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Jacqueline Allen-Collinson

'Grounding' the Phenomenology of Sensuous Sporting Bodies

In the last decade there has been a considerable growth of research in the sociology of the body. Whilst this development has produced considerable amount of theoretically-based work, relatively few accounts can be found that are truly grounded in the corporeal realities of the body (Wainwright and Turner, 2003: 26; Ahmed, 2004: 285). To portray and understand such embodied perspectives, we would argue, demands engaging with the phenomenology of the body, including the sensuous elements of sporting participation. Sociologically-inspired studies of the sporting body, using the resources of phenomenology are scant, however, as Kerry and Armour (2000: 10) have noted. This paper contributes to the small but growing amount of 'embodied' analysis on the body and sport. Here we identify some useful intellectual resources for developing a phenomenology of sport, and subsequently examine the potential for its effective portrayal and analysis via different kinds of textual form.

Whilst Merleau-Ponty's (1962) work undoubtedly offers researchers a stance from which to gather data on the embodied perspective of sports participants, in order to capture more fully that embodiment, we would contend, supplementary intellectual resources are needed, as Merleau-Ponty and indeed philosophical phenomenologists in general rarely engage with empirical data generation (Kerry and Armour, 2000: 10). Encouragingly for our purposes, there are helpful resources primarily situated within a developing anthropology of the senses (Howes, 2003) and also to some extent within an emergent 'sensuous' geography (Rodaway, 1994). In the general sociological literature one can find the occasional paper that alludes to the sensory dimensions of sport and physical activity, for example in relation to touch (Lewis, 2000) and other sensuous dimensions of sport and physical activity, such as Wacquant's (2004) and Downey's (2005) excellent studies of boxing and capoeira respectively. The lack of phenomenologically-inspired analyses of sporting activity is perhaps surprising, especially when the sensuous elements feature so strongly in participants' experiences. In order to help address this lacuna, our paper depicts some of the principal sensory activities involved in doing sport, and employs theoretical resources derived from the anthropology of the senses and 'sensuous' geography in their analysis.

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Andrew Bloodworth

The contribution of physical activity to well-being

Nussbaum's most recent and extensive work on capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000) has been developed with political application in mind but remains of interest to issues of well-being and human flourishing. Nussbaum suggests a list of those capabilities essential to living a fully human life. The account includes bodily health as a central capability and recognises that any defensible theory of the fully human life or well-being must recognise our physicality. This all seems promising for my overall enterprise of examining the contribution of physical activity to well-being. In developing my argument, however, I remain within a capabilities framework, whilst at times deviating significantly from Nussbaum.

My argument requires a more developed theory of health than Nussbaum offers. Nussbaum's approach also argues for the importance of health to the other capabilities without elaborating upon this relationship. Here, I argue for a normative interpretation of health to be incorporated within Nussbaum's capabilities approach. This entails a modification of the theory, ultimately bringing the concepts of health and capability closer together.

I consider the contribution of physical activity to well-being mainly through its impact upon health. I contend that physical activity both preserves those functionings (sticking to the terminology used by both Sen and Nussbaum) central to our lives, and expands the range of valuable functionings or beings and doings (Sen, 1993) we can pursue. Well-being is enhanced not only by functioning, what we actually do, but also by the freedom to choose from a range of valuable options. Having the choice between valuable options defines an autonomous life in Raz's (1986) sense, and autonomy understood in this way is central to our well-being (Raz, 1986). This stance on autonomy and its importance to well-being is contrary to Nussbaum, and the political liberalism advocated within *Women and Human Development*.

Nussbaum, M.C. (2000) *Women and Human Development The Capabilities Approach*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Raz, J. (1986) *The Morality of Freedom*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

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Ask Vest Christiansen:

A Clean Amateur Makes a Good Professional
On deviance, professionalism and doping in elite sport –
Illustrated by the case of Danish cycling

Why are professional athletes, who either have used or are suspected of using drugs, currently being labelled as problematic deviants? Why are their offences regarded so severely, and how were they regarded previously, when a clear distinction between professional and amateur athletes existed? What are today's athletes' attitudes to these matters, and do these attitudes vary according to the athlete's position within the sporting hierarchy? These are the questions the paper will seek to answer.

In addition to the official penalty which is imposed on athletes caught using drugs, they are labelled as athletes of poor morals, who are spoiling the game for everyone else. This extrajudicial judgement seems to reflect the common view that some people become deviant because their motives and values deviate from what is 'normal'.¹

But the definition of 'normal' in the world of sport is ambiguous. This is because the norms sport is said to have are not the same as the norms actually regulating the sporting hierarchies. Thus, a difference exists between the sporting behaviour which sport educators and politicians assert that sport *should* promote, and the behaviour that *is* expressed by virtue of the athletes' will to victory. A difference the paper addresses as the difference between *the spirit of sport* and *the essence of sport*.²

A central reason for labelling athletes using drugs as deviant might be that the potential conflict between the regulating norms of the spirit of sport and the essence of sport, respectively, is left out of account. In the past, when there was a clear distinction between amateurs and professionals, the difference between these two sets of norms was clearer.

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) did not start to regard doping as a distinct problem until the 1980s. The IOC was an organisation for amateur sport and doping was regarded as something associated with professional sport.³ In line with this, professional sport was viewed by the IOC as a degenerated type of sport, in sharp contrast to the ideal amateur sport. One consequence of this was that all the way up to the 1960s, there existed a "cultural apartheid [that] separated drug-free amateurs from professional athletes, whose right to use drugs was taken for granted."⁴

As the paper will demonstrate – using the case of Danish elite cyclists as example – this distinction in the attitudes to doping can still be found among today's athletes.

The paradox is that even though all elite athletes eventually have adopted the professionals' standards for training magnitude and have come to regard their attitude to sport as normative, the amateur ideals continue to be the benchmark for criticism and labelling of athletes caught doping. In order to participate in the big competitions, the professionals were bound to swear to submit to the norms of the amateurs, while the amateurs prepared themselves to live as professionals. As the paper will seek to demonstrate, this might be the key to understand the present conflict between the athletes and the surrounding society, including the labelling of athletes caught doping as deviant outsiders.

¹ Becker, H. S. (1973) *Outsiders. Studies in the sociology of deviance*, London, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Singapore, The Free Press, p. 34.

² Møller, V. (2004) The Anti-Doping Campaign – Farewell to the Ideals of Modernity, in (eds.): Hoberman & Møller, *Doping and Public Policy*, Odense, Univ Press of South Denmark, p 151

³ Killanin, L. & Rodda J. (eds.) (1976): *The Olympic Games. 80 Years of people, events and records*, London, Barrie & Jenkins, p. 143, 152)

⁴ Hoberman, J. (2005). *Testosterone Dreams. Rejuvenation, Aphrodisia, Doping*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, p. 183.

Leon Culbertson

Children, Sport and Moral Education: The Moral Laboratory Thesis Revisited

This paper is concerned with McFee's (2000; 2004) claim that sport can, under certain circumstances, function as a moral laboratory. The paper differentiates between a number of conceptions of moral education to show that the moral laboratory thesis is only of direct relevance in relation to a particular conception of morality and moral education. The paper also focuses closely on the premise of McFee's inference which deals with the intrinsic value of sport. It is argued, contrary to McFee (2004) that no adequate account of the intrinsic value of sport can be given, yet the validity of McFee's inference is considered and the suggestion that the premise regarding intrinsic value is not necessary to the moral laboratory thesis is explored. The implications of this revised articulation of the moral laboratory thesis are considered in relation to the topic of the morally educative potential of sport for children.

McFee, G. (2000) 'Sport: A moral laboratory?', in M. McNamee *et al.* (eds) *Just Leisure: Policy, Ethics and Professionalism*, Eastbourne: Leisure Studies Association.

McFee, G. (2004) *Sport, Rules and Values: Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Sport*, London: Routledge.

Alan P. Dougherty
Climbing as Art

Art is often identified in terms of the intentional production of an aesthetically pleasing or interesting artefact. Such artefacts can be attributed to particular individuals, genres and schools. Furthermore, some would argue, that a proper understanding of an art piece can best be obtained by reference to the biography of its creator(s) or in the context of its genre or school.

At the outset, the climbing of a new route does usually seek to produce a concrete artefact – the route description, in prose or diagram. Historically these were recorded in new route books and in recent years are likely to be disseminated initially via web-sites. Eventually these descriptions are incorporated into climbing guide books. In this paper it is contended that the route description can be attributed to particular and varied genres.

It is also asserted that the process of interpretation by climbing of a particular piece of rock or ice can be regarded as producing a primary artefact in a similar vein to that produced by dance. Just as genres of dance and individual interpretations can be identified so too can this analysis be applied to the sport of climbing. It is contended that the primary artefact of either activity is no less ephemeral than the other and both leave what might be termed a secondary artefact: the choreography of the dance piece or the description of the climb. Indeed detailed, move by move, accounts of boulder-problems¹ amount to a form of choreography, as always, open to individual interpretation.

In short, a claim is made for climbing, a sport which has a long history of aesthetic and ethical concerns, to hold as legitimate a claim to be considered art as do other activities that are widely upheld as such.

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Paul Downward
Equity, Efficiency and Values:
Ethics and Economic Resource Allocation in Sport

Economics is the study of resource allocation and consequently by default or explicit argument underpins policy advice advocating that resources are redirected towards different uses. However, the ethical underpinnings of such advice are often neglected, despite their overtly utilitarian origins. This paper thus begins to explore these issues explicitly. It begins by reviewing the ethical underpinnings of economic valuation and explores the competing tensions that exist between the desire to maintain a value-free discipline and the inevitable entanglement of economic ideas with normative content. The paper argues that the rationale for active policy is undermined in economic analysis because either policy advice relies upon an arbitrary ethical commitment by policy makers, or the mechanism by which sets of ‘right’ allocations of resources for society are established is individual rational choice. The paper then explores the potential for policy activism in resource allocation by redefining the philosophical underpinnings of economics and exploring how this different philosophical redefinition suggests taking account of social institutions as well as individuals and the duties implied in these institutions. The issues are illustrated with reference to sports participation research.

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Lisa Edwards and Kathryn Williams:
Scoring own goals in gender research:
A philosophical critique of the dominant research methodology.

Current research into women’s experiences in sport is firmly embedded in an interpretive post-structuralist methodology. Harris (1999, 2005) for example, attempts to explain the particular female experience of both watching and playing football in the U.K. The strength of the chosen methodology, it is argued lies in its attempt to see the world from the participant’s point of view. Grand narratives and generalizations are rejected in favour of an indicative subjective approach that will get to the ‘real’ experiences of women as seen through their eyes.

These studies, therefore, fit neatly into a growing body of research whose epistemology and methodology are, according to Bailey (2001) veriphobic. Veriphobia or fear of the truth, according to Bailey is deeply problematic in general and politically disabling in particular. In this paper we offer, following Bailey (2002) a general critique of the epistemological and methodological assumptions upon which Harris and other’s research are founded. First we argue that the research is not only constructed upon flawed and misguided principles that undermine the very project, but that the research (by offering generalisations and hinting at truth) is inconsistent with its own guiding principles of subjectivity and particularity. Secondly, we argue that research ought not, as is the explicit aim of Harris (2005) seek alternative accounts of certain practices, but accurate, informed and valid accounts. Finally, we argue that the key concepts which inform the research, namely gender and sexuality, are neither given sufficient philosophical attention nor carefully unpacked in the process of analysis.

The sum consequences of the problems highlighted above is to both undermine the search for knowledge in relation to women’s experience in sport, but also to undermine any possibility of constructing secure political and emancipatory progress on sound epistemological grounds. As Bailey (2001, p. 168) argues “only the truth seeking approach assumes that errors can be corrected and progress made”.

Jeffrey P. Fry
Making a Comeback

Why is the drama of a comeback in sport so captivating? Why do we rise to our feet in jubilation, sometimes close to tears, when the momentum of a sporting event shifts and our hopes are rekindled? Why do even those who do not witness these comebacks first-hand find the retelling of the overcoming of odds by individual athletes (human and nonhuman) and teams so compelling? In this paper I explore the issue of the comeback in sport and examine the various levels of its appeal.

Sport has been likened to an arena in which our own psycho-dramas are played out in symbolic form. In keeping with this I will explore how and why the identities and aspirations of individuals, communities, and even broader audiences are reflected in the comeback in sport. Whether it is the improbable victory of a Liverpool soccer team, the resurrected career of the injured racehorse Seabiscuit during the Depression, Joe Louis's reversal of an earlier loss to Max Schmeling in a context of racial discrimination and a Nazi threat, or the return of adventurers given up for lost, the comeback resonates in us.

From time to time in our lives we all seek to return from a setback. Whether the circumstance involves ill health, a financial crisis, grief, moral failure, or some other deficit, we find ourselves in the down position. We hope for a momentum shift in our own lives. We seek reversal and/or redemption. I suggest that these common experiences help account for our admiration of those who have beaten the odds in sport. Sport is an arena from which we draw inspiration and hope. Furthermore, in sport we see how both effort and unforeseen contingencies play significant roles in the reversal of fortune. Both our works and unexpected grace in the form of contributions by others play roles in the drama of sport and in the drama of our own lives.

In addition to the particular challenges that are distributed among us unevenly, we share in common the looming horizon of death. In the contest for survival death ultimately wins. Furthermore, according to Martin Heidegger, human existence as being-toward death is accompanied by an ineluctable, horizontal *awareness* of finitude. In the context of the universal encounter with death, we are captivated by stories of those who come back from the brink of death. So too in sport we encounter the unexpected resurgence of those on the brink of defeat and elimination. Might these comebacks in sport resonate at a deep level with a desire to stave off our own mortality? In sport, we admire the comeback, and we especially remember those reversals that end in triumph. At a deep, and perhaps inchoate level, might the appeal of the dramatic comeback in sport be linked to a hope for the ultimate reversal of fortune?

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Martin Hardie
Pro Cycling, Crime and Biopower –
doping control as law's administration of the illegalisms of the body

Reading Foucault, Deleuze sees a new notion of law, where law itself and illegality are replaced with the subtle correlation of illegalisms and laws. Law in this respect is not a system of justice but a structure of illegalisms. Law administers illegalisms and loopholes are the stuff of law.

This reading of law is consistent with an idea of the times in which we live as being one in which the theoretical concepts of a permanent state of exception, of biopower and biopolitics, or of an immanent plane of existence, seem relevant. This paper will present a reading of the current interest by the criminal law in the international professional cycling peloton and its coincidence with these theoretical concepts.

The paper will seek to address contemporary pro cycling issues such as the haematocrit testing regime, the Spanish Operacion Puerto investigation, and the post 2006 Tour de France Landis Wiki defence, to illustrate the manner in which doping in cycling is problematised operates is consistent with the idea of law as a system of illegalisms and laws and not one of law and illegality.

In this respect the problematisation of drugs in cycling, whilst often couched in the logic and rhetoric of purity, cleanliness, natural ability and fairness, is a far way from being a system of justice relating to any such objective notion of fair play or cheating. The resulting legal system is a pure structure that administers illegalisms and not law.

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Alun Hardman and Hywel Iorwerth
Sport, Citizenship and National Identity:
Towards a Normative Account of International Representation

In recent years, high-profile scandals over international sporting representation (ISR) have provoked significant debate about the appropriateness of regulatory criteria to be met for someone to play sport for a national team. In Rugby Union for example, the “grannygate” scandal of 2000 led to an official enquiry by the International Rugby Board (IRB) when it became evident that New Zealand born Shane Howarth and Brett Sinkinson were not eligible to play for Wales through their grandparents as they had claimed. The IRB’s official reprimand met with approval from those who had argued all along that the players “were not Welsh” even though both players subsequently qualified for Wales through residency. In contrast, despite living in England since he was seven years old, footballer Ryan Giggs, born in Cardiff to Welsh parents, has only ever been eligible for Wales. Such anomalies have not only been enthusiastically debated but have coincided with an interest in understanding discussions underway on the broader issue of citizenship, nationalism and national identity.

In this paper we attempt to clarify issues of citizenship, nationalism and national identity in sport by looking at ISR from the competing philosophical perspectives of “moral formalism”, “moral conventionalism”, “moral subjectivism” and “moral interpretivism.”

We will argue for a conception of ISR compatible with “moral interpretivism” where sporting eligibility should be judged by reference to rational principles regarding the nature and purpose of international sport and in particular the principle that sporting representatives should share in the national identity of the country he or she represents.

We then go on to identify and clarify how the complex interaction between sport, international representation and national identity can be informed by standards of appraisal grounded in moral interpretivism.

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David Howe

Paralympism: ideology and praxis within Paralympic Athletics

Paralympism is an ideology celebrated by the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) that has been developed in an attempt to establish a universal ethos that extends beyond the Paralympic Games in much the same manner that Olympism has transcended the more established Olympic Games. Whereas a lack of coherence between the ideology of Olympism, a product of the late nineteenth century, and the logistical and moral issues associated with the act of organising and competing in the Olympic Games is understandable one would expect more continuity between Paralympism and the practice undertaken by those involved with the Paralympic Games because of the relative youth of the concept. This paper highlights that adherence to Paralympism is not straightforward for the IPC.

While Paralympism has a degree of virtue on a global scale its conceptualisation does not stand up to scrutiny at the level of sporting practice. In particular this paper will ask whether those working within Paralympic athletics, who control the structure of competition, through the process and production of classification, are acting in the best interests of the athletes. The motto of the IPC is 'empower, inspire and achieve' and yet key ethical decisions are made by officials who are not members of the Paralympic practice community. Organisations established on behalf of 'othered' groups, such as women, ethnic minorities and gay and lesbians are run by members of the community concerned. Sport for the disabled does not follow this tried and tested format. As such a strong smell of paternalism is apparent in the organisation of Paralympic athletics. Using ethnographic observations obtained as an athlete, then as an administrator and latterly as coach in the sport of athletics, this paper illuminates ethical issues that surround of the ideology of Paralympism.

Ultimately this paper asks whether empowerment can be achieved through Paralympism or is this ideology smoke screen created to hide the ethical failings of the movement.

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Leslie Howe
Finding Oneself in the Wilderness

Discussion of certain kinds of outdoor or wilderness sport (hereafter referred to as “remote sports”) has focussed on two issues: 1) the contrast between goal-oriented versus holistic experience endeavour and 2) the problematics of risk and dangerous sport. I intend to discuss both of these issues, but as a preliminary to exploring remote sport in terms of its experiential benefit. That is, I pose the question: what gain is there to the remote sportsperson that is not available in urban sport? Why climb a remote cliff-face rather than an indoor climbing wall? (Note that in “urban sport” I include many that are pursued out of doors, such as football and rowing, and much of alpine skiing; “urban” here implies a highly organised and social sport structure, one that includes facilities, organisation of the competitive situation, etc.)

With respect to 1), the rejection of goal-directed activity in favour of more process-oriented views may in some instances be motivated by a further preference for environmental, often deep-ecological, perspectives on wilderness activities versus more anthropocentric leisure-oriented use attitudes. Where the latter is operative, individuals venture to remote areas to use what is there for the sake of recreation and distraction from everyday urban concerns; in the former, the remote environment is seen as having a value in its own right that one is privileged to experience and to learn to share in as a potentially destructive but otherwise relatively insignificant component. Different sorts of remote sport activity reflect one or the other of these fundamental orientations, and may (as in ecotourism) implicate both.

With respect to 2), Russell, for one, argues that dangerous sport gives one an opportunity for a particular kind of self affirmation. While this may well be so, we need to understand how or whether this is effected in remote sport and whether this is a function of sport or simply dangerous activity. If risk is good, why exactly is it good, and is it always good? If the answer to the last question is “no” it may be that what is valued in risky sport is not risk at all.

A difficulty that attends the assessment of experiential or ontological benefit to the sportsperson of remote versus urban activity is that, depending upon the framework invoked in assessing the nature and value of the environment within which the activity is pursued and of the activity itself within that environment, different benefits not only will be expected to, but very often *will* accrue. This is not to defend a complete, but only a mitigated, relativism. Benefit may be relative to the framework and value-set adopted, but these frameworks and values are themselves open to criticism. For example, some attitudes to the environment are not defensible, and some self projects are delusional or gratuitously destructive. It may be that the value of remote (and urban) sport must be weighed against such larger overall concerns.

Leslie Howe

Stephen Howell and Mike McNamee

Sports talk:

Public consultation in the development of community sports policy in the UK

The call for public involvement in the development of sport and all other public service policy is a continuing demand of Government (Audit Commission, 2005; HMSO, 2006). This paper explores the feasibility of publicly accountable community sports policy. At least two obstacles present themselves to policy makers and national governing bodies of sports: first; the difficulties of developing a sports policy which in some way reflects the will of relevantly affected populations who are appropriately informed; and secondly, that all sports policy have due regard for issues of social justice in sports provision over and above their own interests.

Following Habermas's (1991) and Taylor's (1995) accounts of what constitutes 'public opinion' we critically evaluate the political ideal of publicly accountable sports policy. Despite the apparent ubiquity of public engagement in debates on sport, a small number of elite sports dominates public discourse. These debates are typically unconcerned with issues of social justice. Drawing on empirical research, we argue that the debate is merely the expression of subjective opinions at individual and collective levels, and fails to give rise to genuine 'public opinion' understood as a common space or mind emerging from rational and critical debate via a wide variety of media and face-to-face encounters.

One characteristic of 'public opinion' is that it exists independently beyond the state and therefore has a normative value to which governments should listen (Taylor, 1995).

Whether the modernising agenda of local government, particularly the introduction of Local Strategic Partnerships and Local Area Agreements (DETR, 2001), together with the introduction of the Delivery System for Sport and the development of Community Sports Networks (Sport England, 2004, 2006) are genuinely capable of providing a rational and critical debate on sports policy is contestable. A need persists, then, to bridge the gap between how sports policy ought to be developed and the extant limitations presented by 'public opinion'. (Howell and McNamee, 2004).

We sketch here a response to government aspirations for publicly accountable sports policy and give ethical justification to the idea via communitarian criteria. At the same time we raise concerns over the feasibility of eliciting genuine 'public opinion' and explore a range of strategies to ensuring the legitimacy of sports policy in the absence of such debates.

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Audit Commission, (2005) 'Audit Commission Key Lines of Enquiry for Service Inspections: Culture', UK: Audit Commission.

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Ivo Jirásek
Labyrinth as a challenge to wander

The idea of a Labyrinth is a symbol of something unnoticed and mazy. Historical considerations of labyrinths take us into Cretan form of maze building. In this paper, I would like offer a different meaning of this symbol – as a challenge to wander. I set out this alternative inspired by the picture of labyrinth in thinking of Czech philosopher from 17th century, John Amos Comenius.

In his book *Labyrinth of the world and paradise of heart* we are brought to consider the labyrinth in the same way as the world in general. And this identification completely changes the meaning: Labyrinth is not only something difficult and dark, but becomes an invitation to search the world through the wandering and traveling. Likewise tourism is the very habitual way of getting to know the world. Nevertheless, we can conceive completely different ways of hiking from wandering to pilgrimages. The aim of the paper is to use the metaphor of labyrinth in this more open and positive way, and to account for some important differences of these activities and the different life styles they partly comprise.

Ivo Jirásek

Carwyn Jones and Scott Fleming
Restoring the ‘Moral Balance’: Enforcers, ‘hard men’ and referees.

Shields and Bredemeier (1995) drawing upon Haan’s (1978) interactional theory of morality identify the central importance of “the moral balance” and its achievement through “moral dialogue”. Achieving moral balance, it is argued, is the *raison d’être* of our moral interactions, and we aim to achieve this through negotiation, compromise, discussion argument, i.e., a process of moral dialogue. Moral balance according to Shields and Bredemeier (1995, p. 120) is a “...situation-specific agreement that subjectively equalizes the parties in terms of rights, obligations, privileges, and the general give-and-take of the relationship”. Competitive sport, however, provides a unique set of conditions (rules, officials, zero sum game, gratuitous logic- or a form of ‘bracketed morality’) which sets certain constraints on the process of dialogue.

Under these conditions there have been a long line of players (variously referred to as enforcers or hard men) who have exercised certain particularly aggressive or violent means to set the tone of the moral dialogue or restore the moral balance. By distributing summary forms of justice these players, it is argued, have kept an acceptable level of fairness within games by warning, punishing and intimidating wrongdoers that escape the law. Rightly or wrongly, such players are accepted, tolerated and even celebrated within the respective *ethoi* of their sport.

In this paper we interrogate further this phenomenon from both a normative ethical perspective and a moral psychological perspective. Firstly we argue that although various means of re-negotiating the moral balance within games is widely accepted there must be limits. Secondly we argue that moral action in this situation is complex and involves perception, cognition, emotion and action. The ‘enforcers’ are characteristically in the role for the ‘executioner’ qualities they have, rather than for being an impartial judge and a fair jury. They are, therefore, not always best qualified to restore balance.

Finally we argue that good officials that not only have a sound knowledge of the rules and laws but have a ‘feel’ for the game and the players are often best placed to ensure that, so far as possible moral balance in games is maintained, and if disturbed, restored legally and safely.

Carwyn Jones and Scott Fleming

Kutte Jönsson

What Is the Point of Fair Play? - On Masculinity, Technology and the Ethics and Ideologies of Sporting Bodies and Performances

With the birth of modern sport in the 19th century, sports were used to foster the new elite. With the democratisation of sport, the norms and ideals of the elite became the norms and ideals for other social classes. The concept of fair play played a central role in the reproduction of masculine hierarchies. Historically, the concept of fair play is not class- and gender neutral.

Fair play may play an important part in legitimating masculinized sports culture; in order not to discredit sport in general, athletes have to enact within accepted rules (R.W. Connell, *Masculinities*, 1995).

It is easy to say that fair play is a morally and ideologically disciplinary concept. But the principle is leaking in various ways. The leakage can take the form of non-legal violence between athletes; or, as “pretend injuries” on the pitch; or, in the use of illegal performance-enhancing drugs. Many would consider these examples as threats to traditional sport ideals. But they can also be understood as examples of (perhaps unintentional) “resistance” against the governing norms of fair play. On the other hand, for example non-legal violence can be seen as a confirmation of organised masculine violence and doping can be seen as a reinforcement of physical enhancement and as a foundation for athletic excellence. In other words, non-legal violence as well as doping can be seen as caricatures of already accepted sport norms. In fact, the so called threats against sport may very well confirm the logic of sport. Still, “purists” would perhaps say that fair play is under threat of being drained of its moral status.

So what is the value of fair play? Or, what kind of values is supposed to be protected by the fair play principle? Obviously, the principle is negotiable. The flexibility of the principle may imply that athletes, referees and spectators must assimilate cultural awareness of the context in which the competition occurs.

In my paper I will argue that the principle of fair play is mainly a disciplinary concept, which (a) reproduces conservative and ideologically masculine values, and (b) inhibits the development of sport.

Sporting bodies and sport performances are a combination of body techniques and other kinds of technologies. As a form of moral regulation, the fair play principle sets the rules for how to act with the body, with respect for the game and fellow competitors.

But the legitimization of the norms of fair play may be challenged by the fact that it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between “body” and “mind”. This fictional distinction may in fact be dissolved the harder it gets to draw distinctions between “human” and “machine”, technology and moral agency, and internal and external goals in sport. And this, in turn, can inhibit the development in sport and make the original concept of fair play obsolete.

So, what is the point of fair play?

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Jerzy Kosiewicz
Considerations on Aggression in Sport

Maybe sport, by giving vent to the drive for movement activity, neutralises the need of aggression in everyday life and facilitates benign behaviours out of sport. Maybe necessity or possibility of aggressive behaviour in sport stimulates and increases general aggression, conviction of one's own superiority and the need of demonstrating it.

Regardless of the fact if sport facilitates relieving motivations for aggressive behaviours out of sport or if it stimulates them, it is indisputable that such behaviours are present in sport. It refers not only to achievement-oriented, Olympic or professional sport, but also to mass sport, common sport, school sport, amateur sport and to many other forms of sport-for-all.

Aggression appearing in sport concerns first of all the very athletes behaving towards each other – that is, towards opponents - in an aggressive way, as well as the social milieu connected with sport and especially fans.

In my paper I focus my attention first of all on aggressive behaviours in achievement-oriented (Olympic, professional) sport, as well as on fans' behaviours accompanying the sports spectacle.

Aggression in sport – considering the issue from the viewpoint of regulations of particular sports – may be necessary (that is, instrumental) or non-instrumental (that is, potential in that sense that it enables expression of emotions which are not provided by regulations. It is necessary when aggressive behaviours result from regulations of a given sport. It refers, among others, to such combat sports like boxing, judo or wrestling. Competitors who avoid fighting and who do not manifest aggressive behaviours in that field are induced to manifest them and – if it does not bring results – are punished by referees and, as a last resort, sent off.

The second form of aggression is non-instrumental and unpredictable aggression of emotional basis. It has reactive, angry character and it heads for inflicting harm. It is not stimulated by regulations of a given sport. Quite the opposite – it is limited and punished by them. A boxing fight for a championship between Tyson and Holyfield may serve here as an example. When both boxers violently bashed each other with powerful blows doing it according to the regulations, they demonstrated instrumental and necessary aggression, in spite of the fact that particular elements of the technique and tactics of the fight might not be necessary.

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Lev Kreft : Drama in Theatre and in Sport

Anthony D. Buckley's article »Aristotle and Cricket: Drama in Retrospect«, extending discussion initiated by F. Keenan in »The Athletic Contest as a 'Tragic' Form of Art« concludes that »although not a work of art, a token game is likely to have an orderly unity with the form of Aristotle's 'complex drama'«. At the same time, David Osipovich addressed the question »What is a Theatrical Performance?« extending discussion initiated by symposium on »Staging Interpretations« from 2001 where David Z. Saltz, James R. Hamilton and Noël Carroll discussed opposed interpretational and historical theories of theatrical performance. Osipovich claims, contrary to interpretational theories, that »the performance has its own aesthetic identity, separate from the play.«

There are important historical differences between ancient Greek and modern Olympic games, and not less important historical differences between Greek Dionysian festivals, including tragedy among other elements, and contemporary theater. Traditional modern, already non-Aristotelian theories of theatrical event are now again contested by postmodern theories of theatre, which can be called performance theories. These, on the first sight, seem to be more »sport-friendly« than those insisting on interpretation of text. While (as Keenan's and Buckley's articles prove) an examination of sport games with Aristotle's instruments is still valuable, a question arises: can contemporary discussion on the ontology of theatrical performance give some grounds for another, non-Aristotelian but still fruitful approach to ontology of modern sport games? And, can we proceed from contemporary theatre and its theory, in connection with sport, to another artistic field, that of performance art? To reach at least a preliminary conclusion, I will examine Noël Carroll's characterizations of performance.

This approach will be also an opportunity to touch more general question: should aesthetics of sport start from *the beautiful*, or concentrate on sport's *performative theatricality*?

Lev Kreft

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Irena Martínková:
Quality versus Quantity in Movement Activities

Quality is generally preferred over quantity. However, in terms of praxis, quality has often already been replaced by quantity. Thus, for example, when speaking about the quality of life, movement or health, it is not usually quality that is considered, but rather the quantity. This is seen in the studies in which, for example, life expectancy becomes a criterion for the “quality” of life. Similarly, in movement activities, it is quite popular to measure various movement tasks in movement activities and then consider them as a sign of the quality of life (for example the popular measuring of the number of steps one takes during the day or counting other tasks of physical activity). But during this measuring, quality, which should be the central topic, is often overlooked in the present mania of measuring (Guttmann, 2004)

Therefore, when relating quality to movement, it is important first to realize what movement is and what it involves, and then to look what it means in qualitative terms. Movement is usually considered from a very narrow perspective, emerging from the dualistic Cartesian account. In such a view the human being is the “whole” of the body and the mind; the body is material and unintelligent while the mind is immaterial and intelligent.

Moreover, in this view human movement is only physical and mechanical. This movement then can be measured. But if we understand human being from the perspective of the philosophy of existence, in which the human being is existence (Heidegger, 2001), or even more radically, the human being is movement (Patočka, 1998), the situation will differ. In fact, when we consider the human being to be movement, then quality of life equals quality of movement. In accordance with this perspective, our understandings of human movement, quality of life and of human health all change.

Under this view there are many “new” aspects which come into play and in this complexity measuring is left out of the question; since for measuring, things always have to be simplified. However, this complexity can be reflected upon and through it the human conduct can be influenced. It is the aim of this paper to reflect upon this richer, qualitative appreciation of movement.

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Mike McNamee

**Ethical issues regarding human enhancement technologies:
Therapy, Enhancement and the traditional goals of medicine in sport**

In this paper I want to challenge some of the more liberal positions taken in respect of human enhancements in sport (eg Miah, 2004; 2005; Tamburrini, 2000; 2005; 2006). It is considered by some that more recent accounts of medicine's aims go legitimately beyond therapy and that the work of sports medicine, under such a description, can usefully serve the enhancement efforts of athletes in sports. I challenge this position on three grounds; (i) the idea of enhancement and the efficacy of therapy – enhancement distinction (cf Parens, 1998; Resnick, 2000); (ii) why the non-injured or healthy athlete should not be viewed as a patient; and (iii) an account of the proper ends of elite sports. I conclude that despite our fears that the agencies of prohibited enhancement are always likely to be one step behind the opportunistic athlete and support team, the ideals that they represent are nonetheless worth striving for.

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Stephen Mumford
Virtue and Vice in Sport

Can the watching of sport be in any way edifying? Or is it pure dumb entertainment for the masses?

I will argue that in the watching of sport can, among many other things, contribute to our moral education primarily through the reflection it can prompt in us on virtue and vice.

The argument for this claim has two main stages. First, sport itself is understood as a contest of virtues. Virtues and vices are dispositions for positive and negative outcomes respectively. The competitor that trains the hardest, has the most respect for their opponent, has the greatest mental focus, etc. is the one who is disposed to win, though they need not always win. The competitor who cheats, is overconfident or lazy, is disposed to lose, though they need not always lose.

Second, our moral education comes from consideration of particular cases. Sport, in setting up artificial contests of virtue, is ideally suited to playing this educative role with respect to its observers. This will be discussed with reference to McFee's notion of the moral laboratory and Dancy's particularism.

There are, however, limitations. A number of other factors, which have little or nothing to do with virtue, can sway a particular sporting contest. A particular competitor may just have an excess or natural strength or ability. Even in such cases, however, moral lessons can be gained. Virtue tends to improve performance irrespective of natural ability and even natural ability can be defeated through the competitors own vices.

This framework permits abstraction and generalization. Starting from experiences of particular cases, one can abstract from them a structure of virtue and vice. This same structure can then be applied to other cases and life situations, outside of sport. While the same abstraction can be gained from other, non-sporting contexts, sports are particularly well suited to the role. Like some works of fiction, they set up artificial tests of the virtue.

Stephen Mumford

Jim Parry

Supplements – food or dope?

This paper discusses conceptual and ethical aspects of the use of supplements in sport.

‘Foods’ are nutriment – things that nourish us. A food is something taken in order to maintain life, health or growth. Difficulty with this: to maintain life at what level? To assist health or growth to what degree? Can all my needs be met just by foodstuffs? And what are my ‘needs’?

‘Supplement’ is an incomplete term (supplementing what?), and also ambiguous, meaning both:

- (a) Something added to supply a deficiency
- (b) An auxiliary means, an aid

‘Drug’ has a number of general meanings, which often become confused:

- any medicinal substance
- an opiate or narcotic
- a third ‘modern’ sense recognizes the increased use of ‘social’ or ‘recreational’ drugs
- a further use in sport emphasizes the performance-enhancing qualities of the substance.

In the sense of food-supplements, athletes *must* take supplements. They need to supplement a ‘normal’ food intake in order to support their extra activity.

In the case of enhancement-supplements, athletes *should* take supplements. It is their duty to be at their best, and to be as well-prepared as possible for competition.

So what are the issues?

1. Dope or Supplement?

If some supplements perform the same function as some banned substances, why are they not banned, too?

2. Health or Performance?

Some substances are recommended for health reasons, and some entirely for performance enhancement. Is there an ethical difference?

3. Supplement Efficacy

- a. Efficacy - do they work?*
- b. Efficacy - how do they work?*
- c. Efficacy - quality of substance*

4. Placebo effect

5. Contamination

- a. Deliberate contamination*
- b. Accidental contamination*

6. Strict liability rules (and the application of other anti-doping arguments to supplements)

7. Problems:

- a. Combined effects*
- b. Athlete Motivation*
- c. Quality of Substance: Safety and Athlete Protection*

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Gregory Platchias
Olympism and the Olympic Games:
Two Contradictory Goals of the Olympic Movement

In this paper, I argue that there is a conflict between the anthropological ideal of Olympism and the philosophy of the Olympic Games. The philosophy of life that lies in the heart of Olympism amounts to the overall development of the individual. The ultimate goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man. On the other hand, the Olympic Games are a one-dimensional systematic attempt, which instead of promoting the overall development of the individual, focuses exclusively on reaching the limits of human performance through training and hard effort. However, the harmonious development of the individual and the preparation for physical feats (or mental feats for that matter) cannot go together. These are contradictory goals.

This being so, the goal of the Olympic Games contradicts the goal and the spirit of Olympism. The upshot is that the goal of the Olympic Movement is to act in accordance with the Olympic spirit (which is taken to be the essence of Olympism) and at the same time it 'reaches its peak with the bringing together of the world's athletes at the Olympic Games' (*Olympic Chapter*, § 4). It becomes then evident that the mission of the Olympic Movement is to accomplish contradictory goals (or to represent two contradictory ethical outlooks) and therefore the Olympic Movement cannot at the same time promote both Olympism and the Olympic Games. The one-dimensional pursuit of the gold medal in the Games at all costs and the anthropological ideal of Olympism cannot go together.

I conclude by suggesting that we should stop associating Olympism with performance-enhancing drugs and extremities such as the one-dimensional pursuit of the gold medal in the Games at all costs. This simply doesn't fit with the philosophy of Olympism. While the Olympic Games are related with performance-enhancing drugs for instance, Olympism is not. Peptide hormones, such as growth hormone and genetic doping with erythropoietin are the results of the high competitive level of the Olympic Games and not of the idea of the harmonious development of the individual that lies in the heart of Olympism. The root of the problem of doping is neither the drugs themselves or the athletes nor their coaches and their supporting teams. The root of the problem of doping is the Games themselves.

However, this is not to mean that there's something intrinsically wrong with the Games. Whether or how the Games should be developed remains to be discussed. One thing though is clear: the Games have nothing to do with the philosophy of life that lies in the heart of Olympism and they must be kept distinct.

Emily Ryall

Defining the Human (II): Separating mind & body, and avoiding category mistakes

Gaining clarity in what it is to be human is valuable in that it enables a greater awareness of what can be considered reasonable judgments and expectations as to what humans, as individuals and as a collective, are able to do. This has implications for the concept of sport in terms of its value, purpose and utility. Implicit within this are questions as to how an (idealised) conception of sport can be manifested, in areas such as; the acceptability of performance enhancing aids (the scope of which ranges from nutritional advice, coaching techniques, psychological assistance, developments in manufacturing and design of equipment, to doping methods and genetic manipulation, amongst others), the underlying acceptance of the logic of quantifiable progress (in the perception that human achievement will be continuously improved), and the way in which athletes are regarded and subsequently treated.

The thesis that this paper aims to propose is that the traditional conception of the human (and consequently the athlete) is one that perpetuates a dualism between mind and body. Such a conception stems from being misdirected by language. This encourages a category mistake (as elucidated by Ryle in his *Concept of Mind*) in believing that the term 'mind' is of the same logical type as the term 'body'. Such misdirection and the consequent dualistic picture of the human has implications upon the way in which expectations of human capabilities are formed and behaviour is driven. An example of such dualistic imagery is given by the metaphor of BODY AS MACHINE which encourages the body to be viewed as a vehicle for the self which can be used, manipulated and altered without effect on the being residing within it. This paper will elaborate these arguments by alluding to the work of Ryle, Rorty and Heidegger and conclude that accepting such a dualistic picture of the human is ultimately detrimental to our understanding of sport and the treatment of athletes within it.

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Baris Sentuna: Genetically modified athletes: a story of philosophical parenting

This paper has four major parts. The first part is based on Miah's philosophy in "Genetically Modified Athletes". This part underlines the main philosophical discussion and justifications raised by Miah on genetical modification and future of sports in general which is important in the sense that; it serves a justification for any possible interventions in athletes' behaviours.

The second part of this paper deals with the father of Miah in a philosophical or (scholarly) sense, schematically presenting Fukuyama's philosophy in general who to apply and find justification to Hegel's thesis. His thesis of end of history, applied to American way of thinking and justification. "The End of History and the Last Man". I contend that Miah applies just this perspective to sports in the form of "genetic modification".

Part three is based on Derrida who shares with Fukuyama a common interest in Hegel. Yet Derrida could be named as an anti Fukuyamian. In his books he not only criticizes Fukuyama, also runs comical lines about him and his philosophy. Derrida points out how Fukuyama misread (or never read) Hegel, how he has misunderstood and misused the end of history thesis and how American's cannot be the ultimate source of rationality. All of this is done in his very interesting deconstructionist fashion. Whether the arguments raised by Derrida applicable to Miah's philosophy is considered in this part.

Finally, based on those perspectives, the paper deals with alternative views to Miah's "genetic modification" and his perspective on sports in general, taking into consideration the above insights from both Fukuyama and Derrida.

Baris Sentuna

Gabriela Tymowski

Moral Progress, interest conflicts and the ethical treatment of animals in sport

Scant attention has been paid by sport philosophers to the ethical treatment of animals in sport which includes activities such as “sport” hunting, greyhound and horse racing, and rodeo. Despite being sentient creatures capable of experiencing many of, if not all, the same feelings as humans—such as pain and suffering, and pleasure—animals continue to be used and abused in sport, and to have their interests abrogated. It would seem that while certain populations have been recognized as being vulnerable to harm and in need of protection, the interests and sanctity of animals, particularly in sport, have been overlooked or ignored.

Ethical standards are not fixed, but have changed over time and vary between communities and cultures. Some traditions that existed in the past are decried in today’s world in many western, liberal democracies. For example, in today’s world child labour, human trafficking and slavery are decried and even outlawed in developed countries and much of the rest of the world. In the past, these activities were commonplace and socially accepted, even enshrined in law. That such practices were changed and are now eschewed speaks to a society’s realization and acceptance that those practices were contrary to the interests of individuals and communities. Of course, the interests of some may have been served by those practices, such as slave owners, but the practices whereby vulnerable individuals were exploited and abused were identified as being bad for society in general.

This paper will argue that for the sake of moral progress, interest conflicts between humans and animals need to be examined so as to support the ethical treatment of animals in sport.

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Margaret Whitehead

Squaring the circle - Women, Physical Literacy and Western Patriarchal Culture

The paper is designed to make a particular contribution to the debate regarding the way western patriarchal culture has been instrumental in creating a situation in which women are devalued and viewed in many ways as inferior to men. Women are predominantly cast in the role of objects, very often at the behest of men. The views of de Beauvoir (1949) and Young (1990) are considered briefly and their somewhat dualistic leanings questioned. A monist perspective is then introduced as a backdrop to look again at the situation in which women find themselves. Paying particular attention to the significance of the embodied dimension in the life experiences of women, the paper moves to outline a goal to which women can aspire and ways in which this end can be worked towards. Central to this discussion will be the concept of physical literacy and problems and opportunities in respect of developing this attribute in women.

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