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Tim Anstiss

The Positive Psychology of Sport

The domain of the emerging discipline of Positive Psychology includes the study of positive emotional states (joy, hope, flow, contentment, etc), lives that go well, human strengths and resilience, and institutions that foster and enable the same.

Sport is one of those institutions - having the capacity to help people flourish or thrive and achieve the desired state of eudaimonia. In this presentation, Dr Tim Anstiss will provide a rapid overview of the field of positive psychology before listing known and potential pathways via which sport can help people flourish as human beings.

But sport has a dark side, and a second list of negative outcomes will be shared. Links will be made to the lists of virtues and vices from Buddhism and Stoicism.

Presenter: Tim Anstiss
Tim is a physician, a former international athlete (pole vault and decathlon) and a quarter-finalist on Gladiators. He is a level 1 rugby coach, a part-time lecturer at Thames Valley University, an ageing rugby forward (Maidenhead 4ths) and a popular public speaker. He has Buddhist and Stoic tendencies.
Ask Vest Christiansen

The quest for the ideal body, respect and recognition

Department of Sport Science, Aarhus University, Denmark.

This paper highlights the importance of recognition, respect and honour in the creation of identity in young men, who train 4+ times a week in gyms. The focus thus is not on elite athletes, but on people who dedicate most of their free time to hard training, strict diet and potentially harmful substances. The analysis is based on a combination of qualitative research interviews with young men who have experience with weight training and use of particular anabolic steroids (AS), and the sociological and philosophical literature on respect and recognition. The paper has an exploratory nature. It is work in progress.

The men’s goal is to build a muscular body – a masculine ideal. Although it is a popular myth that it is a person’s inner self that is of crucial importance for their success, people demonstrate, by their practical sense and the artefacts they acquire in their struggle for a place in the social and cultural hierarchy, that the exterior is essential. It is a central tenet from Pierre Bourdieu that the downside of the ordinary is that it is worth nothing if everyone has it. That which has value must be uncommon to allow for social distinction.

This also applies to the body. The prospect of social distinction thus gives meaning to the quest for the ideal body. But the possibility to acquire respect and recognition for what you do and the opportunity to create a social identity are also key elements in the pursuit of the ideal body.

It is this study’s hypothesis that in order to understand the impetuses that can make young men include the use of AS in their training regimen, recognition (Hegel, Honneth) is a better theoretical key than the human pursuit of happiness (Freud), security (Hobbes), or self-actualization (Maslow). The decisive battle thus is not a struggle for wealth, but a struggle for respect from others.

The concluding section of this the paper will also examine honour and the logic of competition for this prominent body cultural practice.
Andrew Bloodworth

Performance Enhancements and Sandel’s Case Against Perfectionism

A range of arguments has been offered against the use of medical technologies as performance enhancements in sport and beyond. I examine Sandel’s Case Against Perfectionism, and in particular his critique of the liberal position offered in Habermas’ (2003) opposition to certain technologies.

Sandel questions whether opposition to certain forms of enhancement and genetic intervention can ‘rest on liberal terms alone’ (Sandel, 2007: 80). Is this ‘richer’ ethics of enhancement, proposed (although in differing accounts) by the likes of Sandel (2007) and Kass (2003), required? What are the implications of this extension? This initial foray into these areas will briefly consider issues such as the extent to which philosophy can offer expertise in such matters, as well as the role (if any) of growing empirical research on attitudes toward performance enhancement in sport.

References


Towards a Taxonomy of Sport

In this paper I take steps towards presenting a taxonomy of sports, which I believe is needed if we are to think of sports with regard to various philosophical questions. I argue that all the sports that involve some sort of physical activity can be divided into three main categories: measurement sports, aesthetic sports and constructive-destructive sports.

The defining feature of measurement sports is that winning a singular competition is settled by reference to a measurement: who ran fastest, who jumped highest, who threw longest, who lifted heaviest, etc. Another feature of measurement sports is that the sport activity could, in principle, be done independently of other competitors. How fast you run, how high you jump, how long you throw, how heavy you lift, etc., are not directly a result of the other competitors’ performance. Examples of measurement sports are athletics or track and field, weightlifting, etc.

The defining feature of aesthetic sports is that winning a singular competition is settled by reference to some aesthetic standard with regard to the performance of the movements that constitute the sport. As with measurement sports, the sport activity could, in principle, be done independently of other competitors. How well you perform on, let us say, the balance beam, is not directly a result of the other competitors’ performance. Examples of aesthetic sports are gymnastics, figure skating, etc.

The defining feature of constructive-destructive sports is that winning a singular competition is settled by reference to a conventionally decided way to count the score of the competition or by one of the competitors being unable to continue the competition. Another feature of constructive-destructive sports is that the sport activity could not be done without the other competitor. How well you perform, let us say, in an ice-hockey match is, in part, a consequence of the other competitor or opponent’s performance. The reason for this is that constructive-destructive sports are dual in nature. One part of the sport consists in constructing, creating or inventing chances that lead to scoring goals, points, etc., while the other part of the sports consists in destroying, preventing or hindering the other competitor or opponent’s opportunity to score goals, points, etc. Examples of constructive-destructive sports are association football, ice-hockey, etc.

I show how various sports fall into each category, while I also point out that these categories are not mutually exclusive. Ski jumping, for example, is both a measurement sport and, at the same time, an aesthetic sport. I also show that sports that belong exclusively to one of the categories may still contain elements from the other categories. Road cycling, for example, is a measurement sport, but the way it is performed today clearly contains elements from constructive-destructive sports, as when competitors actively try to prevent other cyclists from performing as well as they could.
Nick Caddick  
**Challenging Epistemological Assumptions and Research in Sport Psychology**

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A rich history of empirical science has undoubtedly influenced the epistemological positions and research decisions made by sport psychologists. However, application to the human realm of the methods and assumptions used to study the natural world has been criticised within the discipline (e.g., Martens, 1987). As argued by philosophers such as Peter Winch (1958/2008), human action and behaviour is associated with motive, reason, and meaning. Since these concepts are inherently subjective and open to interpretation, empirical investigation into the nature of these aspects of the human condition appears to be based on some misguided assumptions. In this way, quantitative research can be seen to de-contextualise the sporting world into arbitrary metrics such as significance levels and effect sizes.

Empirical science appears to be logically incompatible when applied to investigate various human and sporting phenomena. Rather, the study of subjective meanings seems to be facilitated most by methods such as existential phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and narrative inquiry. In contradiction to familiar physiological/behaviouristic approaches to sport psychology, these methods escape the mechanistic and reductionistic tendencies of empirical science (Fahlberg et al., 1992).

Although a greater diversification of methods is evident in sport psychology today, a distinct positivistic influence is still apparent in much of the available research. As suggested by Winch, it may be far more appropriate for social scientists (such as sport psychologists) to consider their discipline from a more philosophical and subjective viewpoint. In this way, a fascination with the term ‘science’ might no longer continue to constrain the types of research and knowledge produced within sport psychology.

**References:**

Gideon Calder

“Mr Best, where did it all go wrong?” - Coaching, ethics and character

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Recently, England football captain John Terry was relieved of this role after allegations emerged of an affair with the then-girlfriend of his team-mate and friend, Wayne Bridge. This, said the pundits, gave England’s coach Fabio Capello a difficult decision, in a World Cup year and with a settled, recently successful side: should he sack his captain? The Football Association stressed that Capello’s decision would be taken “on footballing, rather than moral grounds”. Capello duly decided, without much apparent fuss. This, according to the press consensus, was a mark of decisive, venerable leadership.

But what are “footballing grounds”, exactly? Can they indeed – in this case, or others – be cleanly distinguished from moral ones? Most commentators acknowledge that to coach is, in some respects and to some extent, to coach character – and that the nature of character is not such that what is conducive to sporting success is an isolated part of the wider substance of the self. But just how much of the lives of the coached (their minds, bodies, habits, foibles) is how much of the coach’s business? Anecdotal research suggests an ambivalence in answers to these questions. Ask a coach whether they can make decisions on purely sporting grounds, and typically they’ll say yes. Ask them whether they feel responsibility for the lives of their charges beyond sport, and they’ll also say yes. Does this ambivalence matter for the philosophy of coaching?

In this paper, I will argue that it does, and that a broadly Aristotelian “take” on ethics provides the most fertile basis on which to tackle it. Rather than exceptional or peripheral, the questions raised above help define the very thing which coaching is, at least as it is best understood: a kind of promotion of “living well”, where what counts as flourishing crosses over between what might otherwise be regarded as separate realms, with separate roles attached.

When, famously, a hotel waiter asked of George Best (in bed with Miss World and festooned with casino winnings) “Where did it all go wrong?”, he captured something important about ethics, and about the ethics of coaching in particular. Coaching is never a “purely” sporting matter. Neither in terms of its object, or its results, can there be easy, firm boundaries between sporting and other aspects of life. But this raises complex questions, about paternalism, power, consent and the nature of coaching influence, both within and beyond the immediate context of the sport in question. It raises questions too about the nature and scope of codes of ethical practice within professions.

These questions, I will argue, will be addressed most coherently and adequately in ways which resist what Alasdair MacIntyre has identified as the compartmentalising tendencies of contemporary morality. The cases of Best and Terry are exceptional in a sense, of course – but they are also, in terms of coaching ethics, complicatedly run-of-the-mill.
Chad Carlson

Restricted Free Agency: Words on the Ambiguous Agency in Play

Meier has claimed that, in play, “man is most fully his own master.” With this statement he argues that humans are the central if not the only agent in play. He says that play is voluntary. We choose when and where we will and will not play. In his view, humans are fully in control and have autonomous power when at play.

Kretchmar has made a different claim. While acknowledging the human agency in play that Meier previously mentioned, he has also argued that there must be “a sufficient play-invitation” from the world for true play to occur. This lessens the primacy of human agency and adds a non-human element to the agency of play.

With these differing claims we can begin to see that there is ambiguous agency in play. In fact, some authors have specifically argued that play is an ambiguous phenomenon. What are its causes? Is it uncaused? What are its influences? Is it un-influential? These and other questions about the ambiguous agency in play will be the topic of this presentation.

In this paper, I will revisit authors who have previously written on the agency in play such as Meier, Kretchmar, Ellis, James, Peirce, and others. These writers have come to various conclusions that have perpetuated the ambiguity. Some have argued for human agency as the causative factor. Others claim that non-human agency is not only necessary but also the prime influence. Still others have argued for strict agnosticism on the topic, saying that we cannot know what causes play.

Following this review of the existing literature, I will offer arguments on how to more clearly determine the agency in play. I will argue that there is some human agency in play and that there is some non-human agency in play. That is, we have some say in our play but there is also a part of it that is out of our control. As natural “players,” we can predict our play to a large extent. We know the locations and activities in which we most often find play.

However, the non-human agency in play makes it largely uncertain. At times the world cooperates and offers us play-attractors. At other times the world provides play-inhibitors that shorten our play times or keep us from play. At still other times the world overpowers us with play-destroyers that essentially prohibit us from playing.

As I describe the nuanced agency in play, I will both expand on the role of human agency and offer a deeper description of the three ways in which there is non-human agency: play-attractors, play-inhibitors, and play-destroyers. An explanation of human agency and the three types of non-human agents will further clarify the role of each in the ambiguous causality in play.
Leon Culbertson

‘Progress’ and Performance-enhancement

The notion of progress appears to be central to performance-enhancement in particular and human enhancement more generally. Loland (2000) has drawn attention to the logic of quantifiable progress that dominates record sports, but it could be argued that we tend to have a picture of progress in mind (not literally) when we admire most elite sporting performances, not simply those involving quantification. Equally, a picture of progress seems to accompany much of our thought on medical matters, bodily aesthetics, intellectual capacity and societal and political change. A particular picture of progress appears to have a central role in much of our thought on many important matters, yet the concept itself is rarely given much attention. A lot has been written about what kinds of things might constitute progress (technological innovations or changes to societies), but little has been written about the concept of progress itself.

It would be easy here to ask ‘what is progress?’ Wittgenstein would have regarded that question (critically) as a metaphysical question. This paper will argue that posing the ‘what is …’ question here would be unwise, leading only to the pursuit of a philosophical illusion. Instead, the paper will consider a range of different ways that we tend to use the term ‘progress’ in everyday language. The paper will show that the term is regularly used in many different ways to draw a number of contrasts and therefore does not have a univocal meaning, as the dominant picture of progress tends to lead us to assume. The paper will then argue that it is necessary to pay close attention to appropriateness of use in specific contexts, and that failure to do so can lead us astray in thinking about important questions regarding the use of medical technology and social and political change.

The paper focuses on arguments in favour of the use of medical technology to assist performance-enhancement in sport, suggesting that many such arguments employ an inappropriate conception of progress for the specific context of their use. This, it is argued, leads to confused reasoning and erroneous conclusions.
Most discussion of research ethics is properly about
(a) the tricky nuances of voluntariness, informed consent and confidentiality in the recruitment and
treatment of participants, and
(b) the final adequacy of this toolkit.

The discourse is naturally slanted towards researcher treatment of the participant. But it seems to offer insufficient resource for consideration of participant questioning of the researcher that the latter might find compromising to himself or to the data collection.

This paper considers a real-life episode in which a researcher collecting qualitative data on football fan identity was asked by a participant interviewee which team he supports. The researcher finessed his away around the question, without stating any falsehoods. A Virtue Ethics defence of this response, turning on the virtue of honesty alongside participant entitlement, is then proposed.

A powerful counter-argument, ‘situational’ in flavour, is then offered. It is a fair participant assumption that the researcher is interested in football and follows a team. The culture of fandom is one of open allegiance. Therefore, the researcher should sincerely and willingly answer the participant’s question, perhaps when the interview is over (or scrap interviews with football fans). This argument is strengthened by the importance of researcher-participant rapport.

It is then argued that the counter-argument is itself defective, for reasons which are also fairly considered situational. By considering analogies with the Samaritan, the counsellor and the doctor, it is argued that the researcher in this case inhabits a precisely defined context that legitimates suspension of the typical reciprocal openness. The twin concepts of role-identity and mode of self-presentation are key to each case. The researcher (like the participant) inhabits a role that allows him to limit his self-presentations. We are regularly and reasonably precious about the contexts in which we disclose even public facts of our identities (consider a schoolteacher asked by a pupil in class if he is married or attached). The professional or quasi-professional research context legitimates researcher protectiveness about what he considers significant elements of himself, even when these elements are continuous with the research subject area and partake of a culture that is typically open.

The paper proposes that the honest character dislikes practising economy with the truth, even when that is in fact an honest thing to do. He regrets that the situation is such. The treatment therefore concludes by contemplating what, if anything, the researcher relevantly situated might do to pre-empt participant questions of the kind illustrated. In Aristotelian spirit, doing things in the right way is perhaps morally pivotal.
This paper will introduce the concept of ‘movement rights’, and will categorise these as third generation, collective rights, on a par with the right to a healthy environment, the right to natural resources and the right to physical space.

It will be argued that progression from high modernity to a second enlightenment will necessarily entail a developing focus on third generation, collective rights, and positive as well as negative freedoms. This will involve not just protection from negative risk but an entitlement to positive freedoms and rights such as movement rights linked to movement intelligence, positive risk, trust, autonomy and human becoming, flourishing or personhood. It will demonstrate the way in which this links closely to an evaluation of the distribution of risk, both structural and individual, macro and micro, and positive and negative, and consider the implications of this for movement and sport.

Developing movement intelligence and rights, in turn demands an examination of the physical social and cultural space devoted to movement and sport, and necessitates a renewed focus on establishing hierarchies of value in relation to movement and sport activities. The ultimate logic of this is that the current focus on discrete facilities for health and elite movement and sport activities, with high levels of protection from risk, would give way to landscapes and facilities for universal development of movement intelligence involving high levels of positive freedom and positive risk resulting in real hedonism, movement and sport, and autonomy.
Tim Elcombe

The Citizenship Turn for More Ethical Sport

Sport continues to wrestle with ethical challenges and its moral worth in twenty-first century society. Many view sport as an organic context for the development of individual character, source of communal pride, and wellspring of inspiration. At the same time, sport notoriously falls prey to corrupting external forces, leaving it riddled with instances of moral ambiguity.

Defenders often mobilize broad concepts such as “fair play” and “sportspersonship” to protect sport from an immoral (or amoral) abyss. These traditional approaches, however, are narrow, passive, static, disengaged, and in the end, ineffectual. For instance, conceptions of both fair play and sportspersonship start with the assumption sports exist as a special or independent realm from the rest of life. Furthermore, both overemphasize a one-sided focus in terms of the source of ethical responsibility – fair play on institutional codes and sportspersonship on individual character. As the history of sport continues to reveal, these long-standing dominant approaches to sport ethics have failed – to the point where philosopher John Russell compellingly questioned the conduciveness of sport to cultivate moral development at the 2009 IAPS conference in Seattle.

Making the “citizenship turn”, in contrast, holds greater promise for more ethical sport and for sport to enhance its moral place in larger society. This turn begins with the adoption of a “thick normative account of sport” similar to the one outlined by Sigmund Loland at the recent IAPS conference – an account that sees sport as part of a larger societal whole. From this starting point, appropriating the work of pragmatic philosophers including John Dewey and William James will give substance to the evolution of a citizenship approach to sport ethics. For example, Dewey’s notions of democracy and community, as well as James’s conception of ‘The More’ will be employed to bolster both the critique of current sport ethics education paradigms as well as the efficacy of the proposed citizenship approach to sport.

Taking a citizenship approach to sport ethics requires a complete revisioning of sport and its place in culture. Consequently, such a turn would require an involved, long-term commitment by those with a vested interest in more ethical sport. The upshot of such a transformation, however, would be well worth it. A citizenship approach to sport could address such fundamentally problematic issues in sport including cheating, role modeling, athletic retirement, violence, and the athlete’s existence, to name but a few.

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Ladies of Besiktas: A Dismantling of Male Hegemony at the İnönü Stadium

Istanbul Bilgi University

Founded by four friends in 2006, the fan group “Ladies of Besiktas”, now has hundreds of active members and representatives in almost all Turkish cities as well as in Germany and Japan. On the official Facebook group page their mission is listed as reconciling three seemingly contradictory concepts of “women”, “football” and “fandom” in Turkey and refusing to fall behind men in any respect, including in the ability to support their team in the stadium rather than “in the safety of their home” and to talk football. They go to Besiktas’ İnönü Stadium dressed in identical black and white scarves and jackets and blow whistles to mute the male fans who use foul language.

This chapter will elaborate on the emergence of the fan group Ladies of Besiktas and its effect on the disruption of gender norms in Turkey. The group not only managed to end male hegemony in the İnönü Stadium but also, through public appearances and TV, web and print interviews, managed to challenge stereotypes among football fans. In forums, members thank the founders for no longer being ridiculed or called names for their interest in and love of football. Groups like Ladies of Beşiktaş can help promote equality in and outside the stadium for female football fans in Turkey.

1 One of the three big football clubs in Turkey.
Jeff Fry

Change Your Coach, Change Your Brain?

Neuroplasticity and the Neuroethics of Coaching

In his book Social Intelligence: The Revolutionary New Science of Human Relationships (Bantam Books, 2007, p. 5), author Daniel Goleman writes that “our relationships mold not just our experience but our biology” through a “brain-to-brain link.” It is the case, says Goleman, that “we create one another.”

This paper explores, in particular, the moral responsibilities of coaches given the emerging knowledge about the brain. Presently attention is being paid to the role that sport plays in producing brain traumas (consider football and American football). For example, the role of American football in producing concussions has recently drawn special attention. But might sport be changing our brains in other, less easily detectable, ways as well, and might coaches be playing a prominent role in this regard? Neuroscientists have devoted energies to mapping the neural correlates of reported experiences. These correlations raise some important, perennial, metaphysical issues (for example, correlation does not necessarily entail identity, or causation). Nevertheless, there are at least some potential ethical issues that are raised by these correlations. What if coaches are having more than a momentary influence on the developing brains of youths, and perhaps even the more fully developed brains of adults? What are coaches’ responsibilities given recent claims about neuroplasticity? What relevance does “social neuroscience” have for thinking about a neuroethics of coaching?

There is evidence of an all-too-widespread, implicit mind-body dualism in our approach to sports (“sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me”) that may have lasting and sober consequences. If coaches are changing the brains of athletes under their charge, what responsibilities does this entail? Should coaches pursue this in a purposeful, paternalistic way, or should they perhaps attempt merely to do no harm? What relevance might emerging neuroscience have for coaches thinking about such matters?
It is increasingly acknowledged in both the academic literature and in professional practice that there is an important moral dimension to the practice of sports coaching (Hardman, Jones & Jones, 2010; Drewe, 1999). Whether understood primarily as an instrumental vehicle towards improved performance, or as an end in itself, the ethical climate of sporting environments receive widespread attention from stakeholders both inside and outside sports practices and their institutions (Fasting & Brackenridge, 2009).

Much attention in academe has focused on articulating and examining the underpinning moral principles and theoretical frameworks which might better inform an understanding of the ethical dimensions of sports coaching practice. Often, however, such efforts have been divorced from, or unrelated to how coaches might actually embed a moral outlook to their coaching practice. The result is that (morally) good coaching practice is mainly recognised at either an abstract or intuitive level, but locating with precision, confidence, consistency and clarity manifestations of morally admirable coaching interaction that are emblematic of wholesome practice remain elusive. Furthermore, if exemplary coaching moments occur, it remains difficult to capture their essence in a way that might inform the development of a moral framework for future pedagogic practice and professional development.

More recently, a number of moral philosophers have focused on articulating the complex factors which combine in the performance of moral behaviour. In particular and in part as a response to earlier work by Kohlbergian-tending moral rationalist, writers such as Flanagan (2009), Gilligan (1992) and Dancy (2004), have highlighted that morality is multifaceted, situational, particular and above all else extremely demanding. Their work suggests that ethical action is made up of a number of inter-related elements including moral reasoning, moral action and moral reflection.

In this paper we offer an alternative approach to the development, implementation and evaluation of coaching ethics. It takes as its point of departure the notion that sports coaching is to be understood as a domain of practical knowledge which is further constituted by concepts of Greek origin namely techne, which is a form of productive knowledge and phronesis, which is translated as practical wisdom (Rorty, 1980).

To illustrate how practical knowledge in the ethics in sports coaching might be developed we critically evaluate an experimental study conducted with an elite level sports coach. The focus in this paper will be on the methodological issues encountered in the development and implementation of the study and whether such an approach might provide benefits for coach education programmes.

References
Pavel Hlavinka

Spiritual aspects of games and sports in relation to leisure time

This paper is an analysis of the game from spiritual and ethical aspects, based on the phenomenological approach of Martin Heidegger and Medard Boss. On the basis of their philosophical conception of freedom I define the existential character of leisure time as the field of authentic self-realization, similar to the way it is treated by the humanistic psychology of Abraham Maslow.

After an analysis of leisure time, there follows a phenomenological analysis of the characteristics of a game from the perspective of its link with the ethical issues of holiness, fair play, experience of pleasure and “Gelassenheit” (accommodating reception).

As the basis for a morally and spiritually oriented approach to games I propose three elements:

(a) The idea of “supportive contact with the self-realization of the rival”. A spiritual approach to the game is not based on a rational calculus or on the Kantian imperative of moral duty. One should be guided by what could be called intuition about the mood of the person, the event and the place. In other words: always respect and be responsibly open toward the phenomena encountered in the game, which in our opinion is the natural phenomenological maximum.

(b) Another essential feature of moral and spiritual dimension of the game is the “dissolution of egoism”. This requires the abandoning of a manipulative approach to the external world but at the same time it requires careful attention to the defence of the place of the touch of the feeling of happiness in the human self. This rare place arises from the relation between the urgency of and the accommodating reception of what already is here and now. Permanent attention to our interlinking with the transcendental consciousness exceeding our small self gives prevalence to a positive acceptance of the language of fate, which can be learnt in the game of life rather than from textbooks, instructions and regulations. Textbooks and external norms give certainty to Cartesian rational orderliness, invite an analytical dissection of the past, encourage active planning and produce the regal feeling of moral judgment.

(c) Ethical norms are understood as a “projection of unconditional love” into the world of the multiple and the differentiated. Ethics is seen as a set of philosophical theories dealing with morals, that is, judgments distinguishing between the good and the evil. So now we think that morality is something within which we could meet in some way, within a particular ethical conception, the assumed criteria of morally good acting. The game, which can dissolve egoism, is a manifestation of morality and spirituality.
Peter M. Hopsicker and Doug Hochstetler

Runners and Joggers, Cyclists and Riders: Phenomenological Differences between Competitive and Recreational Endurance Athletes.

Peter M. Hopsicker, Penn State Altoona
Doug Hochstetler, Penn State Lehigh Valley.

Pearl Izumi’s recent advertising campaign has stoked an age-old debate in the endurance athletics community. The athletic performance clothing and footwear manufacturer’s ad, titled “We are Not Joggers,” highlights several differences between “runners” – those who compete – and “joggers” – those who do not compete. Through this advertising ploy, Pearl Izumi blatantly divides the endurance athletics community into two groups: hard-core, driven, focused, rugged, pain-embracing competitors and soft, half-hearted, watered-down, lackluster, domesticated, pain-avoiding “finishers.”

While Pearl Izumi’s ad focuses on runners, the same bifurcation in the cycling community – between “cyclists” and “riders” – can be made. Cyclists ride purposefully focusing on goals and finishing first. Cyclists do not go out for “rides.” They seek to suffer and those who do not accept the pain lead, as one Belgian cyclist describes it, a lifestyle so “empty” that it is “shocking.” Riders, on the other hand, have no appetite for pacelines and pelotons. As one French cyclist admits, riders need the bike – the freedom, joy, and sensuous experience “more than they need victories.”

Debates at past sport philosophy conferences have skirted these contrasting perspectives. Runners and cyclists seem to project an attitude that there is something inferior about the jogger or rider. In contrast, joggers and riders point out the elitism and pretentiousness of the single-minded runner or cyclist. While these positions are somewhat useful in distinguishing the intentions between highly competitive and recreational athletes, there has been no philosophical critique of these often-assumed platforms. Are these positions valid? Are the differences between runners and cyclists and joggers and riders this profound and obvious?

The purpose of this presentation is to critically examine the validity of these positions. Specifically, we will phenomenologically examine the differences between those who race and those who only seek to finish endurance sporting events. Grounded in the works of Merleau-Ponty, Sudnow and other philosophers and utilizing first-person evidence from the endurance running and cycling community, we will attempt to reveal the experiential differences between runners and cyclists and joggers and riders. Dividing the presentation into three parts, we will focus on the intentions, attitudes and experiences of endurance athletes participating in the lead group, the middle of the pack, and those “falling off the back.” From this examination, a philosophically grounded comparison between runners and cyclists and joggers and riders will be presented. Outcomes will reveal not only thematic similarities and differences between these three segments within a race, but also will also reveal similarities and differences between the perceived different factions of the endurance athletics community.
Leslie Howe

High Performance Sport and the Rational Amateur

Are the lives of professional and elite athletes worthy of emulation? The suitability of prominent athletes as role models is often questioned in light of the bad behaviour of some either away from or on the field of play. Of greater concern, though, are revelations such as André Agassi’s admission in his autobiography that he didn’t actually like tennis and those in a recent CBC fifth estate documentary detailing the devastating after effects of player careers in North American football (depression, dementia, and life expectancy reduction of 20 years). These raise more poignant questions regarding the rationality of athlete participation in high performance sport and, by extension, the suitability of such athletes for emulation.

This paper considers the case against high performance sport (HPS), using this term to encompass professional sport and elite “amateur” sport, including Olympic level and elite youth sport aimed at producing professional or national and international level athletes. I consider HPS in relation to definitions of sport as serious play and as the pursuit of excellence. I shall argue that HPS, in its pursuit of excellence, where this is defined in terms of objectively quantifiable results rather than activity-process, treats the athlete body as teleological instrument, thereby reversing the activity-agent relation. The consequence is that sport exists not for the player but the player for the sport. This conception of the relation of player/athlete to sport facilitates the disappropriation of the player/athlete’s body for the realisation of the aims of others. More crucially, the requirement of total commitment on the part of the player/athlete is interpreted in terms of a total identification which is highly destructive: on the one hand, participation is a project that may be fairly characterised in terms of bad faith and, on the other, defeat, injury, or retirement risk loss of identity.

In view of these concerns, I argue that HPS as presently practised is in many respects an irrational project on the grounds that it is inconsistent with constitutive sport ideals, which cannot be achieved under conditions of totalising identification. Athletes and players can indeed do great things under these conditions but what they do is not sport.

Finally, I shall argue that an amateurist ideal, while historically elitist, might now be reconceived in contrast to professional and modern professional amateur sport as both rational and democratic.
Emanuel Hurych

Qualitative and Quantitative Forms of Self-competition

This paper considers the problem of self-competition as a very specific and controversial type of competition. It suggests distinguishing between qualitative and quantitative forms of self-competition, both of them as specific different forms of competition within one individual person.

This basis of the problem was inspired by the article On Competing Against Oneself (Howe, 2008). Howe is engaged with the motive of competition which she calls “self competition”. She disagrees with Krein (2007), who argues that we cannot speak about self-competition within adventure therapy because of the absence of competitors and the lack of repeatable measure of performance.

As a consequence of this question this paper aims to find the relation between self-competition and individual challenge on one hand, and the phenomenon of experience on the other hand. The term qualitative self-competition is suggested here and the differences between qualitative/quantitative will be explained. This will be accompanied by some concrete examples from the area of movement activities.

The possibility of measuring the performance is, according to Krein (2007), the most important condition for competing. The question is where the borders of objective measurements are. When we compare athletics (results in metres and seconds) and gymnastics, or figure skating (points given by jury), there is a big difference in the objectivity of measurements. Self-competition, that means competition within oneself, is based on the accepting of a challenge. It could be a very important motive for a person to reach a chosen point and to prepare for it.

I use an example from the sport I do and enjoy – triathlon. The dream of nearly every triathlete is to participate in the most prestigious race of the world – The Ironman in Hawaii. For the majority of the people (besides the elite racers) it is much more important to finish the race than to defeat other competitors. If the racers are well prepared, they have got higher aims, like to break the barrier of twelve, eleven, or ten hours. This is a normal situation. A few racers will set their own goal to finish the race in the top thousand competitors, but the majority will only target themselves just to complete the event.

On the other hand, the time does not say anything about the effort they had to make during the race. There is no information here about their feelings in the water, or on the bikes. The time does not say anything about the training, about the will of each of them, about how many people helped them and what things they had to give up on their way to the dream.

All of these things could be included in the term ‘qualitative self-competition’. It is focused on the means of the activity, while quantitative self-competition is aimed at the result of it. Some things can be measured, but they are only very small pieces of information. They are technical measures, and don’t say anything about the person.
The aim of the paper is to show the complexity of the relationship between experience and competitive motives in general. The other goal is to introduce the term ‘qualitative self-competition’, as a phenomenon closely connected with experience. While qualitative self-competition is of course also very closely connected with the result of the activity and level of the performance, qualitative self-competition is much more focused on the process and depth of the experience.

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Deconstructing Sport: When Philosophy and Education Meet in Derrida’s Thought

The French deconstructionist philosopher Jacques Derrida, recognized as one of the greatest thinkers of our century, was in his youth, during World War II and before beginning his career as a philosopher, a footballer who liked playing this game with his friends or other people. In a 1991 interview, when he was 60, Derrida narrated this childhood dream of becoming a professional football player, confiding that all of his philosophy and thought had been inspired by sport and the game of football.

Starting from this biographical interview, the aim of this study is to demonstrate, first of all, how Derrida’s whole philosophy and technique of deconstruction really has its roots in the concept of sport. The French-Algerian philosopher understood sport as a cultural structure based on the concepts of play, game, body, rules, and all of the oppositional pairs deriving from différance and from the tensions it generates.

Secondly, the study will try to show how sport is for Derrida a metaphor of life and its meaning, suspended between being and nothingness; a place and a field in which the human beings act, learn and educate themselves, deconstructing, as in a text, values and prejudices of their lives and understanding, through sport itself, their roles and responsibility toward themselves and the community in which they live.

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Pain and suffering are authentic parts of sport. However, the paper looks for the meaning of these phenomena.

Agon (an old Greek word for fighting, or competition) is a transcultural element in any society. The original war agon was transformed into sport agon. If we look at ancient writings, we can see the brutality of descriptions of war agon. What kinds of pain and suffering can be seen in sport agon? It can be a sign of a strong regime and way of living; a sign of best performance; an authentic part of sport; or a loss of sport authenticity (injury).

Loland (2006) shows some possible approaches to the study of pain in sport: as physical phenomenon, as cultural and social construction, and as meaningful phenomenon. Phenomenology understands death as a horizon of our living (human being is “being towards death”), so we can think also about death in the sport environment as a horizon of pain in sport. Could death as the effect of sport activity be a sign of the authenticity of sport? There are more and more deaths at playing fields these days. Isn’t this a boundary of professional sport and a sign of its crisis?
Carwyn Jones
Drunken Role Models - rescuing our sporting exemplars

It is often claimed that elite professional athletes are role models and as such have certain duties to behave in morally appropriate ways. The argument is that given their influential status and influence, they should be good examples rather than bad ones.

In relation to alcohol consumption and the problematic behaviours associated with excessive consumption, many professional athletes are bad role models. They consume too much and behave badly. Drawing on neo Aristotelian insights I argue the following.

First, persons who exhibit good character and virtues like self control are preferable to those who exemplify vice like recklessness and selfishness in general and in relation to alcohol consumption in particular. To exhibit virtue is both good in itself and preferable from a moral education perspective. In other words it is better to exemplify virtue in front of others who may follow the example.

Second, acting well and becoming the right sort is notoriously difficult and the moral atmosphere or the ethos of the culture in which virtue plays out has a significant impact. It is important therefore to include the ethos of sporting practice in any proposed reform of drinking behaviour such that tolerance and tacit promotion of masculine drinking practices is eschewed in favour of responsible and considerate consumption.

Finally I argue that we must cultivate the proper virtue of emulation so that people who are admired or esteemed (sporting heroes) by young people in particular are not copied blindly. In other words it is important to cultivate a critical capacity to recognise worthy role models and to avoid identifying with unworthy characters, practices and vices. Part of this process is to highlight proper and worthy role models inside and outside of sport.

In conclusion, I believe that although bad role models are grabbing the headlines in relation to problematic drinking practices, there are good role models in sport who should be lauded as exemplars of good character living a worthwhile sporting life. Such characters can show those inside and outside the practice community a more responsible and considerate approach to alcohol.
Jerzy Kosiewicz

Sport – Beyond Moral Good and Evil

Sport is – and should be – an amoral phenomenon (not to be confused with an immoral one); that is, a phenomenon which is completely independent from ethics, except possibly of deontological ethics, which concerns those who have professional obligations towards their employers and other persons who are provided with and are influenced by their services.

Conduct according to rules of a given sport has no moral character. It has only a pragmatic character, similar to conduct in compliance with principles of an administrative code, the civil code or the penal code. Of course, when one acts in accordance with the rules of sports rivalry one can additionally also realize other aims – like, for example, aesthetic, spectacular or moral ones. However, in each case, rules of the game and legal norms have priority, because they are the most important regulative determinants of conduct in various societies, including variously defined human teams.

The above-mentioned legal and sports regulations are not moral norms. They can, however, influence moral behaviours if they are in conflict with the law or rules of the game. From this viewpoint, moral norms are ex-territorial in their relation to the assumptions and rules of a particular sport. Contestants, and people responsible for them – like, for example, coaches or sports officials – as well as their employers, are neither required to account for their moral beliefs, nor for their moral behaviours, if only they act in compliance with the rules of sports rivalry.

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Lev Kreft

Lost in Translation: Heidegger and Slovenian Ski Jumping

Heidegger brought out his non-concept Gelassenheit after WW2; its meaning remains uncertain and controversial, with some roots in the medieval mysticism of Meister Eckhardt, in truth understood as aletheia, and in Heidegger’s enthusiasm for Oriental philosophy. It has been translated in English as releasement, to demonstrate that it is something different from simple relaxedness, and from more scientific relaxation. In Slovenian, however, it has been translated as sproščenost, which is parallel to English relaxedness, thus producing hybridity of denotation in-between relaxedness, relaxation and releasement.

This hybridity was (ab)used for a political slogan of the 2004 elections when Heidegger’s term was repeated on and on, finally entering popular discourse as well as other domains such as economy, culture, and media. This phenomenon was examined by Boris Vezjak in The Relaxed Ideology of Slovenes. On the Political Implications of the Philosopheme “Relaxedness” (The Peace Institute, Ljubljana 2007). Relaxedness entered sport jargon as well, but Vezjak’s study did not enter into this field of research. However, the public life of this term was short, with one exception - in ski jumping, it became one of the main notions used to explain what is missing from Slovenian ski jumping during the period 2004-2009.

In my paper, I will present the reasons for such unprecedented populist use of Heidegger and the popularity of this term in Slovenian ski jumping. For the latter, I will start from an examination of ski jumping discourse used in the Slovenian sport daily Ekipa (Team), during the period from November 2004 to March 2009. This will expose what results we may get by an inoculation of kinesiological mechanism and psychological technique with philosophical mysticism.

Literature:


Ekipa (Slovenian sport daily), issues from November 2004 to March 2009
Teresa Lacerda\textsuperscript{2,3}

From Ode to Sport to contemporary aesthetic categories of sport.
Strength considered as an aesthetic category

The mentor of the Modern Olympic Games situated sport and art in a very special place in education and considered the two domains were related. Art and sport were of such importance to Pierre de Coubertin that he conceived that they ought to be together in the Olympic Games, and from 1912 to 1948 the Olympic Art Contests took place simultaneously with the sports competitions. He participated in 1912 contest, in the category of literature, with the distinguished Ode to Sport, whereby he enhances sport’s values. This paper is focused in the second part of the elegy, the one concerning beauty.

Starting with “O Sport, you are Beauty!”, Pierre de Coubertin mentions, beyond beauty, an assemblage of aesthetic categories such as sublime, abject, balance, proportion, harmony, rhythm and grace. He also mentions strength, power and suppleness. Although the first quoted categories are general categories of aesthetics, it seems quite relevant to emphasize the need of the author to introduce specific categories that fits to body movement and sport, such as strength, power and suppleness. There is no doubt that the first group of categories also fits to sport and body movement, but it equally fits to different forms of art, while strength, power and suppleness can only be applied to sport and performance arts (such as theatre and dance, activities where the body is the main protagonist, as in sport).

The purpose of this study is to analyze strength as an aesthetic category of sport and there will be developed some arguments to sustain this statement. The main argument is that the aesthetics of sport needs to grow and develop, not apart, but beyond the classical aesthetic categories of art.

Strength has been for long one of the ex libris of sport, manifest in the third term of the Olympic lemma created by Coubertin, citius, altius, fortius. In fact, strength is never absent from sport: in its static or dynamic dimensions, through the state of resistance or speed, in absolute or relative terms, in individual or team sports, through cooperation or opposition. From the aesthetical point of view this constant presence ends up in a wideness of the aesthetic experience, improved by the plurality of situations where strength can occur or manifest itself.

In sports such as gymnastics, diving or synchronized swimming, the appreciation of strength exhibited by the athletes communicates to the observer some king of ease and lightness that enhances the aesthetic judgment. In other sports like weightlifting, boxing or rugby, effort and heaviness are stamped on the athlete’s faces, what contributes to a sort of communion between the observer and the athlete that can also improve the aesthetic experience.

In the context of sport, and like rhythm, balance or suppleness, strength can travel between the status of motor capacity and aesthetic category. This can improve the communicative power of sport, so as its emotional appeal, leading to a better understanding about its beauty.

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Brent Kious (2008) has recently attacked several arguments favouring a general anti-doping position. We show that his attack does not succeed, for a variety of reasons.

First, it uses an overly inclusive definition of doping at odds with the WADA definition which has global, if not entirely uncontroversial, currency.

Secondly, it seriously misconstrues the position it attacks, rendering the attack without force against a more balanced construal of an anti-doping position.

Thirdly, it conflates the harm reduction aspect of anti-doping with the unreasonable goal of harm elimination.

Fourthly, it makes unwarranted appeals to matters Kious considers morally ‘obvious’, while simultaneously attacking a position many others take to be equally morally ‘obvious’, namely that of anti-doping. Such an inconsistency, attacking and appealing to the moral status quo as befits one’s argument, is not acceptable without further qualification.

Fifthly, his position suffers from a general methodological flaw of over-reliance upon argumentation by analogy that, although intuitively appealing, ultimately fails to deliver the sought-after conclusion.

These issues are symptomatic of a more fundamental problem: any attempt at providing a blanket solution to the question of whether doping is morally acceptable or not, is bound to run up against problems when applied to highly specified contexts. Thus, rather than reaching any specific conclusion for or against doping in this article, we conclude that an increased sensitivity to context will result in a more even-handed appraisal of arguments on the matter.

References

Irena Martínková

Two Concepts of the Human Body

Based on phenomenology, mainly the early philosophy of Martin Heidegger, I shall introduce two different ways of understanding the human body, which are usually presented under the phrases ‘I have a Body’ and ‘I am a Body’.

The phrase ‘I have a Body’ will be connected to the understanding of the body as an object, as is seen for example in the philosophy of Descartes or sciences as well as in Heidegger’s concept of presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit).

On the other hand, the phrase ‘I am a Body’ will include two different understandings of lived corporeality: the body as an instrument, which the human being uses to fulfil his/her needs and aims (this understanding will arise from Heidegger’s famous analyses of an instrument and readiness-to-hand - Zuhandenheit), while the second understanding of the lived human body will arise from Heidegger’s concept of authenticity.

References


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Philosophy of Japanese rugby: Tetsunosuke Onishi’s ‘fighting ethics’ in rugby

The Japanese rugby union team toured Wales to play a test against Walsh national side in 1983. The test was played at the National Stadium in Cardiff Arms Park on 2 October. Japan gave Wales a fright in losing by only a five-point margin 24-29. Japan adopted the strategy that used a lot of signals to be able to pass a ball. It was Tetsunosuke Ōnishi who was a professor of Waseda University who established this strategy. He was a coach of considerable achievements and has been described as a Japanese Carwyn James. As a leader of rugby in Japan, he researched the method to defeat foreign teams, because it was difficult for the Japanese fifteen to beat foreign teams whose players had advantages in their physique over Japanese players.

Ōnishi not only coached rugby but also educated his students through sport activity as a university professor. He especially valued sport ethics, as a result of his experience in playing and coaching rugby. Also, his experience of being sent to the front during the Second World War gave a major impact to his educational thoughts about sport. He inquired into the essence of sport through rugby and insisted on an educational meaning of sport against the background of his experience at war.

The present study clarifies the sport philosophy of Ōnishi who was a distinguished theoretician of rugby in Japan. He did not adjust philosophical theories to sport phenomena. Rather, his sport philosophy was invented from his sport experience. We deliberate the educational thoughts of Ōnishi, focusing our attention on his concept of fighting ethics, and refer to the social function of his sport education. These points under discussion are considered in the light of his experience both in rugby and at war.

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Takayuki Hata, Nagasaki University
Robert Mertzman

Applied Ethics in Sport Related Higher Education in the United States

Many colleges and universities in the United States maintain that they have an obligation to ensure that students in sport related subjects master the skills of applied ethics before taking their place in society working with athletes and the public. They maintain that (1) students should be made aware of common ethical difficulties that arise in the practice of their profession (2) students should be made aware of methods for recognizing ethical issues in their profession and (3) students should know how to manage ethical problems of common and novel origin when confronting them in the workplace.

By sport related higher education I am referring to departments in colleges and universities in the United States that are devoted to some or all of the following: sport management, physical education, kinesiology, sports medicine, exercise science, athletic teams and wellness. Such studies may be undertaken in schools of education, arts and science, medicine, or business.

By applied ethics, I am referring to educational and training programs designed to help practitioners in specific fields to apply moral and ethical concepts to events in their professional lives.

Sport related higher education has a wide variety of approaches to applied ethics ranging from no requirements at all to sport related programs built entirely around principles of applied ethics. Academic programs that teach applied ethics often utilize one of the following two common approaches: (1) a module/day/lesson on applied ethics distributed throughout most classes taken in the academic program or (2) a specific class or classes within the program that address applied ethics issues.

In this paper I present data on how academic programs teach applied ethics in their profession. I examine the two common approaches to teaching applied ethics mentioned above and inquire into how each method may be evaluated for effectiveness. While both approaches have benefits and liabilities, both approaches suffer from flaws in execution.

I conclude with a proposed method for sports related academic departments to evaluate their success in teaching applied ethics. I believe this method of evaluation would show that many institutions in the U.S. inadequately address applied ethics in their curriculum. Significant changes are necessary for colleges and universities to meet their goal of preparing students for the ethical challenges in their professions.

I hope to engage participants in the exploration of these issues and in solutions to the problems. I am looking for insights in how institutions in the U.K and on the continent teach applied ethics in sports related programs.

Robert Mertzman, C.Ph.,

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Verner Møller  
**Elite sport – education to deception?**

In 2007 Danish cyclist, Michael Rasmussen, was suspended from the Tour de France after it was found out that he had lied about his whereabouts in the month prior to the start of the race. At a press conference in November 2007 he publicly admitted he had provided false information to the International Cycling Union and gave marital problems as the reason for his act. As a result of his confession the UCI requested the cycling union of Monaco, which had issued him his riders’ licence, to open disciplinary proceedings against him.

These proceedings eventually led to a two-year ban for “evading sample collection” and “tampering with doping control”. Paradoxically, if he had stuck with his lie, there would have been no basis in the cycling regulations to penalise him. Inspired by the Michael Rasmussen case this paper will explore the relationship between elite sport and deception.

It is well known that (almost) everybody occasionally lies (Knox et al 1993). It is equally well established that lies are generally condemned. As Benjamin Constant pointed out, Kant’s categorical imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”, appears to imply that even a person who is asked by a murderer where his target is, holds an obligation not to deceive him.

Constant’s objection to Kant’s deontology seems to have a strong ally in common sense. Most will probably assess that a person who was aware that his neighbour hid Jews in his basement acted in a morally commendable manner when, questioned by SS-troops, he/she denied any knowledge of Jews in the neighbourhood.

In light of the in situ acceptability of some instances of deception, the paper will
1) Present a typology of deception reaching from clearly acceptable (valued lies) to completely unacceptable (despicable lies).
2) Use this typology to analyse examples of deception in sport.
3) Discuss to what extend if at all elite sport value and thus educate to deceit.
Dr. Arno Müller, Bielefeld University (Germany)

Health, sports and the art of life –
A critical view on German health education programs in the context of P.E. lessons

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“The processes of structural and cultural change in our society have also made their way into our schools, presenting new challenges that require them to redefine their educational mandate. The old approaches to promoting health in schools need rethinking as well. It is increasingly clear that the ‘health-promoting schools’ model developed in the early 1990s in response to criticism of the largely ineffective traditional health curriculum is not up to the challenge.”

Several health education initiatives for German school children now presuppose that sports (in general) is an excellent tool for health promotion. In their view health is often regarded as the key component to lead a satisfying life. “Health is not everything. But everything is nothing without health” seems to be their slogan (a well known saying – which is sometimes wrongly ascribed to the German Philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer).

While it might be true for some sports that they have a positive effect on the individual’s health, it can hardly be denied that, firstly, high performance sports is not a healthy business at all and, secondly, that individuals might prioritise other options than health. Having said that, I would argue to support people in leading an autonomous life, rather focusing on a normative concept like “health”.

Encouraging individuals to be aware of the authorship of their own life is a main aspect of the philosophy of the art of life (lat. ars vivendi) which consists of two subsets, firstly the art of dying and secondly the art of loving (lat. ars armandi). While in earlier papers presented at BPSA conferences I focused on the first aspect only, I will now address the philosophy of the art of life in its broader meaning, i.e. nothing less than the question of ‘how to lead a good life’? and what can sport contribute/not contribute towards achieving this?

Jim Parry

The Youth Olympic Games – some ethical considerations

This paper presents some of the principles underlying the YOG, and some of the practical challenges in implementing them.

Regarding the sports programme, issues to be examined will include:

- Participation and equality of opportunity
- Selection of sports for the programme
- Age and Fairness
- Immaturity and Harm
- Talent ID and Early Specialisation
- Exploitation of Young Athletes
- Preservation of Olympic Values

Regarding sports participation, issues to be examined will include:

- Sport Rules (and their Adaptations)
- Winning
- Losing

Regarding the educational programme, issues to be examined will include:

- Educational classes
- Language differences and educational levels
- Inoculation with Olympic Education?
- Education or Indoctrination?

The paper concludes that, whilst some novel issues are thrown up by a ‘Youth’ edition of the Olympic Games, many of the issues covered simply highlight in a novel form already-existing ethical challenges for the Olympic Movement.
Tiago Pedroso de Lima
Kant, Fair-play & the ATP Tour: The Arthurs case

Using Kant’s distinction between actions from duty and actions conforming to duty but for some selfish purpose, I will claim that Australian tennis player Wayne Arthurs’ surprising action could be analyzed from a Kantian standpoint. Arthurs’ sportsmanship contributed to his first round exit in the ATP tournament at Lyon in France (November 2001). The Australian was beaten 3-6 7-5 7-6 by Israel’s Noam Okun. Arthurs granted his opponent a point at 8-8 in the tiebreak, though Okun’s shot was given out by a line judge. But is the Arthurs case a good starting point to reconsider the classical fair-play concept?

Lieke Vloet makes a very productive distinction between two main fair-play acceptations: sometimes fair-play is interpreted very broadly, in which case not only refers to honest and sportsmanlike sport practice, but also to values such as health, integration via sport or child orientation. But Vloet underlines a narrow fair-play’s definition: fair-play means simply to play sport in a fair and a sportsmanlike manner. But what is to play sport in a sportsmanlike manner? a) Fair-play means sticking to written rules (but in sport there also some unwritten rules). b) Fair-play means accepting decisions made by the referee.

Wayne Arthurs is a professional Tennis player, but he doesn’t accept the line judge’s decision. Why?

Is the Arthurs line judge decision disobedience an action from duty or does he act in conformity to duty but for some selfish purpose?

References:

Heather Reid

What Is The Nature Of The Athlete? And Why It Matters for Sport Philosophy

Among the most important metaphysical issues in sport philosophy is the question about the nature of the athlete. In general terms, it is a question about the nature of persons, and often it focuses on the relationship between mind and body.

The purpose of this paper is to survey some of sport philosophy’s past answers to this question and then to propose a re-examination of the issue in light of historical and multicultural perspectives heretofore neglected.

In his 1990 book Philosophy of Sport, Drew Hyland considered the three mind-body positions of dualism, physicalism, and phenomenology. Although dualism (immaterial mind separate from material body) has been the dominant view in Western philosophy, sports enthusiasts resist its tendency to privilege mind over body and thereby to denigrate sport as a lower form of human activity. Physicalism (mind and body as material) has more surface appeal, but tends to view human beings as machines and to neglect the less tangible aspects of sports performance, such as its spiritual and psychological significance.

Phenomenology, which focuses on the experience of the lived body, was Hyland’s preferred approach to the question for athletes. This view of a person as both mind and body, dubbed “holism” is the most popular metaphysical theory in the philosophy of sport, but it requires more in-depth discussion. What may be surprising to those who associate holism with 19th and 20th century continental philosophy (i.e. Merlau-Ponty), is that it reflects attitudes found in ancient Greek and Chinese philosophy. By adding ancient perspectives from China and Greece to the metaphysical issue of mind and body, I hope to enrich the philosophical discussion and improve our understanding not just of athletes but of sport as an enduring human practice.
Emily Ryall

Being-for-others in sport: feelings of shame and pride, contempt and respect

The basic tenet of existentialism is that we are free to create and recreate ourselves in an attempt to realise possibilities of being. However, the truth of this proposition runs up against the fact that we don’t exist as beings in isolation; but rather are involved in, what Sartre (2003) maintains is, a continual struggle for domination over others, and a resistance of others’ domination of us. When we fail in this struggle we are reduced to being regarded as an object and our possibilities of being are determined by others rather than ourselves; we find ourselves in ‘bad faith’. The manifestation of losing the struggle for dominance and allowing our being to become transcended by another can be found in the emotions of shame and pride. Equally, the struggle for dominance over another can manifest itself in contempt or respect for the other. When we win our struggle, we may view the other as an object and not as it wishes to be viewed; hence we view the other with contempt. Or, the struggle may be a worthy challenge that forces us to view the other with respect (although this in itself is a precursor to losing the struggle for transcendence).

As I have argued previously (Ryall 2008), sport seems to provide an area whereby the nature of being is intensely illuminated, for we are always aware that the meaning we ascribe to sport is arbitrarily defined and freely chosen. And yet at the same time, the nature of sport means that it is a stage on which the choices we make are wholly visible, and the emotions of pride and shame, contempt and respect (of varying degrees) are common. It is the arena whereby the struggle for dominance is acute. As such, this paper will consider whether Sartre’s notion of ‘the look’ exposes the problem of these emotions and the way we view ourselves and others in sport.

References:


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The Caster Semenya case: gender and category differences in sports competitions

Our nature wasn’t originally the same as it is now: it has changed. Firstly, there used to be three human genders, not just two - male and female- as there are nowadays. There was also a third, which was a combination of both the other two. (Plato, Symposium)

An event that occurred during the most recent Athletics World Championships (held in Berlin) raised serious questions about traditional categories of sport competition, based on gender differences.

The condition of Caster Semenya, winner of the women’s 800 metres gold medal, and a suspected hermaphrodite, raises anthropological and ethical issues which cannot be easily solved. The ‘paralysis’ of IAAF - who were unable to decide whether the athlete should be allowed to keep the gold medal or not (until medical examinations gave an answer) - is completely understandable. It is not an easy decision - taking away the medal would be viewed as insulting the dignity of hermaphrodites, whereas allowing the athlete to keep the medal would destroy traditional categories (hermaphrodites would be able to choose which category they wish to compete in and therefore their condition would be considered as nature’s gift).

Are there any criteria to establish a person’s sexual identity? Can there be cases in which male and female polarities coexist in a single individual? In which category should hermaphrodites compete? This paper wants to open a discussion but does not expect to reach univocal and universally accepted solutions. The interdisciplinary approach of this study will be supported by a multi-level analysis which includes biological-genetic levels and psychological-social levels. Starting from a description of the case, the authors will try to examine all the possible solutions, highlighting their limits, their strong points and the anthropological and ethical implications connected to them.

References:
Baris Sentuna
Transformations of “ethos”: The case of Aikido and some speculative thoughts on today’s sports

In this paper, the idea of ethos in the martial art Aikido is discussed and used to illuminate other sports.

The first part of this presentation consists of ideas regarding the concept of “ethos”. Loland and McNamee (2000) in their discussion of fair play discuss the movement from fairness ethics to virtue ethics through “ethos”. They note how much ethical discussion on sports is compressed to fairness. Since that time, other authors have articulated different ideas as to the nature of ethos in sports. Reid (2009) discusses virtues of Ancient Philosophy, while Stephens and Feezell (2004) raise the possibility of a Stoic “ethos” in the context of sportsmanship. I return to a discussion of the different concepts of “ethos” after presenting an account of the “ethos” of Aikido.

The second part of this presentation is based on the “ethos” of Aikido. Actually “ethos” of Aikido is based on the “ethical code of Samurai”. The ethical code of Samurai consists of 7 virtues. These virtues in history are transformed in the transition period of modern Japan. Yoshida Shōin is one important figure in this transformation (Huber, 1981). Shōin transferred these warrior code to the honour codes of “gentlemen” because he thinks there will be no need for warriorship as in ancient times. Morihei Ueshiba founder of Aikido was born the son of a fisherman in a very special time during this transformation. If he had been born 10 or 20 years prior to this he could not have practiced martial arts, since, in classical Japan if a son was born to a Samurai they would grow up as a Samurai; if they had been born to a fisherman then they would be brought up as a fisherman. Such is the process of social determinism in pre-modern societies. In this more open period in Japan’s history Ueshiba mastered various martial arts. After opening his Dojo he invited many martial artists to work with him. Ueshiba after a time meet with Demaguchi who was a leader of a sect known as “Omoto Kyo” whose ultimate aim was “to create peace” in the world. Synthesising Omoto Kyo teaching with the martial arts he had learned, Ueshiba at last created the martial art today known as Aikido while retaining the “ethical code of Samurai” in the sense of the honour of a “gentleman”.

The third and final part of this presentation is based on the “ethos” of modern sports and begins by asking the crucial question “Whose ‘ethos’ is present? Is it the fans or club holders or players or team? Nowadays, many footballers transfer from one club to another. We see, for example, Cristiano Ronaldo move from Manchester to Real Madrid, and Roberto Carlos from Madrid to Fenerbahçe. Is it the “ethos” that they embody simply transferable? Is the ethos of football as exemplified in Ronaldo, the ethos of Ancient Philosophers or Stoics? While we might hope that Ronaldo was a philosophy major but it seems hard in the professionalism today where they are recruited at the age of 18 or less. Likewise, is Roberto Carlos playing for Fenerbahçe the same Roberto Carlos playing for Real Madrid or is the ethos, which he embodies, context dependent? As a Fenerbahçe fan my answer is a certain No. Does this mean that, in considering the ethos of the team before and after his appearance, something is altered? In the postmodern capitalist world where one may buy anything, can one buy an “ethos”? Maybe this is not possible, yet still one may enquire whether one may instead buy the creator of a new “ethos”, maybe in the shape of a new and powerful coach such as Mourinho.
Natalie Szudy  
The Physical and the Spiritual: An Examination of Religious Requirements and Muslim Female Athletes

Some athletes pray for assistance in the game they are about to play. Others dedicate their athletic achievements to their religious beliefs. Finally, for some athletes sport is their religion. Given these multiple interpretations, how are we to navigate between the relationships of religion and sport? The plurality of intersections highlights the need for further discussion and evaluation. This is especially important when religion and sport conflict, and the tensions reverberate through the body of the athlete.

In the Euthyphro, Socrates explores the possible definitions of piety in order to further unpack the relationship between human actions and divine doctrine. Although a concrete definition of piety was not offered, the philosophical inquiry initiated in the Euthyphro provides a starting point for the examination of religious doctrine and human actions. Socrates’ argument highlights the necessity to include logical and philosophical tenants in the discussion of religious discourse. This is further supported by an argument offered by Ibn Rushd (Averroes). Rooted in the examination of logic in Islamic philosophy, Averroes argued that the integration of logic and philosophy is essential when examining Islamic religious requirements. Fundamentally, both of these approaches argue against the explicit acceptance of divine command as paramount and infallible and argue in favour of philosophical discussion of religious structures and requirements.

When considering the relationship between religious requirements and participation in sport and physical activity, the discussion of the conflicts that have occurred with some Muslim female athletes can support the examination of religious doctrine and how it can impact Muslim female embodiment. For the purpose of this analysis, I will be using the institutional structures that are an integral part of both sport and religion. The institutions of religion and sport can be loosely defined as external and internal structures that support operational rules. The relationship between religion and sport reveals a complex intersection of values and requirements that are prescribed through both religion and sport creeds, rituals, and codes of conduct. In this paper, I will explore the relationship between religious requirements and the Muslim female athletic body. I argue that the application of logical and philosophical discussion used as an analytic framework in the evaluation of religious discourse is integral in understanding the impacts of religious discourse on the embodiment of Muslim Female athletes.

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Carl Thomen

The Player of Games

The climactic scene in Iain M. Banks’ The Player of Games involves the Culture game-master Morat Gurgeh and the Emperor Nicosar battling to the death in the ultra-complex game of Azad. Despite his mastery of most game forms, Gurgeh for the first time finds himself unable to explain why he is playing the way he is, until he realizes that his own play is representative not only of his understanding of Azad’s tactical elements but also of his own world view, his ethical principles, and the values of the Culture; in short, his play displays not only his game-playing talents but also his psyche, himself. In the end, he triumphs because of this realization.

In this paper, I want to explore the link between creative self-expression and what it ultimately means to “win”. Noam Chomsky states that if “a fundamental element of human nature is the need for creative work, for creative inquiry, for free creation without the arbitrary limiting effect of coercive institutions, then, of course, it will follow that a decent society should maximize the possibilities for this fundamental human characteristic to be realized.” It could be argued that our increasingly performance-centred attitude towards sport is at odds not only with the attainment of an important metaphysical sporting value, but also with a fundamental aspect of human nature.

To support the above contention I turn first to the philosophy of Chomsky, Vizinczey and Nietzsche to explore the significance of creative self-expression for the well-lived life, before re-examining Banks’ theme in more detail and with reference to the work of Johan Huizinga in Homo Ludens.

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Can there be a moral duty to cheat?

Ethical values seem to play an important part in the conduct of sports/games, perhaps most prominently where they relate to cheating. ‘Cheating’ is of course a complex category. It may vary according to what is contravened, from the rules or laws of the sport through to what is often called the ‘spirit of the game’. It may vary too according to the type of behaviour involved, whether an act or omission, and according to the degree of advantage obtained, or at least sought. Whatever the variations, though, it seems usually to be assumed that cheating is simply wrong, in that there is nothing ethical to be said in its favour, and that thus the only relevant tasks in response are to consider any non-ethical mitigating circumstances and the appropriate punishment, if any.

In this paper I would like to consider another possibility: that there might be cases where whether or not to cheat is a genuine ethical dilemma, such that there is some (not necessarily overwhelming) moral reason in support of cheating. This inquiry, it should be said, will not involve any bizarre and carefully constructed cases of the kind where, for example, a player knows that cheating will somehow save thousands of innocent lives, but will relate to the more ordinary circumstances of sport and to the kinds of cases that have been reported and discussed over the years in the press.

More specifically, it will involve taking account of two aspects of sport. Firstly, there is the somewhat ambivalent attitude of supporters, players and the media to cheating, revealed, for example, in the idea of the ‘professional’ foul. Secondly, there is the question of what participants in team sports owe to the others involved with their team, whether as players in the same team or as its supporters. Together, I will suggest, these make plausible the possibility of a duty, on some occasions, to cheat.
Mizuho Takemura

Ethical Consideration about Property in his/her Person by others and by own self

— through prior doping practices and problems in sport competition

Doping is one of the most serious problems in sport circles. In this paper I will try to consider about the ethical problem to be found previous doping affairs that is regarded as the problem about ‘property in his/her person’ by others or by oneself.

This inquiry is related to thinking about the ground for banning for doping in sport competition.

First of all I would like to demonstrate that there are two types of doping problems through historical facts in sport competition. One is the case of the doping affair under the DDR [old East Germany] government. The other one is the case of the Ben Johnson doping affair.

After demonstrating prior doping affairs, you could realize ethical inquiries into each of these doping affairs. About former doping affair you can think about the questions that are like “is it acceptable that others or government invade his/her person/body” or “Who has the property in his/her person/body” and so on. As for latter one you can find such an inquiry that “do we have the right to the disposal of our own person/body”.

Dr. W.M. Brown indicates that there are no grounds of banning for doping logically from J.S. Mill’s theory point of view. That’s because Dr. Brown relies on the concept of individual freedom. This concept of freedom about doping problems introduced in his paper is intimately connected to the concept of the property of the human person in his/her body. I will try to consider these ethical problems the above mentioned in this paper through different kind of doping affairs in sport competition.

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