditionally conceived academically inclined pursuits, in ways which can more overtly value the essence of active, authentic and informed participation.

This starter paper proposes to initiate discussion on the merits of articulating a phenomenological account of experience within a high-stakes examination curriculum, despite the many complex 'philosophy to practice' issues (for example, criteria for evaluation and reflection) which require clarity and scrutiny for coherent courses to beneficially develop.

Reference

Thorburn, M. and Collins, D. (2003) 'The effects of an integrated curriculum model on teachers' pedagogy practices', *European Physical Education Review* 9 (2): 187-211.

Physical Literacy - A Debate

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The intention of this paper is to stand back from current physical education practice and take a broad philosophical view of the fundamental goals of all aspects of movement education. The concept of Physical Literacy as currently defined is presented and compared with the notion of being 'physically educated'. The concept of Physical Literacy is justified from an existential and phenomenological viewpoint. Physical Literacy is then considered alongside firstly motor development and secondly the ongoing work on talent identification.

The implications of the notion of Physical Literacy for movement opportunities from birth and in movement education and physical education throughout schooling are considered.

Finally the paper opens up four areas of debate in relation to the concept of Physical Literacy. These are:-

1. Is Physical Literacy a universal concept?
2. How can the concept relate to the physically challenged and those with other disabilities?
3. How far should a physically literate individual be able to verbalise/articulate the components of this attribute?
4. Has an understanding of personal health promotion a place in the concept of Physical Literacy?